Author Archives: Wairimu Wanjau

We’ve put together a selection of readings and podcasts that we think you might enjoy in December.

READING

Yemen’s Incomplete National Dialogue: Insights on the Design and Negotiations Dynamics by Ibrahim Jalal

An analysis of Yemen’s National Dialogue, identifying a number of lessons learned and the legacy and implications of the National Dialogue for peacemaking efforts in the country going forward.

Recommended by Alex Shoebridge

All Quiet on the Western Front by Erich Maria Remarque

It is a classic on describing the horrors of war and the dangers of hyper-nationalism and propaganda. It is beautifully written and also manages to find a deep humanity in the chaos that humans can bring upon one another. It follows a young German who enthusiastically enlists in WWI and then is soon mired in the atrocity of the trenches. A story of great humanity and still extremely timely. There is also a film out on Netflix now.

Recommendation by Rainer Gude

Ideology and Mass Killing: The Radicalized Security Politics of Genocides and Deadly Atrocities by Jonathan Leader Maynard

Maynard’s book, Ideology and Mass Killing: The Neo-Ideological Motivation behind Genocide and State Terror, advances an alternative ‘neo-ideological’ perspective which systematically retheorises the key ideological foundations of large-scale violence against civilians. By combining cutting-edge research from multiple disciplines — ranging from political science and political psychology to history and sociology — to demonstrate how ideological justifications for violence shape such violence in ways that go beyond deep ideological commitment. Most disturbingly of all, the key ideological foundations of mass killings are found to lie, not in extraordinary political goals or hatreds, but in radicalized versions of those conventional, widely accepted ideas that underpin the politics of security in ordinary societies across the world.

Recommended by Nick Ross

PODCAST

Crisis Group “Hold Your Fire” Season 3, episode 12: Football and Politics in the Gulf

In honour of the self-styled Greatest Show on Earth™, Crisis Group’s “Hold Your Fire” series has an episode on Football and Politics in the Gulf. One of the respondents is Dina Esfandiary, an extremely astute observer of all-things MENA and particularly Iran (with whom I had the pleasure to work in a previous professional life).

Recommended by Alex Bramble

Into Africa (produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C.

This bi-weekly podcast discusses security, political, economic, and cultural themes that occupy the continent. An exciting and enjoyable opportunity to stay updated on and better understand the multi-faceted change that African countries are currently undergoing individually and/or collectively, including the opportunities and challenges that they are encountering.

Recommended by Philip Poppelreuter

Seeking Peace podcast

The Seeking Peace podcast, produced by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security in partnership with UN Peacekeeping and Our Secure Future, explores women’s roles in bringing lasting peace to communities—whether it be through grassroots activism, peace negotiations, journalism, politics, or as uniformed peacekeepers. The podcast has covered themes such as the role of women in negotiations , building peace , defying gender norms , leadership and allies , and more. Interviewees range from grassroots activists and peacebuilders to scholars and academics to UN officials.

Recommended by Wairimu Wanjau

Our session at GPW 2022 “Increasing militarisation and feminist foreign policy: compatible or worlds apart?” – co-organised with the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, the Government of Mexico, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the German Mission to UNOG – shared some of the growing wealth of lessons from the experiences of governmental and non-governmental actors on the opportunities and challenges of applying a feminist foreign policy lens to policymaking efforts. It included insights on how to effectively implement and amplify feminist foreign policy, and how it can serve as a tool to counter increasing militarisation and catalyse more just and inclusive policymaking.

Over the past few decades, intersectional feminist perspectives have been increasingly incorporated in academia and activism, and significant multilateral gender-sensitive normative advances have been made, notably centred around the Women, Peace and Security Agenda and UN Security Council Resolution 1325.

Yet, until more recently, policy practice was behind this curve. In 2014, Sweden became the first country to launch a feminist foreign policy (FFP), with Luxembourg following suit in 2018, and Mexico in 2020. In May 2022, the Netherlands committed to pursuing an FFP, and the new coalition government in Germany has signalled its intention to adopt an FFP and is currently defining the shape it will take. In 2017, Canada created a feminist international assistance policy, with France adopting a similar feminist foreign aid policy in 2019. An FFP moves away from the traditional foreign policy lens of hierarchical global systems, reframing security in the perspectives and well-being of marginalised and vulnerable groups.

In parallel, the world is witnessing an ever-increasing degree of militarisation. All forms of organised violence and armed conflict have risen over the past decade. In 2021, global military expenditure surpassed the two trillion US dollar mark for the first time, and despite the economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, military spending in 2021 was 0.7% higher than in 2020 and 12% higher than in 2012. The trend of heightened militarisation can be observed across multiple other domains, from policing to outer space. It has been sharply exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, – which prompted both Sweden and Finland to relinquish decades of military non-alignment and simultaneously apply to join NATO. Germany has also significantly increased military funding and agreed to arms transfers to Ukraine.

The workshop addressed whether doctrines such as FFP can help to assuage increasing militarisation, and explored whether increasing militarisation and feminist foreign policy can co-exist, both in the realm of international relations and even within individual governments’ foreign policymaking; and if so, how?

The discussion underlined how FFP can help to apply a gender lens – rooted in UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda – to conflict resolution and security challenges, such as disarmament and arms control, to minimise the harm caused by weapons, hold perpetrators accountable, help victims, and ensure that approaches to tackling security challenges address the needs of all people to build resilient and inclusive societies. It also showed that doctrines like feminist foreign policy can provide and help to promote alternative frames of reference as a counterpoint to traditional Realist IR paradigms, which are dominated by and perpetuate militarisatised narratives and frames of reference, from both a theoretical and practice-oriented perspective. This can help peacebuilders develop conceptual clarity and support their critical thinking and reflection on their work and the opportunities and challenges they face in order to contribute to sustainable peace in creative and innovative ways with a maximum level of effectiveness and impact.

Five key takeaways from the event were:

1. Feminist policymaking needs to be enacted both within and beyond borders, meaning FFP has to go hand in hand with feminist domestic policy. Coherence between domestic and foreign policy ensures not only more joined-up policymaking, but applying a feminist policymaking lens to all sectors can help societies become more inclusive and just. This does not mean that there is no room for a degree of pragmatism alongside an idealist goal; as is the case with some governments that have adopted FFP, feminist foreign policy can act as a catalyst for more gender-responsive domestic policy. The discussion also underlined the importance of countries “exporting” FFP committing to and achieving a degree of self-examination at home before carrying the torch elsewhere.

Caption: H.E. Francisca Elizabeth Méndez Escobar, Permanent Representative of Mexico to UNOG

2. At both national and international level, it is not enough for FFP to be a top-down project; it needs to be anchored in the wider societal context, with broad-based public consultations to ensure public buy-in and to collectively shape the agenda. The Swedish tradition of feminism from above and below that has defined a lot of public policy is a good example in this regard. As ever, grassroots movements are key; in the same way that women and young people drive many aspects of peacebuilding, women and youth at the grassroots level can help to apply intersectional approaches to defining domestic and foreign feminist policymaking that responds to the needs and demands of all members of society.

Caption: Annika Bergman Rosamond, Associate Professor (Docent) in Political Science and International Relations, Lund University

3. Gender equality is a fundamental part of FFP, but the doctrine goes further than that: at its heart is an intersectional approach that also addresses race, ethnicity, religion, disability, and sexual orientation. Above all FFP is about addressing unequal manifestations of power. To be a vehicle for intersectional policymaking and outcomes, FFP needs to continue to champion rights, representation, and resources. But it also needs to be more transformative and radical, going further than the “three r’s” to dovetail with other fundamental systemic transformation like adopting less extractive and exploitative economic growth models to reduce structural inequality and exclusion, and tackling climate change and reimagining our relationship with nature. In short, the three r’s should be joined by the three p’s: peace, people, and planet.

Caption: Kristina Lunz, Co-Executive Director, Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy

Africa more than anywhere has seen the use of foreign policy to advance power and acquire resources to benefit certain countries at the expense of others. Despite a first wave of decolonisation in the second half of the 20th century, the legacy of colonial foreign policy still presents a major challenge. Africa today is also still heavily influenced by external powers: it is one of the loci of the rivalry (and to some extent cooperation) between China and the US, one of the upshots of which is greater militarisation and securitisation of Africa, impelled by the war on terrorism and the need to protect vested political and economic interests. There is potentially a role for FFP to play in both counteracting militarisation in Africa and also breaking down the legacies of colonialism. But a fundamental barrier is the double standards of governments – both “exporters” and “importers” of FFP – addressing armed conflict with violence, while at the same time calling for peace. To reduce militarisation in Africa, African governments (like all governments) must first address gender inequalities inside their borders through African governments’ enactment of national plans to advance gender equality, such as 1325 National Action Plans.

Caption: Helen Kezie-Nwoha, Executive Director, Women’s International Peace Centre (WIPC, Kampala)

It is important to recognise that security without arms is not a reality that will materialise any time soon, if ever, and that – as with all political endeavours – unless the notion is backed up by tangible manifestations of political will, FFP is in danger of being just more empty rhetoric. However, FFP can help to assuage the rising trend of militarisation. It can do this in a number of ways, including by helping to diffuse tensions by furthering trust-building between more immediate neighbours, and also more broadly between the global north and global south. This needs to be based on exchanges in good faith to clarify any misconceptions around FFP and its relationship with the existing international peace and security agenda. This also means open and constructive exchanges about existing inherent contradictions, such as governments – including proponents of FFP – prioritising militarised or securitised remedies to instability and armed conflict while calling for peace. Above all, backed up by the necessary political will, FFP can be a catalyst for domestic and international policymaking with peace, people, and planet at its heart.

Last but by no means least, a big thank you to the speakers, co-organisers, our GPW virtual assistant, participants, and everyone else who contributed to the event.

The 5th Paris Peace Forum, which took place from November 11-12, hosted several sessions on topics related to the overarching theme of the forum, “Riding out the Multicrisis.” At a time when the international community is experiencing rising conflicts around the world triggered by multiple issues with various degrees of complexity (and with each resulting in or exacerbating various knock-on effects), the forum provided a platform to discuss the issues and (possible) responses.

A key thematic thread at the forum was “Fostering more inclusive and just societies,” which had several dedicated sessions on several sub-topics spread over the two-day event. The sessions all highlighted that the current intersecting crises have a disproportionately high impact on women, especially indigenous women, women of colour, young women, and women with disabilities.

Here are three takeaways from the discussions around this particular theme:

Local solutions and intelligence to conflict resolution

One of the key focus points of the 2022 Paris Peace Forum was that conflicts need to be solved with local solutions and local intelligence – and not dictated or directed by external forces. In the session on “Learning from Indigigneous Human Rights”, Silvana Baldovino – Biodiversity and Indigenous Peoples Program Director from the Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental – emphasised that understanding the needs of people affected by (indigenous) human rights violations and discrimination is key to being able to respond to them in a targeted and adequate way. Only by giving space and listening to each other can sustainable solutions be supported.

Therefore, true partnerships need to move beyond the national and international levels and focus on people on the ground who are affected the most and best placed to shape the solutions.

Low importance of feminist foreign policy

One small room, women squeezed around a table, just one man – this was the setting when discussing concrete actions on feminist foreign policy from different regions of the world at one of the biggest peace forums. What does this say for how feminist foreign policy is perceived and prioritised? The working session “Beyond the Concept: Feminist Foreign Policy in Action” at the Paris Peace Forum 2022 was one of two sessions focusing on feminist diplomacy. But lessons learnt from different countries and proposals for concrete action were sadly in short supply. Exchanging knowledge and experiences of highly qualified women (and men) that are working on women, peace and security every day can contribute to a better understanding of what is needed to foster, promote, and implement feminist foreign policy. Inclusive Peace sees feminist foreign policy and feminist diplomacy as an issue of gender equality, but also as an intersectional approach that addresses race, ethnicity, religion, disability, and sexual orientation. Above all it’s about addressing historical unequal manifestations of power. To achieve all of this, both more space and universal buy-in (including, for example, the input of men on gender equality) is required. It would be great to see these discussions on bigger stages at next year’s Paris Peace Forum, which are accessible to more people and which are afforded the focus and resources to match the rhetoric.

Rising threat towards women’s rights

In political decision-making processes (mostly led by men behind closed doors), women cannot be talked about without them being present. In view of the increasing violence in all forms against women (especially people like women peacebuilders and women human rights defenders who work for women’s rights on a daily basis) and the growing risk of women’s rights being curtailed, it is all the more important to involve (those) women in solution-finding processes, as only they can bring their experiences, knowledge, and demands to bear. The high-level panel on “Accelerating feminist diplomacy in numbers” confirmed that women’s inclusion in diplomacy, high-level negotiations, and decision-making processes is still lacking, questioning international responsibility in this regard, and that threats to women’s rights are simultaneously rising. Gabriela Ramos (UNESCO) and José Manuel Albares (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Spain) both emphasised that legal frameworks need to incorporate women’s right to participation to foster their inclusion, e.g. through quotas, as this is the responsibility of every country. But while quotas can be an effective means of ensuring women’s participation, they are not sufficient in and of themselves to ensure women’s influence and thus ensure their participation is meaningful. In addition to the inclusion of women, their protection is also crucial, as women who speak out for women’s rights and work to build peace are particularly vulnerable. Therefore, Inclusive Peace sees the responsibility of all states not only to strengthen the inclusion of women in all kinds of political decision-making processes and on different levels of diplomacy, but also to ensure their protection. Affording space for these kinds of discussions in international fora like the Paris Peace Forum is an important first step,but there’s still a long way to go!

On 4 November, 2022 as part of the Geneva Peace Week, we will be co-hosting and co-organising an event on, “Increasing militarisation and feminist foreign policy: compatible or worlds apart?” with the Center for Feminist Foreign Policy, The Kingdom of the Netherlands, Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations in Geneva. Find the link to the event here.

Panel speaker: Kristina Lunz Co-Founder and Co-Executive Director, The Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy

Kristina is the Co-Founder and Germany Co-Executive Director of the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, an award-winning human rights activist, and former advisor to the German Federal Foreign Office. She’s been known for her feminist work for several years and been interviewed by and portrayed in numerous (inter)national media outlets. She was named as Forbes 30 under 30 (in both Europe and DACH), is a Handelsblatt/BCG “Vordenkerin 2020”, a Focus magazine “100 Women of the Year 2020″, an Atlantik Brücke Young Leader, Ashoka Fellow as well as BMW Foundation Responsible Leader. She is a first generation university student with a graduate degree from Oxford University.

Panel Speaker: Helen Kezie-Nwoha, Executive Director, Women’s International Peace Centre (WIPC, Kampala)

Helen Kezie-Nwoha is a feminist peace activist and a women’s human rights defender from Nigeria. Since 2016, she has been working as the Executive Director at The Women’s International Peace Centre (The Peace Centre), formerly known as Isis Women’s International Cross Cultural Exchange (Isis-WICCE). The Peace Centre is a feminist organization that focuses on promoting women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict settings and the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda.

Read her full bio here: Helen Kezie-Nwoha-Bio-IncluisvePeace-Event.docx

Panel speaker: Annika Bergman Rosamond, Associate Professor (Docent) in Political Science and International Relations, Lund University

Annika Bergman Rosamond is Associate Professor in International Relations at Lund University, Sweden. She has published widely on feminist foreign policy as well as gender cosmopolitanism, gendered nationalism, indigenous justice, feminist security studies and gender and celebrity humanitarianism. She obtained her D.Phil. at the University of Sussex. She has held positions at the universities of Leicester and Edinburgh and at the Danish Institute for International Studies. Annika was recently Chair of the Feminist Theory and Gender Studies section of the International Studies Association, USA, and is currently co-convenor of the British International Studies (BISA) Gendering International Relations Working Group.

Read her full bio here: Annika Bergman Rosamond-Bio-InclusivePeace-Event

Opening Remarks: H.E. Francisca Elizabeth Méndez Escobar, Permanent Representative of Mexico to UNOG

Ambassador Méndez graduated as a BSc in Political Sciences and Public Administration and a MSc in Latin American Studies from the Mexican National Autonomous University (UNAM). She obtained her second MSc in Law and Economics from the Milan State University in Italy. She has diplomas in international politics, public diplomacy and Arab studies, the latter with professors from the University of Oxford.

Ambassador Méndez entered the Diplomatic Service of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1991. Prior to her appointment to Geneva, H.E. Mrs. Méndez served as Ambassador of Mexico to the United Arab Emirates, from January 2017 to January 2022, also covering Iraq.

Read her full bio here: CV Emb. FEME inglés – final – feb.22.

The latest instalment in October 2022 of our National Dialogue peer-exchange series looked at the interplay of National Dialogues and peace negotiations. Here are five key takeaways from the discussion led by expert National Dialogue practitioners.

National Dialogues (NDs) often take place during times of turbulence, contestation, and change, including in contexts having recently experienced (or still experiencing) large-scale armed conflict. In such circumstances, the design, conduct, or implementation of NDs can coincide with other political processes, including peace talks. Chad is the latest example where an ND is set to take place in close proximity to peace talks; Ethiopia may soon follow.

Experiences from Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Yemen, Myanmar, and elsewhere suggest that there are several possible scenarios of how NDs and peace negotiations interact. These scenarios and their practical implications – particularly the trajectories, prospects, and pitfalls of the intersection between NDs and peace negotiations – were used to frame the discussion during the peer exchange.

Five key takeaways

Takeaway 1: the essence of NDs does not always translate into reality
An ND is generally conceived as a formally mandated multi-stakeholder negotiation in which large segments of society and politics are represented, intended to address a broad range of societal, political, and economic issues concerning the entire country.

Beyond this, a range of factors determine the exact nature of an ND; foremost among them are who initiates an ND and with what objective, and who is included. Formal ND mandates can vary considerably, although they often fall into one of three overarching categories: political reform, constitution-making, and peacemaking. But along with the formal mandate, NDs are shaped by their different stakeholders’ differing interests and distinct views of potential gains, and they ways in which they look to use NDs to advance them. This can dilute – and in some cases undermine – the fundamental conception of what an ND is for and how it works. For instance, in the case of heavily co-opted NDs – initiated or controlled by incumbent political elites to preserve or strengthen the political status quo – an ND is unlikely to be intended to be meaningfully inclusive and a catalyst for social and political change. In this way, NDs taking place in proximity to (or serving as) peace talks can serve as a “smokescreen”, a distraction or entirely co-opted process which portrays itself as a sincere attempt at conflict resolution or peacemaking while the primary focus and arena of political (and sometimes violent) contestation lies elsewhere. NDs can also be an instrument of power in other ways: in certain contexts, the participation of civil society actors in an ND paved the way for their subsequent assumption of a formal political role.

As such, while the essence of an ND might be clear in principle, in practice there is no overarching blueprint for an ND, given the many different understandings, mandates, and interests involved.

Takeaway 2: Inclusion is not binary, and is often highly contested
NDs are thus inclusive in essence but not always inclusive in reality. Comparative experience suggests that this is particularly the case in instances where NDs and peace talks take place in proximity to each other, though the question of inclusion can also change over time throughout the lifespan of an ND. Inclusion is also not binary. This is because it is a highly political issue; who is included, how, where and when, are all decisions that can have an impact on the power dynamics that will determine the shape of a country’s economic, social, and political landscape. As such many ND processes give rise to different shades of inclusivity. This is often a mixture of inclusion on the one hand (facilitated by elements such as inclusive selection and decision-making criteria) but also patterns of exclusion (commonly due to elite resistance) – a kind of exclusionary inclusion.

Takeaway 3: The interaction between NDs and peace talks is complex and fluid
The relationship between an ND and peace negotiations – like NDs and peace negotiations themselves – is not fixed, and can evolve over time, or change more suddenly with a shift in the context. Developments in one forum can also affect another forum: National Dialogues and peace talks can positively reinforce each other but also undermine each other, and sometimes both phenomena can occur at different moments within a given peace or political transition process.

There is a wealth of evidence to suggest that once an ND process is hijacked or resisted by key elites, the chances of reaching meaningful and sustainable outcomes are significantly reduced. It then becomes a question of how elite interests manifest themselves or how they can be managed. But elite interests can also change over time.

South Sudan provides an interesting example of this: one of the aims of the ND launched in December 2016 was to complement/help to salvage the 2015 ARCSS by broadening a previously elite process to include public participation. But the genesis and initial realisation of the ND process was heavily co-opted, with low levels of inclusion and little space for meaningful dialogue. Peace talks that were ongoing in parallel to the ND produced an agreement in 2018, after which opposition parties who had been previously reticent, joined the ND. This increased level of political and civil society participation helped to sustain the ND despite the collapse of the parallel peace talks. The ND ultimately produced a series of political reform recommendations, including on limiting federal authority within a federal system, presidential term limits, and ensuring independence among the different branches of government. These specific outcomes led to ruling elites blocking the package of suggested measures. As such, initial co-optation gave way to a more genuine process, whose outcomes were then blocked by elite resistance.

Takeaway 4: It’s potentially the nature of the forum more than the name that matters
There was a suggestion during the exchange that whatever the space for discussion is called – peace talks, a National Dialogue – is less important than the forum ultimately being meaningfully inclusive and addressing the causes of armed conflict. A further suggestion was that creating a dichotomy between peace negotiations and NDs creates both a danger of forum shopping, and also may make NDs more susceptible to elite capture.

Overall, the distinction between NDs and peace negotiations can be important but also sometimes challenging. Both NDs and peace negotiations are spaces where the negotiation and renegotiation of the social and political contract – the crux of peace and political transition processes – can occur. The earlier that unarmed actors beyond the main conflict parties can bring their experiences, aspirations, and influence to bear in these spaces, the greater the likelihood that these spaces and the overall processes will give rise to more inclusive outcomes that can sustainably resolve armed conflict and pave the way for more peaceful, just, and inclusive societies. But different fora can also play complementary roles, and as the example of South Sudan illustrates, be mutually reinforcing and sustaining. This is particularly the case given that gains achieved in one forum will often not prove sustainable unless they are taken up in another forum.

Takeaway 5: NDs and peace processes are specific moments and instruments in broader political transitions
The discussions in the peer exchange echoed a clear message from previous peer exchanges: that NDs are by no means – as they are sometimes portrayed – a definitive solution to all of a country’s problems. In reality, they are often inconclusive and unfinished, and could even be characterised as being inherently open-ended.

This is because NDs and peace talks are just two of the distinct moments and spaces within the ecosystem of fora – both formal and informal – in which peace processes and political transitions are borne out. These processes are not smooth and linear but can rather be characterised as a constant negotiation and renegotiation of the social and political contract, marked by a series of back and forth between progress and setbacks. NDs and peace negotiations are some of the many milestones along this journey.

Our approach to the event series
In hosting this event series, Inclusive Peace and our ND practitioner partners aim to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of National Dialogues and explore strategies to improve their effectiveness.

Our approach puts the experience and lessons of ND practitioners at the heart of the discussion, by having peers from different country contexts lead the exchange. Country experts and international experts then have the opportunity to listen and learn from these experiences, but it is the peer exchange that is the main focus of the event.

The previous instalments in the event series, looked at the role National Dialogues can play in helping chart a way towards consensus in tough political environments, the challenges relating to politicisation of National Dialogue processes, and the interaction of National Dialogues and elections. Read more about our work on National Dialogues here.

Kenya held its general election in August 2022. Every time there are elections, the region holds its breath in the hope that no major violence will break out that could paralyse the nation and the region. It did not happen this time round: in comparison with previous elections, the recently concluded general election – particularly the presidential contest in Kenya – managed to avert large-scale election-related violence.

The fifth president of Kenya was sworn in on 13 September 2022 following a Supreme Court ruling to uphold his victory after a legal challenge by his opponent and other entities. As the country waits for the lower courts to share their rulings on other election contest petitions at the end of October, some cases might result in fresh new elections, which could raise tensions in those areas. Good practice in violence prevention and sustainability are key tenets of peacebuilding. This article looks at the recent Kenyan election from this perspective, examining the reasons why violence prevention was successful but did not contribute to building sustainable peace.

Key factors that prevented large-scale election violence

Campaigns based on issues: As a first in Kenyan electoral history, campaigning in this electioneering period centred around factors such as the economy, unemployment, gender disparity, education, the cost of living, and not mainly along ethnic lines as has been the case in the past. Candidates’ pledges during rallies were also forward looking rather than dwelling on historical issues. This shift in focus from past campaigning around ethnic identities to salient current issues cuts across different demographics and ethnicities – as the attention moved from the community level to the individual level.

Transparency of all election results: A key factor in preventing violence was the full transparency of the election results – another first in Kenyan election history – which were fully transparent as they came in. The public had access to all the forms from all polling stations, a total of 46,232 from the public portal on the election commission’s website. This level of open access allowed people to undertake their own tallying and get the results ahead of the announcement. Previously, Kenyans had to rely on the announcement of combined results with no way to track or independently verify them.

Respect for laws and institutions: After the announcement of the national and local election winners, including the presidential election results by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), the losing candidates pledged to contest the results in court and at the same time called for peace. Additionally, supporters and the general public urged all aggrieved parties to take their cases to court and wait patiently for the rulings instead of taking to the streets as observed in the past.

In October, there are 123 petitions from gubernatorial to parliamentary contests being handled in the lower courts around the country with rulings expected later in the year. As for the presidential election result dispute settlement, the courts upheld the new president’s win and shared their summary judgement under heavy security. In the aftermath of the ruling, the petitioners’ messages of acceptance of the verdict despite a refusal to agree with the ruling calmed the supporters of the losing candidate.

Violence fatigue: After the announcement of the election results, voters from the runner up’s regional stronghold communicated that they would not be engaging in violence. The messages shared on social media, and interviews in the media expressed a call to peace and an inclination to respect the court’s settlement. This suggests that mentally the public was exhausted from the electioneering period and wanted to move forward with normal life, and is also evidence of voter maturity and fatigue with the use of violence as a political instrument.

Conflict-sensitive media coverage: Contrary to past elections , the media – both local-language and national – took on the role of calming tensions. The Media Council of Kenya (MCK) trained 2,500 journalists on the coverage of elections as part of their mandate after the 2013 Media Council Act came into effect. In the lead-up to the elections, the council shared an elections coverage guideline, which was signed by the stakeholders. The coverage focused mainly on the issues being discussed, proposals, and the strategy of the campaign, rather than on grouping voter preferences – and by extension voters – into ethnic and regional categories.

Insufficient sustainable prevention and peacebuilding

Though large-scale violence was prevented, this was not a violence-free election, with incidences of politically motivated threats and killings that included the death of an IEBC staff member. Moreso, despite more balanced election reporting, media independence remains a constant challenge in Kenya. The MCK released a report on the media performance where they observed press freedom violations such as “denial to access voting areas, critical information from relevant public bodies, profiling of journalists and media outlets, online trolling of journalists and media outlets and in some cases physical attacks on journalists.” Another area of concern is the role of social media and the misinformation observed by influencers.

Yet, the biggest obstacles for getting the country on a pathway to sustainable peace is the mixture of different structural political and social challenges, starting with the winner-takes-all British type of election law that is not conducive to sustainable peace in a multi-ethnic society, in addition to a culture of corruption, the lack of public confidence in the political class, and the lack of access to justice for political and other crimes.

These current and long-term issues are analysed below.

Election law not fit for purpose: In a multi-party, multi-ethnic society, a winner-takes-all British-style election law seems like a colonial relic blocking the pathway to sustainable peace in Kenya. The current election laws and the constitution are contradictory and difficult to implement in practice. Despite the introduction of the new political parties law, which allows for coalitions of parties, the law still hinders a broader split of power sharing in order to ensure a smooth transition and governance.

Low voter turnout: This year’s voter turnout numbers were a point of dispute brought to the attention of the court as the number kept fluctuating. In 2017, a 79.51% turnout was recorded, while in 2022 the number recorded was 65.4% with a majority of the youth not voting. A breakdown of the statistics is still to come, but it is already clear that the turnout dropped significantly. The Kenya National Commission of Human Rights (KNCHR) launched a monitoring report of the 2022 Kenyan elections, ‘Demystifying our democracy: Towards a Human Rights Compliance’, in which they signal their concerns, including regarding the voter turnout.

Lack of confidence in the political establishment: Overall, the lower voter turnout in this year’s elections is testimony to the disconnect between people and the political class. People have lost confidence in the willingness and ability of politicians to change ordinary people’s lives. Kenyans are under extreme pressure: rising costs of living, a high rate of unemployment, the consequences of climate change on people’s livelihoods, and the endemic corruption combined with an understanding that politicians get extremely rich from the job (Kenyan elected officials like MPs are among the highest paid in the world!) has disillusioned people.

Unfinished National Dialogues: The Kenyan political and social contract is broken. There has not been a proactive and genuine broad-based approach to engage the public on political and social issues – especially recurring and unresolved obstacles such as political structures, proportional representation, tackling corruption and accountability, and full autonomy of independent commissions, which came up during the presidential election petition but have not been comprehensively explained or discussed. Kenya has seen a few such initiatives in the past, including from government and civil society and also from religious leaders; some of them furthering a path to peace and change, while others were just lip service. A renewed honest national conversation is needed to renegotiate the political and social contract in the country to pave the way to sustainable peace.

“Working at Inclusive Peace has given me the opportunity to be part of a team determined to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding differently” – Alex Shoebridge.

As the Head of Peace Process Support within Inclusive Peace, Alex Shoebridge is an old hand at this. Inclusive Peace’s “think and do” tank, which adapts the comparative research to provide tailored advice and accompaniment to partners in a way which supports and reinforces their own initiatives, strategies, and ideas, was what appealed most to Alex. He saw the work as a refreshing change from what he had done previously, and is enthusiastic to lead the Peace Process Support Team team and organisation.

Over the past year, Alex has been building the Peace Process Support team and helping to shape the broader organisation. “We are a small but rapidly developing and growing space within the peacebuilding and peacemaking arena, which has yet to reach its full potential in doing things differently”. According to him, building the team is a continuous process and a very exciting prospect. “One of my key roles is figuring out how to optimally organise the team from language to expertise needs, it’s bringing that together in a group of people that share the same spirit regarding our approach and the value of our work.”

For Alex, the light bulb moments that take place when engaging with partners bring energy: “where there is a resonance between the ideas and options we put on the table and how they see it taking shape to advance their own thinking and engagements. Over time, this approach makes engagement more robust, sustained and meaningful”.

A self-proclaimed sports fan, Alex sees his role as looking and guiding a diverse talent where the skills complement each other’s work and the projects. “You can’t have all goalkeepers in a team, you need to have midfielders and other positions,” he adds jokingly.

His team learns from each other and where appropriate applies the lessons shared to their own engagements. Cross-learning and sharing is critical for our approach, and even more important to be very deliberate about in a remote workplace. He sees a lot of potential in the connections of projects by growing and shaping the work as a team rather than working in isolation on individual projects.

Alex Shoebridge’s bio.

On 19-20 July, 2022, our Head of Peace Process Support, Alex Shoebridge and Programme Analyst, Farah Abou Harb joined Yemen Policy Center to talk to Yemen experts, peace practitioners and researchers to rethink peacemaking in Istanbul. our Peace Process Support team’s shared the four key outcomes from the two-day event.

There is no one-size-fits-all approach to peacemaking and peacebuilding across the country, given the fragmented and contested nature of the state. The situation has exacerbated suffering and created very different conditions and realities for the population.
More can be done to connect different actors from diverse communities – local authorities, civil society, businesses – so they can learn from each other and find ways to coordinate and scale up their collective peacemaking efforts.
Civil society engagement has been a challenge, but the role of civic actors in the city of Taiz shows there is real value in drawing on the expertise and influence of civic actors to shape peacemaking efforts in the country.
More can be done by the international community to better understand and adapt to people’s different realities in Yemen in rural and urban areas. This requires longer-term engagements that get behind locally-led efforts.

Photo source: Hito Ortake (Flickr)

Our Head of Peace Process Support, Alex Shoebridge shares the likely different scenarios to play out that have important implications, opportunities, and challenges in terms of inclusion following the announcement of Chad signing a deal with over 40 opposition parties to launch peace talks.

Chad is the latest example where a National Dialogue is set to take place in close proximity to peace talks; Ethiopia may soon follow. This thread sets out the key features and examples of these scenarios.

Other experiences from South Sudan, Myanmar, Yemen, and elsewhere point to a number of scenarios which can take place. Each of these scenarios also has important implications, opportunities, and challenges in terms of inclusion.

Scenario 1

Peace talks feed into National Dialogue, and reach concluding stages in the lead up to the ND, shaping the agenda, roadmap, and inclusion of certain groups. In Afghanistan, DRC, and Nepal, peace talks mandated inclusive #negotiations to shape political transition.

Scenario 2

Peace talks overlap with National Dialogue, and face delays or extensions for various reasons, prompting NDs to either take a parallel or sequenced approach. Here, those actors already “on board” move ahead on certain issues, while others are deferred. This is usually to allow for the inclusion of other actors, issues, or geographic areas to be engaged in the ND process. The ND in CAR evolved in this way, though due to a breakdown in peace talks the ND did not include all actors.

Scenario 3

Peace talks collapse, National Dialogue proceeds. This can result in the #agenda/issues of the talks being “transferred” onto the ND, or for others to be left out. NDs can then be instrumentalised to advance specific priorities at the expense of an inclusive process. The ND initiated by the EZLN in Mexico is one example of this dynamic, and the 2016 ND in South Sudan began on similar footing. In these cases, inclusion of diverse stakeholders was initially limited or compromised, but in some contexts, this did “open up” over time.

Scenario 4

National Dialogue collapses, peace talks continue. These typically include a small set of stakeholders addressing certain issues, not necessarily as broad as a ND. NDs can collapse for various reasons, including political recalculations amongst political/civic elite.

Often, they prefer to pursue their objectives in a smaller negotiation format. In South Africa, bilateral talks between the ANC and National Party helped enable broader talks. This is the opposite of Scenario 3, whereby a broad format is abandoned for a narrower process.

Scenario 5

National Dialogue collapses, peace talks collapse, conflict relapses. For various reasons, parties no longer see negotiation platforms as a way of achieving their objectives, shifting to military or security responses. This can lead to an increase in violence in the short-term, such as in South Africa following the collapse of CODESA II and prior to the MPNP process, or an extended period of violent conflict like in Yemen.

These scenarios are not mutually exclusive, and both National Dialogues and peace talks (and the contexts in which they are grounded) evolve over time. But as a number of countries move on the pathway towards peace and pursue both NDs and peace talks.

It’s worth keeping in mind the potential complementarities, contradictions, and permutations which may evolve over time, and what this means for the potential (or not) for inclusive processes and inclusive outcomes.

Photo: Oporty (FreePik Photos)

This third installment in our content series Five trends that shaped peace and political processes explores the interrelation between climate change, peace and conflict and suggested ways forward to address these challenges holistically.

There is a long-standing and well-established connection between natural resource exploitation and governance and armed conflict. There is a clear correlation between countries’ climate vulnerability and political and economic fragility, and a strong overlap between countries affected by conflict and those most exposed to the risks associated with the effects of climate change; almost half of current UN peace operations, including a majority of the largest operations and an overwhelming majority of the total personnel deployed to UN peace operations are located in countries that are most exposed to climate change.

Conflict economies are also fuelled by livelihood destruction, resource exploitation and mismanagement, and hampered socio-economic development. Both the causes and effects of inequality are exacerbated by conflict and climate change, whose severest impacts fall on the most vulnerable.

As the UN Secretary General underlined in his state of the planet address: “The fallout of the assault on our planet is impeding our efforts to eliminate poverty and imperilling food security. And it is making our work for peace even more difficult, as the disruptions drive instability, displacement and conflict.”

Peace processes and the environment

Formal peace agreements in the 20th century dealt only sporadically with environmental issues, but in the past two decades all major peace agreements have included provisions on natural resources and environmental protection and management. Recent formal peace processes have also highlighted their direct and critical interdependence with environmental issues.

In Colombia, protection of the environment is viewed by youth activists as inseparable from the effective implementation of the 2016 peace agreement, particularly in terms of mechanisms to stop deforestation. Issues relating to the governance of natural resources are a prominent feature of the peace process in Mindanao in the Philippines.

Environmental peacebuilding is a relatively recent but rapidly evolving field which aims to integrate natural resource management into conflict prevention, mitigation, resolution, and recovery, or vice versa, to build resilience in communities affected by conflict. Such advances can help to build positive peace through emphasising shared environmental interests and taking more inclusive approaches to environmental management, including promoting the role of groups such as women and Indigenous People in environmental protection, equitable resource distribution, and sustainable development, which in turn can enhance their political and economic influence and strengthen their contributions to peace. This in turn can help to ensure that historically marginalised groups are meaningfully included in peace and political transition processes and that inclusive processes lead to inclusive outcomes.

Policymaking momentum and concerted engagement

There has been a recent groundswell of attention and momentum in policymaking circles on the interdependence of climate justice and environmental protection and peace and security, particularly focused around events such as the UNFCCC CoP 26, the 2022 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development, and the Stockholm +50 international meeting.

Yet there is still too much of a disconnect between climate-related policies and global peacebuilding and peacemaking efforts. Climate security was not on the official CoP 26 agenda ostensibly to make already fraught negotiations less difficult. The vetoing of the first-of-its-kind UN Security Council resolution casting the climate crisis as a threat to international peace and security only serves to underline the need for actors in these two fields to join forces to ensure that climate-related security risks are at the heart of global conflict prevention efforts.

The global climate justice movement talks a lot about the need for systemic change, which in addition to fighting climate change would also tackle key structural issues such as exclusion and inequality. Peacebuilders, and particularly young peacebuilders, are increasingly adopting climate justice language. But there is scope for greater coordination between the two fields, including systematically adopting each other’s language and engaging in concert to champion a joint cause, sharing lessons on how to effectively organise and mobilise their constituencies, and jointly strategising on how to collectively influence policymakers.

Concerted action could also channel the significant current momentum of the climate justice movement to help to reinvigorate a global peace movement that is not as strong today as it historically has been. Collective research, practice, and advocacy work can also draw on the manifold and hugely significant structural similarities and overlaps between advancing climate justice, environmental protection, and peacebuilding.

Perpetual Peacebuilding and reimagining our relationship to the environment

Rethinking peace processes and peacebuilding goes hand in hand with reimagining our relationship to our environment. Both require shedding outdated models that no longer reflect reality nor can galvanise change: the liberal linear model of peacebuilding and neoliberalism.

Both involve redress for historical injustices: the climate debt of the nations that were first to industrialise and overcoming the legacy of colonialism.

Both are inextricably linked to combatting inequalities and exclusion and ensuring social justice.

Both need to be grounded in the same principles: sustainability; humility; and homegrown, locally-owned, locally-led solutions.

Both undertakings must get beyond binary notions of success and failure, and short-termism, apathy, and political expediency.

This means, for instance, creating a policymaking environment where the invasion of one sovereign state by another is not a necessary catalyst to enact policymaking options such as (partial) fossil fuel divestment that an overwhelming body of research and a growing advocacy movement have been urging policymakers to undertake for years.

It also means that making progress to a more inclusive, sustainable world needs different frames of reference than unbridled capitalism premised on assumptions of eternal linear growth in a world with finite resources, and which cherishes profit extraction above all else.

Not only is a safe, clean, and healthy environment a human right, but even more than that, as the Rights of Nature posit, we need to fundamentally rethink humanity’s relationship with nature, abandoning the conception of nature as a resource to be exploited and degraded, and appreciate the fundamental interconnection between humanity and the natural world.

To paraphrase Antonio Guterres, making inclusive peace – among humanity and with nature – is the defining task of the 21st century. It must be the top priority for everyone, everywhere.