Author Archives: EDITOR - Majken

In January, we hosted a discussion on the interplay between National Dialogues and national elections – we here bring you the five key takeaways built on insights from an outstanding set of experts and practitioners.

A National Dialogue does not always play out within a neat and time-bound frame that fits within the term of a government or president ruling a country – sometimes National Dialogue processes happen at the same time as tense political moments such as national elections. Our latest event in the peer exchange series explored exactly this topic and here are the key takeaways of what experts and practitioners from Zimbabwe, Kenya, Lebanon and Myanmar brought to the table.

TAKEAWAY 1: The interaction between elections and ND processes is highly complex

The discussion highlighted how National Dialogues have the potential to diffuse tensions related to elections, but also how they can be derailed or swept away by elections. National Dialogues also have the potential to be co-opted by political elites and used as ‘smokescreens’ to direct voters’ towards achieving their own political objectives.

In Lebanon, recent history clearly shows just how complex the interaction between elections and National Dialogues processes is. Recently, certain actors have called for the need for an urgent National Dialogue to address certain issues ahead of the country’s elections in May 2022. This call, however, is being greeted with scepticism by others. While the country faces mounting challenges, the need for some form of National Dialogue can be seen to be more important than ever, though the current format (and the manner in which it is tied to the political system and the electoral cycle) has proven unable to facilitate the types of conversations required on the need for structural change. This dichotomy only serves to further increase tensions, while further undermining public support in many quarters.

TAKEAWAY 2: Need to recognize both opportunities and challenges

The intersection between National Dialogues and elections presents both opportunities and challenges.

  • Among the opportunities:
    Elections can create entry points for moves towards National Dialogues from political elites. Politicians are trying to attract voters during elections and if actors pushing for National Dialogue processes have public back-up, it will be in the interest of political elites to support visions for National Dialogue processes.

As an example, The Council of Churches in Zimbabwe is hoping to use the run up to elections in 2023 to generate buy-in for a National Dialogues process. National Dialogues can also act as a “pressure valve” to potentially address certain issues in the lead-up to an election, or in the aftermath of an election.

  • Among the challenges:
    Electoral crises can lead to political tension or violence that can close down the space and hope of a meaningful National Dialogues process.

This is currently the situation in Myanmar, where both the military government and the opposition are hoping to defeat one another. In combination with a climate of civil disobedience, tensions in Myanmar are simply too high to envisage a meaningful and inclusive National Dialogue process.

TAKEAWAY 3: National Dialogues are part of long term transitions

Elections are intense periods in any society and they often prove not to be the best time to address fundamental political divisions or question the social contract of a society.
National Dialogues are excellent instruments for this, but for National Dialogues to pave the way for change within a given political system they need to be seen in a longer-term perspective. National Dialogues are part of long term political transition processes with cycles of setbacks and gains. National Dialogues can happen in sequences over many years building on the outcomes of previous dialogue processes.

In Kenya, National Dialogue processes have been part of an on-going political transition process since the mid-1990s. Elections in Kenya have proven to be a major political fault line, which have on occasion led to violent conflict. National Dialogue processes have sought to both assuage the fallout of contested elections and to undertake prevention efforts to avoid tensions around elections leading to violence. By seeing National Dialogues as part of long term transition processes, they can be seen as one mechanism for helping the country manage transition processes, and to inculcate and reinforce a broader culture of dialogue and inclusion.

TAKEAWAY 4: The political system and context influence the space for dialogue

The larger context of a political or electoral system has great influence on how National Dialogue processes play out and what opportunities for change they might bring.
In systems that require a party to win an electoral majority, there is more incentive for political elites to build a culture of dialogue and political consensus, whereas in systems that guarantee certain parties a share of power – such as in Lebanon – political parties fundamentally lack incentive to build consensus.

The political situation in Myanmar, is an example where Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy government assessed that they couldn’t influence the National Dialogues process significantly. The National Dialogue was essentially a way for the military to engage with armed groups and not seen as a space for political contestation. This led to their focus on the parliamentary process and followingly the failure to broaden the mandate of the process and transform the military process into a more political process.

TAKEAWAY 5: The type of National Dialogue is key

The discussion also highlighted how the type of National Dialogue process influences what it can achieve. Some types of processes provide a space outside of formal politics to maintain or shape an elite deal, others are more inclusive. In Lebanon, National Dialogues have essentially served as a space to galvanize elite deals and prove, in its current form, to be ill-equipped to address calls for reform and more inclusive politics.

National Dialogues can also be a means of power projection. In a number of contexts, including in those highlighted during the session, National Dialogue processes became a superficial tool for the military to hold onto political power outside the parliament.

Our approach in the event series

By hosting this event series, Inclusive Peace contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics of National Dialogues and explores strategies to improve their effectiveness with our partners in different contexts.

Our approach is unique in the way that we address a topic of interest for National Dialogues practitioners by having peers from different country contexts lead the exchange. Country experts and international experts then have the opportunity to listen and learn from these experiences, but it is the peer exchange that is the main focus of the event.

The first two instalments in the event series, looked at the role National Dialogues can play in helping chart a way towards consensus in tough political environments, and the challenges relating to politicization of national dialogue processes. Read more about our work on National Dialogues here.

Read all news

Report,

What Makes or Breaks National Dialogues?

This report is based on the National Dialogue research project and its comparative analysis of 17 cases of National Dialogues (1990 – 2014). It aims to contribute to a better understanding of the functions of National Dialogues in peace processes.

October 2017|Anne Zachariassen, Cindy Helfer, Thania Paffenholz,

Download Pdfview document

Briefing Note,

What Makes or Breaks National Dialogues?_BN

This briefing note summarises the findings of a research project on National Dialogues and inclusive peace processes commissioned by UNDPA. It is based on a comparative analysis of 17 cases of National Dialogues (1990-2014).

April 2017|IPTI,

Download Pdfview document

Each month we bring you a selection of key peacebuilding dates in the month to come. Here our choice of selected February events and observances. 

Feb 15.: The Conflict in Yemen: Current Situation and Future Prospects

The Arab Center Washington and partners are organizing a two-day online academic conference on the status quo and future possibilities for the conflict in Yemen on 14th and 15th of February. Our own Thania Paffenholz will attend as speaker on Panel 3 with insights from her signature perpetual peacebuilding approach and the ongoing hybrid consultations with Yemeni women peacebuilders that we are co-facilitating.

Find out more about our take on the conflict in Yemen beforehand by checking out our blog piece on moving from perpetual war to perpetual peacebuilding in Yemen.

Feb: BLACK HISTORY MONTH 

Black History Month is an annual celebration, initially started to recognize the previously overlooked central role of African Americans within U.S. history but now widely celebrated globally. To us at Inclusive Peace, this observance is key as it calls attention to racial issues not only in the US but also on a global scale with regards to the intersection between racial justice, transitional justice and reconciliation, and the never-ending work of peacebuilding. Find out more about the official theme for Black History Month for 2022 here.

Feb 20.: World Day of Social Justice  

On this year’s World Day of Social Justice the UN is focussing on Social Justice in the Digital Economy to foster a dialogue on actions needed to overcome the digital divide, provide decent work opportunities and protect labour rights in the modern era of digital technologies. Register for their virtual event, hosted on 23.02.22 at 10a.m. EST to learn more about what we can do to further this cause!

Read all news

This first instalment in our content series Five trends that shaped peace and political processes in 2021 explains why authoritarian backlash happens in countries in political transitions and what change makers and their supporters might do in case of shrinking civic spaces.

One year ago, on February 1 2021, Myanmar’s parliament was supposed to meet for the first time since the November 2020 elections. That didn’t happen. Early morning Myanmar time, the news presenter at the military-owned Myawaddy TV station cited the military’s constitutional right to declare national emergency. Political leaders, civilian leaders and activists were detained, internet and phone access were cut off, flights were cancelled and roads were blocked by soldiers – a military coup was being carried out.

Elsewhere, in Mali (May) and in Sudan (October) last year, and as recent as last week in Burkina Faso military forces completed coups d’état and regimes from Belarus to Hong Kong continued to tighten their grip – 2021 meant disheartening news for many countries in democratic transitions.

On multiple occasions in the past year, we have seen the waves of optimism in countries transitioning to civilian government or undergoing political reform fade away. Authoritarian backlash has threatened to reverse any gains achieved in terms of more inclusive, democratic governance in these diverse contexts.

In this blog piece we ask why this is happening and what can be done by pro-democracy actors (and their supporters) who live in and work around these contexts and who seek to push ahead despite shrinking civic spaces.

Why is this happening? 

First of all, we want to point out that while these developments indeed sound disheartening, such developments are common historical trajectories in peace and political transition processes. Seen in this light, authoritarian relapse or backlash is not a fatal blow, but unfortunately rather a predictable dynamic. However, that does not make it easier for those seeking to shape a more progressive future departing from the status quo.

A protest march in Bardo to demand the release of the detainees 26-01-2021, Tunis Tunisia, Photographed by: Hasan Mrad

Resistance to change by status quo actors
Few, if any, political transition processes involve a “clean” break with the former regime. Whether it be the military or political actors, or private sector elites, there are often actors involved in a transition process that are more interested in maintaining the status quo and are likely to be resistant to (or undermine) changes promoted by more progressive actors.

In many instances, those same actors maintain a monopoly on state security forces or otherwise “hold the keys” to determining how the political transition process plays out – be it in relation to transitional governance arrangements, constitutional reform, or other processes. Insofar as the initial change in regime has not directly jeopardized their interests, these actors may appear to accommodate more progressive actors in any transition process. However, their priorities can change swiftly and, with it, erase any progressive gains.

Pro-change actors struggle to unite
In many contexts, regime changes have been prompted by mass mobilization and protests, often involving and driven by a broad coalition of actors who may have little in common aside from the desire to see change. It might be conservative religious actors coming together with pro-democracy activists, or it might be professional trade unions joining forces with student movements.

Such coalitions of strange bedfellows can exert significant influence in the short-term, precisely because they represent and draw on a broad cross-section of society. However, pro-change coalitions often fail to sustain momentum as the differences within such coalitions become more apparent in the immediate post-transition period. It is not to say that such differences are fatal, nor that the unifying factors that brought such actors together cannot again be used to bridge these differences and serve as a force for change.

Protest in Minsk, Belarus. Photo: Andrew @urinfinity/unsplash 

Pro-democracy activism has become increasingly more dangerous
Globally, the reduction in civic space has, on the one hand, created a more favorable environment for non-democratic actors to exert control as there is less attention and punitive costs to pay at the international level. At the same time, as the CIVICUS monitor shows the “closing” of civic space in most contexts experiencing peace and political transition processes speaks to the heightened risks facing more progressive civil society actors agitating for change.

This is a worrying combination for those seeking non-violent pathways to peace and political transition and often places those doing so at high personal risk. The lack of protection and heightened security risks facing women human rights defenders and women peacebuilders is one example which has lately seized the attention of the international community of late, including the UN Security Council. However, practical measures to address these challenges and counter the underlying causes will require more concerted efforts.

What can be done?

Knowing why authoritarian backlash happens, however, doesn’t help civic actors working in and around these contexts much. Here we outline a couple of options for what change makers working in and around contexts can do to push ahead despite shrinking civic spaces.

Acknowledge peace processes as messy affairs
As peacebuilders and change makers, we can do much better in acknowledging exactly how inherently turbulent, non-linear and lengthy peace and political transition processes are. We can also do much better in preparing for the types of authoritarian backlash which are almost inevitable in many contexts. We need to abandon notions of “successful” or “failed” transitions – at worst, they encourage too much focus on short-term gains and divert attention away from the need for ongoing (re)negotiation of how society and politics function.

At Inclusive Peace, we think of this as perpetual peacebuilding, where peace and political transition processes are better understood as a series of negotiations and renegotiations of the social and political contract in a society.

Transition processes are far from the neat, linear and tidy affairs that many – whether policymakers or activists – may foresee or hope for. They involve constant tension and competition and require ongoing re-strategizing and re-negotiation. They are also not unidirectional – what has been achieved can be rolled-back, and the limited spaces for more progressive, reform-minded actors can open up in unforeseen and unanticipated ways.

Demonstrators in Hong Kong Photo protesting against China’s plans to impose a new security law on the territory. Photo: Joseph Chan

Equally, measures geared towards limiting the space for democratic reforms cannot be sustained indefinitely. Cracks in the concrete walls of the authoritarian system and its allies eventually start to appear. For those seeking to influence the way forward, it is therefore critical not just to be patient, but to be strategically prepared for when the window of opportunity presents itself.

Work in scenarios and proactively develop strategies
This could involve working in scenarios and proactively developing action strategies for each scenario, preparing and seeking to shape the day when the “cracks in the walls” appear. It could also mean working to develop and strengthen those national and international allies that will be key when the day comes. And even though none of these scenarios might play out exactly as they were envisioned, they will come in hand: defining a variety of reactive and proactive strategies can enhance the ability of civil society, business and others to affect change. Knowing the appropriate strategies will help navigate the unfolding circumstances and create or make use of any entry points and opportunities when they unfold.

However, while identifying creative ideas and strategies from other contexts can be very useful for civic actors trying to affect change in their own context, replicating precisely the strategies and approaches used elsewhere has typically not been effective. There have been many examples where “colour revolutions” or protest movements have sought inspiration from neighbouring countries, replicating strategies and tactics which ultimately fail to succeed. In many instances, such experiences overlook the specific circumstances and conditions in a particular country. There is no “one size fits all” when it comes to charting strategies for civic actors to influence political transition processes. Instead, it is possible to draw inspiration and adapt specific elements from numerous country contexts and, in this way, shape a specific approach which is tailored to the particular context and therefore more likely to succeed.

Keep creating pressure – and keep funding
While the firm grip of an authoritarian backlash may appear insurmountable, there are often some cracks which appear over time, and which offer openings for civil resistance to challenge the status quo. Working inside and outside the country – either simultaneously or in a complementary way – can also create different types of pressure, though this comes with heightened risks and, depending on the regime, actions beyond a country’s border targeting opposition movements cannot be ruled out. In this way, alliances and coalitions of actors – both inside actors as well as those from other countries – ranging from peer movements to policy makers – can ensure sustained focus and attention on shifting the status quo. This also speaks to the need for external actors to provide consistent support and accompaniment.

Our approach in these contexts

At Inclusive Peace, we help our partners identify these scenarios and develop strategies to proactively ideas and inspiration to shape transition processes by using evidence based comparative research, sharing our own experiences from more supporting actors in over 20 countries around the globe and connecting partners with other experts and peers. Read more about our peace process support here.

Read all news

Each month we bring you a selection of key peacebuilding dates and events in the month to come. Here our choice of selected January events. 

Jan 20.: National Dialogue Peer and Expert Exchange 

At Inclusive Peace, we look forward to hosting the third installment in our National Dialogues peer and expert online exchange event series. In this event we will discuss opportunities and challenges in the intersection between national dialogues and elections with a select group of peers and experts. Check out the key outcomes from our last event in the series and look out for outcomes from this discussion in our February newsletter. 

Jan 20.-21.: Basel Peace Forum 

Keeping and promoting peace in times of pandemics, wars, and climate change, requires innovative solutions and approaches. The next Basel Peace Forum focuses on the links between peace, conflict and the agency of cities and the power of emotions in peacebuilding. If you are interested in joining and have not received an invitation, reach out to the organisers. Also see last year’s sum up for a better look at what Basel Peace Forum is all about.

Jan 26.-28.: PeaceCon 

In light of recent global climate, health and political crises that have challenged our way of thinking and acting the tenth anniversary of annual Peace Conference #PeaceCon@10 aims to address these obstacles and explore pathways to overcome them. Check out the agenda for this year’s event and sign up to join the fight for a more peaceful global future!

Read all news

At Inclusive Peace we look back at 2021 and point to five trends that shaped peace and political transition processes in the year that went by. In this first piece, we sketch out the trends and invite you to follow the upcoming pieces on the specific trends, which we will post in the weeks to come.

As many of us prepare to take time off over the holiday season and before 2022 starts in earnest, our daily news and social media sites tend to be clogged with lists – anything from “your top 5 whiskeys” to “holiday destinations in a time of COVID” are listed for you.

At Inclusive Peace, we have an end of year list as well: In this blog piece we present 5 trends which shaped peace and political transition processes over the past year, and which are set to continue going forward.

AUTHORITARIAN BACKLASH AND PATHWAYS FOR CIVIC ACTORS
On multiple occasions in 2021 (think Tunisia or Sudan) the waves of optimism which have met transitions to civilian government or political reform have, overtime, been met with authoritarian backlash which has threatened to reverse any gains achieved in terms of more inclusive, democratic governance. Moreso, authoritarian systems in Myanmar, Hong Kong and elsewhere remain in power despite notable civic movements challenging their actions.

This is a historically common trajectory, and what Gilbert Achcar describes as the inability of the more progressive elements of a society to address it’s “morbid symptoms” before they instigate a reversal. Seeing this dynamic play out, we explore the implications for the civic actors that nevertheless seek to secure and advance more progressive pathways for inclusive societies and we also reflect on reactive and proactive strategies these actors can pursue.

A protest march in Bardo to demand the release of the detainees 26-01-2021, Tunis Tunisia, Photo: Hasan Mrad

WOMEN, PEACE & SECURITY: INCLUSION IS STILL LACKING 
In 2021, as in so many other years, we observed how we and other key players in the women, peace and security field have come together to talk about how women’s inclusion in peace and political transition processes is still lacking and voiced out the need for change.

But the desired change keeps us waiting. In this piece we look at some of the underlying factors for why women’s inclusion in peace and political transition processes hasn’t gone mainstream yet – if women were a natural part of peace and political processes we would leave the inclusion terminology all together. We look at what more can be done to advance this important agenda in a pragmatic way taking into consideration the broader elements of intersectionality, pluralism and diversity and we sketch out clever strategies and examples of how to get implementation going.

INCLUSIVE PROCESSES WITHOUT INCLUSIVE OUTCOMES
In the past year, we have seen substantial challenges concerning contemporary peacemaking – and this trend will certainly carry forward in the coming year. This is not necessarily tied to the lack of normative frameworks in which to inform and shape peace processes. Indeed, there has been significant progress over the last two decades in the development of normative policy frameworks – such as the WPS agenda, the YPS agenda, and the Sustaining Peace resolutions. In many instances, these frameworks have inspired more inclusive peace and political transition processes.

However, this has not resulted in the types of inclusive outcomes that were assumed to follow from inclusive processes. Why not? In this piece, we discuss why inclusive frameworks do not necessarily lead to inclusive outcomes and we discuss what more needs to be done to move in order to create pathways to inclusive societies instead of focussing solely on inclusive processes.

THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND PEACE AND POLITICAL TRANSITION PROCESSES
2021 was again a year of more bad news on the climate front. The global climate crisis is more than ever an inevitable fact and climate change plays a key role in all current peace and political processes. However, we observe a disconnect between climate-related policies and global peacebuilding and peacemaking efforts.

In the recent COP 26 meeting in Glasgow, world leaders gathered in an effort to bridge differences and chart a way forward to address the climate crisis. While some progress was made, the latest projections point a worrying picture particularly for countries affected by violent conflict, which for the most part will also be those most affected by climate change. In this piece, we will reflect on what this means for peace and political transition processes, as well as what faltering and failing processes mean for any efforts to address or mitigate climate change.

Two Afghan women in Shahrak-Sabz Internally Displaced People’s camp on the outskirts of Herat. The drought has hardest hit the western region of Afghanistan, Herat. Photo: Shutterstock

SOCIAL MEDIA IS A NEW FRONTLINE
In 2021, social media platforms proved to play a central role in both decentralising the power to shape narratives and serving as an ideal channel to spread disinformation and hate speech. However, the spreading of disinformation is not as new as we might think – disinformation has always been a feature of conflict.

In the early and mid 20th Century, this involved pumping out posters and blasting radio programmes to mobilize the masses. The message hasn’t necessarily changed, but the means and speed in which it is spread represents a shift in how wars are waged. Now, social media is a key battle front and presents a fundamental challenge to how peace can be sought. In this piece we look at how we see this play out in the contexts we work in and what we see as key strategies for building peace in this new reality.

SUM UP
This list is written at a time when we are seeing many peace and political transition processes unravel. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the tenuous threads of unity achieved by the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords risk being severed. In Northern Ireland, the implications of Brexit have brought into question fundamental elements of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. And in Lebanon, the structural frailties of the Taif Accord and the Doha Agreement were once again highlighted by recent clashes between rival armed factions.

These are just a few recent examples which illustrate that even long-standing, so-called “successful” peace agreements can be deceptively fragile when new dynamics emerge, or when old dynamics resurface. It also points to the fundamental need to rethink how peace processes are designed, implemented, and sustained.

With this blog series we hope to inspire peace practitioners around the globe on how to do this in practice – keep an eye out for the upcoming instalments in the blog series by signing up to our newsletter.

Read all news

In our November newsletter, we introduced our new content series peacebuilding lessons where we give you key insights and lessons learned from a variety of peacebuilding and peacemaking processes. This month, we hear from our Executive Director, Thania Paffenholz, who gives us insights into her role in the Colombian process and the key lessons she learned.

Q: About five years ago, you went to Colombia to act as an expert facilitator in the peace process that led to the ratification of the Colombian Peace Deal in November 2016. Could you tell us about when you entered this moment in history and what role you played in it?

TP: Talking about the Colombian peace process, we first need to define which process because there were several peace processes consisting of negotiations between the different armed groups and the government. I entered two of these processes: the process between the government and the FARC and the process between the government and ELN. In the FARC process, which culminated in the Colombian Peace Agreement in November 2016, I entered in the last phase when it had already gone public. In the ELN process, I started my engagement in the first phase of informal and confidential bilateral negotiations and then continued during the formal negotiation phase.

Colombian flag waving in front of a historic building in Cartagena, Colombia. The white stripe has been added to symbolize the peace process. Photo: Shutterstock

In the final phase of the FARC process I worked with a variety of actors in and around the process. I worked with Colombian civil society organisations including the Catholic church and supported different civil society consultations that fed ideas into the talks, both in Colombia and the Diaspora.

I also worked with international actors supporting the two sides. As an example, during the last round of talks our research team developed a non-paper – which we later published as a report – on the role of civil society in ceasefire monitoring which helped to inform the implementation design of the agreement.

Overall as an organisation, we played very much a behind-the-scenes role in providing ideas and options for those inside and around the talks. After the peace agreement was signed we provided assessments and ideas to both the government, civil society and international actors about strategies for the referendum. The signed peace agreement was put to referendum which failed in October 2016. When the referendum failed, we helped facilitate a new process design to renegotiate the agreement .

In this work, I pushed for what you could call the survival of the peace process despite a failed peace agreement. I provided ideas and options for next steps the week after the referendum to the government and civil society actors such as the student movement, the unions and international actors.

During the ELN process, I worked intensively with the ELN and later also with the government and the facilitators to design a participatory process for the talks and the broad societal consultation process.

Q: Could you outline the key lessons you learned as an expert facilitator working in these processes?

TP: Sure, of course there’s a multitude of lessons that I as an expert facilitator and we as an organisation learned, but I’d say that three lessons stand out from the Colombia process.

TP: In Colombia it showed, as it has in all the peace processes I’ve worked in, that good entry points on all levels are key.  From these entry points you have to build your networks among a broad spectrum of actors from the parties as well as those who can influence the parties, key constituencies in the country as well as the public, and the internationals.

In Colombia, I worked very closely with governments that had access to different actors inside and outside the country. This gave me both access and the ability to enter these spaces. It was an essential strategy to have government partners that were supportive to give the needed political greenlight and protection. So, when I say build your networks, I don’t mean only working with a network of local partners, but with a huge international network of various stakeholders. And it also means to leverage your existing network in the country – in the Colombian case, we had a broad network of civil society and religious actors that we activated throughout the work.

As an example of important entry points in this case, I would mention that we as a Geneva-based organisation, had a close collaboration with the Colombian ambassador in Geneva which provided excellent contacts. We also worked with global religious networks and women groups that gave us access to Colombia specific actors such as the Catholic Church and women networks in the country.

TP: In the Colombia case there was such a conducive environment for peace, regionally and internationally – the US was very supportive, the whole world was supportive. And you could say that there was such a hype for peace, that at times, the resistance to the peace agreement that existed in Colombia was forgotten. If you look at it from a comparative perspective, such a resistance is normal. The key lesson is to take the resistance into account and not only talk to the moderate pro-peace parties but also to those that are not in the pro-peace camp.

In Colombia for example, a large part of the population was against a peace agreement with the FARC. Many people had suffered from the human rights violations that took place during the war and were of the opinion that making peace with the FARC was like selling out and avoiding justice. The political opposition built on this resistance since it was the ruling political party who entered the negotiations with the FARC. As a consequence, the opposition built a very strong social media campaign that resulted in the lost referendum, where Colombian voters rejected the ratification of the peace deal to great surprise for all international actors.

In this case the opposition – in contrast to the government – understood the powers of public communication and took advantage of the “peace hype” that meant that resistance was forgotten and remained non-addressed. A key lesson coming out of this is that as an expert facilitator you have to be aware of the “hype” for peace and pay close attention to the resistance that exists and come up with options for how to deal with resistance. Just because the international community or regional actors are supportive, it doesn’t mean that the majority of the population will be supportive.

TP: On the morning of the failed referendum, I boarded a plane to Bogotá. And this choice was entirely based on intuition – we didn’t have funding besides for the flight ticket and to many this could seem like an unwise decision. However, I knew I had to go to Bogotá and to engage with counterparts in person to share ideas on what can be done after a lost referendum. It turned out to be a very wise decision as I was able to speak to many stakeholders including the government, to provide solidarity and most of all, ideas for the immediate next steps to safeguard the peace process.

Photo: Milo Miloezger/Unsplash

Leading up to the referendum, we had done research comparing previous referendums that took place in peace processes. We looked into what were the conditions in those countries compared to the conditions in Colombia and we shared those findings with the Colombian government as well as international actors. When the referendum then was lost we could – based on this research – provide comparative insights from other processes where similar failures had happened.

So, I would also say that this is a lesson I learned as an expert facilitator: you need to trust your intuition and the fact that sometimes you don’t always know what the right thing to do is, but you have to trust your instinct.

TP: Do you need to know your audience before you enter a new context? And what does it mean to know your audience? In the mediation and peacemaking world there used to be two broad philosophies about how much knowledge you need when you enter a context. One school of thought argues that you should only have minimal knowledge in order to not get dragged into details and preserve a neutral perspective. The other school of thought argues the opposite – namely that you need to know a lot.

My experience is that it depends on your role, the setting and your style. The advantage of Inclusive Peace’s comparative evidence-based approach is that it allows us to bring a lot of knowledge from what has worked and what has not worked in other processes. This approach allows me to start a conversation on options with the parties and other constituencies that all parties find relevant.

Is it possible to do this work without knowing the context and the audience? Not really. In the Colombia case it was essential to assess strategies from other processes with similar conditions in order to develop ideas for Colombia. When assessing the strategies, we looked at the context variables and the mindsets of the audiences in question. In the Colombian case I worked very closely with our research team to prepare and accompany our missions to Colombia in order to provide the most relevant knowledge and examples.

Here we profited hugely from our prior research into previous peace processes in Colombia and research about the mindsets of different armed groups similar to the FARC and the ELN.
This allowed for a fast and profound understanding of their needs, interests, red lines and the best way to communicate with them.

I call this approach to play the role of a critical friend – and this will be the final lesson: Be a friend that listens and asks critical questions but also provides ideas and options.

Colombians on the streets in October 2016. Photo: Leon Hernandez/Flickr

Want to read more about Thania’s and Inclusive Peace unique approach to peacebuilding? Dive into her blog Perpetual Peacebuilding: Changing the way we think about and make peace.

Read all news

Report,

Civil Society’s Role in Monitoring and Verifying Peace Agreements: Seven Lessons from International Experiences

This report summarises the findings of two comprehensive research projects. It formulates seven lessons from international experience on Civil Society’s role in monitoring and verification in peace processes.

January 2017|Nick Ross,

Download Pdfview document

In a new partnership, we explore options for moving forward the Yemen peace process in collaboration with UN Women Yemen and Yemeni civil society actors.

Inclusive Peace has in partnership with UN Women and the Yemeni civil society, namely the Group of Nine +1 Coalition, recently kickstarted the first in a series of local consultations on the Yemen peace process. The consultation that took place on Sunday November 21 focused on envisioning a Yemeni Women’s Peace Process that can move along the current peace efforts.

In this first set of local consultations conducted by the Southern Women of Peace, the Youth Advisory Council and the Women for Yemen Network, approximately 25 members of each group came together to envision new options for Yemen. In a hybrid environment participants reflected on what a women’s peace process might entail in their local environments and to explore a women’s agenda with a menu of options for creative and feasible new actions and initiatives.

The aim of the local consultations was to collect in-depth information on participants’ visions of a Yemeni Women’s Peace process – as well as enhancing the knowledge of Yemeni civil society on different approaches and strategies to move along the current ‘stuck’ process in Yemen.

The consultation is the first in a series of eight and we will follow up with key findings later on, but here are a couple of quotes from the participants that all showed great enthusiasm and willingness to collaborate around a common agenda in order to make their voices heard and engage in the political transition processes.

Today there are a number of challenges and obstacles that hinder women’s meaningful participation in the peacebuilding process. During the war, the priorities constantly change, and the livelihoods of many Yemenis are deteriorating. Therefore, we need women to work together, join forces and think about alternative ways which will lead the road to peace.
Amna Shehabi (Member of the Yemeni Women’s Union, Abyan)

Involving women in the political process requires unifying efforts and implementing the outcomes of the national dialogue which stipulates that at least 30% women should be involved at least 30% in the peacebuilding process. Thus, efforts must be joined in the interest of involving women in the peacebuilding process”
Dohaa Al Ahdar (Member of the Youth Advisory Council)

Women are more likely to agree on a common agenda despite their different views and perspectives. Therefore, women need to play a key role in the peace building process. Through women, different parties can find common ground to unify efforts.”
Maha Awad (Founder & Coordinator of the Feminist Summit, Abyan)

Read all news

It’s event season and at Inclusive Peace, we jumped right into November with a well-attended online session at Geneva Peace Week 2021 on building and sustaining perpetual peace. Thanks to both our speakers, moderators, participants and co-organizers, it became everything we intended it to be: a profound, broad-based discussion on the need to rethink and reshape peace processes towards locally-owned solutions.

In case you missed the event – or attended it and need a recap – this blog details 3 key takeaways from the session which share insights into modern, perpetual peacebuilding tactics, as well as some clips and highlights from our session.

If you want to dive deeper, the recording of the full session here or read more about how to change the way we think about and make peace in this blog post written by Inclusive Peace’s Executive Director.

Additionally, we had the pleasure of having the talented Iulia Zolotcov join the session as our graphic recorder, and have compiled a great video timelapse of the graphic recording which shows how the discussions evolved. Let’s have a quick look at key points on the current barriers to perceptual and inclusive peacebuilding for international communities.

TAKEAWAY 1: ACKNOWLEDGING AND ADDRESSING TOKENISM

A key insight from both our panelists and the discussion in the breakout rooms, is that tokenism is still widespread when it comes to inclusion in peacebuilding and peacemaking. It is, therefore, critical to ensure that inclusive efforts are comprehensive and effective.

Possible solutions to explore should

  • focus on leveraging governance and accountability systems that are already in place and also creating new ones
  • take advantage of synergies for local groups to enhance their capacity and agency
  • include thinking about how elite inclusion can have a positive knock-on effect for broader inclusion rather than conceiving them as antithetical

TAKEAWAY 2: BALANCE BETWEEN LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS & ACTIONS

Another insight derived from our workshop was how international, regional and local actors should change their modes of engagement. A central theme in the discussion was the need to strike the right balance between local and international actors in terms of involvement with, actions for and ownership of solutions for peace processes.

This “right” balance should entail

  • Improved coordination between internal and external actors, and among external support actors with a particular and a focus on eradicating competition
  • An inversion of current top down prejudices that are prevalent in certain contexts, including problematizing what we mean by the international community (i.e. not just Western or large power interests)
  • Avoiding romanticizing the local and by extension demonizing the international. In reality, there is tremendous range in the types of actors, approaches, and ways of collaborating which defy the binary (local/international).

TAKEAWAY 3: DEFINING AND IDENTIFYING “THE LOCAL”

A third insight from the session focuses on the need to define what we mean by local actors and then to identify who are (all) the relevant local actors in a given process. It is absolutely clear that creating active local engagement and fostering a sense of local ownership creates agency for local stakeholders and ensures that the needs and priorities of local actors are channeled into national processes.

Hamzat Lawal, one of the speakers, and an activist and founder of Follow The Money – the largest Pan-African grassroots data-driven movement – gave some more insight into how civil agency and integration are key to solving communal issues, such as vandalism in Nigeria.

Taking these insights into account, peacebuilding strategies should focus on creating a sense of ownership amongst key community members and leaders, as well as connecting them with governmental actors in influential positions.

Initiatives should consider

  • A thorough needs assessment of local community members and focus on creating spaces for them to air their grievances with the promise of being heard and taken seriously
  • The diversity of perspectives from within the community and not assume that everyone relates to the same problem or requires the same peacebuilding solution
  • Well-designed channels and structures for communication ensuring information flow not only from community members to government officials, but also back again

SUM UP – WHAT’S NEXT?

At Inclusive Peace, we incorporate these insights into why we need to rethink peace processes and what solutions might look like into our ongoing work on transforming the way we think about and make peace.

For 2022, we are cooking a couple of very exciting events and projects on rethinking peace processes – so keep an eye out for more initiatives from us and our partners on rethinking peace processes. In the meantime, we give the last word to one of Inclusive Peace’s senior advisors, Youssef Mahmoud, former UN Under-Secretary General.

Read all news

November marks fifteen years since the Nepal Peace Agreement was signed. We reflect on the anniversary in this first instalment in our series of inclusive peacebuilding lessons.

This peacebuilding lesson is based on our case study on women’s participation in Nepal’s constitution-making process 2008-2012. In this lesson we break down two key strategies that Nepali women’s groups applied to advance inclusion in the process.

STRATEGY 1: introduce a quota

APPROACH: target/effect policies and policy makers to influence direct decision-making

PROBLEM/BACKGROUND: Historic and deep-seated gender inequalities led to women having never comprised more than six percent of Nepal’s parliamentarians until 2007.

MOTIVATION: Pushing for progressive inclusion mechanisms in a peace process can help to jump-start and institutionalize more inclusive governance beyond the peace process itself.

OUTCOME: The quota ensured that women made up 33 percent of the members of the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly was the most representative body of its kind in Nepal’s history in terms of gender, caste, and minority inclusion and provided a critical juncture to shifting some of these structural barriers. This precedent set by the peace process has created momentum and attention to permanently enshrine inclusion, including in relation to women’s participation in governance. The new Constitution passed in 2015 has ensured a 33 percent representation of women in national and state Parliaments and 40 percent in local legislatures.

THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS: In relation to this strategy, here are some lessons learned – both positive and less positive – that can be applied by or relevant for peacebuilders in other contexts and peace processes.

  1.  Identify the right allies: It is key to identify those actors who are well-placed to help achieve your objective by leveraging their position or influence. In this example, if the objective is to establish a quota in governance mechanisms, who in the parliamentarian landscape is strategically wise to approach to introduce the quota strategy? Peacebuilders should also consider if there are any external/non-governmental organisations you can bring in to support your initiative. Likewise peacebuilders should consider if there are women politicians and peacebuilding practitioners available that would be suitable for positions within the political system and if these could be mobilised to push for a quota.
  2. Back up with evidence: When you have identified which parliamentarians, external/non-governmental organisations and women politicians or peacebuilders to approach, consider what evidence can you bring forth to support the effectiveness of a quota in general and for your specific situation.
  3. Consider protection issues: As many as 70 percent of all women Constituent Assembly members in Nepal were confronted with some form of violence. Women also faced legal action due to their political involvement, and routinely struggled with men politicians’ negative attitudes towards them. Knowing this it is important to consider what measures need to be taken to ensure that women’s participation and uptake in political decision-making bodies does not result in additional safety risks and violence towards the women after the quota has been introduced.

STRATEGY 2: mass action

APPROACH: mobilise civil society and create spaces for influencing indirect decision-making by targeting delegations instead of mediators

PROBLEM/BACKGROUND: In many peace processes, civil society advocacy exclusively focuses on the mediating or convening entity, roles sometimes played by the UN or the AU, for example. However, targeting the mediator or convenor may lead to some gains in terms of inclusion in the process, but are often limited in their ability to influence and change behaviour of the conflict or negotiating parties themselves.

MOTIVATION: mass action can lead to direct political representation at the negotiation table, and beyond the negotiation process itself

OUTCOME: By targeting delegations, mass action in Nepal led to direct representation at the negotiation table which in turn carried over into the Constituent Assembly. This did not simply involve public advocacy and mass action, as women’s groups strategically engaged with the 23 parties to prepare lists of potential female candidates.

THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS: In relation to this strategy, here are some lessons learned – both positive and less positive – that can be applied by or relevant for peacebuilders in other contexts and peace processes.

  1. Think seriously about communication: Identify delegations and individuals to address and create a system for sustainable, long-term communication and think about how this communication will be most effective. Consider channels, length, frequency, engaged members, women group representatives etc.
  2. Identify political allies: Consider how you can create ties with political relations which influence and penetrate indirect decision-making (these are often still male and elite-driven even after the inclusion of women in decision-making bodies). These allies will help you further in mobilising mass action.
  3. Focus on meaningful inclusion: In order to engage as many women’s groups as possible, think about how to advance past paternalistic or crony politics where most of the women in politics are there by virtue of their family relations and undermines the ability to pursue a common and distinct agenda for women in a particular country. Sure, such individuals may be well-placed as champions to help advance the broader cause, but one needs to be clear-eyed and continuously seek to broaden the definition of inclusion. Set a strategy for cultivating and managing a meaningful inclusion agenda and preventing cosmetic and superficial inclusion.

Infographic,

Infographic: Women’s role in Nepal’s constitution-making process (2008–2012)

This infographic analyses women’s influence in Nepal’s First Constituent Assembly (2008-2012).

June 2018|IPTI,

Download Pdfview document

Case Study,

Women in Peace and Transition Processes: Nepal (2008–2012)

This case study analyses women’s influence women in Nepal’s First Constituent Assembly (2008-2012).

July 2017|Estefanía Charvet,

Download Pdfview document
Read all news

On Sunday the 5th of September, the newly-appointed UN Envoy, Hans Grundberg, officially assumed his duties. Next week will mark six years since the Huthis first entered the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, precipitating a civil war which had been simmering for years, and which persists to this day. Have we reached a critical juncture in Yemen? At Inclusive Peace, we suggest that Yemenis and their supporters must seize this moment to rethink the peace process and move towards a culture of perpetual peacebuilding.

When outgoing UN Special Envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, delivered his final briefing to the UN Security Council on 15 June 2021, he spoke with concern and resignation.

‘Yemeni men, women and children are suffering every day because people with power have missed the opportunities presented to them, to make the necessary concessions to end the war’, he declared, later stating that ‘only a negotiated political settlement can truly turn the tide in Yemen’.

The flaws of the current UN approach were unwittingly revealed in his statement. The idea that the only path forward involves gathering together members of the political elite to reach an accord represents an outdated and narrow view, and contradicts the reality of peace processes.

The flaws of the peace process in Yemen

Griffiths’ words find us at a time of desperation. Having endured over a decade of unrest and violence, the COVID-19 pandemic and its accompanying economic crisis have further entrenched the challenges facing Yemenis.

In his first foreign policy speech in February 2021, US President Joe Biden pledged to end the war by cutting support for offensive operations in Yemen. In March, Saudi Arabia released a peace initiative, proposing a nationwide ceasefire overseen by the UN. In recent months, Oman has attempted to bring the Huthis and Saudi Arabia together for talks. A new UN Special Envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, enters office. Nevertheless, violence persists.

The efforts made by the UN and other members of the international community to promote peace in Yemen following the escalation of the conflict in 2015 have struggled and stalled. Official, high-level negotiations have rarely produced results and on the few occasions on which agreements have been reached, they have barely been implemented.

It is not only in Yemen that international peacemaking is failing to set societies on pathways to peace. In Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, Sudan and elsewhere, belligerents in peace talks remain locked in conventional, linear formats; negotiations have floundered; and any attempts at broadening inclusion are all-too-frequently shallow and cosmetic.

The people of Yemen urgently need the space to transform the peace process and to determine the role of regional and international actors. It is time for Yemenis and their supporters to reflect on the process to date and to develop ideas for fundamental change.

Possibilities for a transformed peace process in Yemen: provocative questions and strategic options

Innovation and courage are required in Yemen. At Inclusive Peace, our comparative research offers glimmers of hope, and a range of strategies by which Yemenis and members of the international community could begin to rethink the peace process.

A new UN Resolution, or multiple mediators?

In Yemen, the UN is constrained by UN Security Council Resolution 2216, an agreement reached in 2015 which characterises the war as a contest between the Huthis and the internationally recognised government led by President Hadi. However, Yemen is now profoundly fractured and fragmented. Military, economic and ideological power is so diffuse that analysts write of ‘multiple Yemens, tiny statelets and zones of control held by an expanding number of armed groups, all of which have different goals and trajectories’.

Can the UN adapt to this reality? If not, who else could the Yemenis turn to for supplementary mediation and facilitation? Multiple mediators, working in concert or sequentially, is not without precedent.

In Mozambique, two Italian members of the Communità di Sant’Egidio, a Mozambican Roman Catholic archbishop, and a representative of the Italian government brokered the Rome General Peace Accords of 1992. Regional governments and business professionals also brought pressure to bear upon the warring parties before the UN entered the stage to oversee the implementation of the treaty.

The peace process in Aceh, as a second example, was first mediated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue between 1999 and 2004 before the Crisis Management Initiative oversaw dialogue in 2005.

Both Saudi Arabia and Oman have already made forays into the process and Yemenis must consider which mediators are best-equipped to work in harmony to grapple with the fluidity and intricacy of the conflict. Yemenis could also consider whether all these mediators do indeed need to be external.

 

The region as part of the solution

The conflict in Yemen is both regionalised and internationalised. Yemen’s neighbours, together with states further afield, hold culpability for the chaos and tragedy in Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in particular, are tightly enmeshed in the fates of predominant Yemeni factions, and the war in Yemen must be considered in the context of regional and international rivalries and alliances.

How might a reimagined peace process grapple with this complexity? The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has spearheaded peaceful resolutions and restored constitutional governments in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Gambia, offering multiple cases of effective, regional cooperation in search of peace.

And while its efforts were fruitless, in the early years of the Syrian crisis, the Arab League attempted to defuse the conflict and monitor a ceasefire.

Those along Yemen’s border may have provoked and exacerbated the pain of Yemenis but it is not inconceivable that they may also need to play a prominent and, crucially, collective role in any reconstructed peace process.

Making way for a home-grown, inclusive process

The National Dialogue Conference, convened between 2013 and 2014, has been condemned as unwieldy, unrepresentative and unrealistic. The Dialogue did, nevertheless, succeed in gathering together Yemenis from across the country to deliberate the future of the state.

Following the seizure of Sanaa by the Huthis in 2015, however, the peace process has dramatically narrowed. Consultative mechanisms involving women, such as the Technical Advisory Group (TAG), have been sharply criticised as being superficial while, as a forthcoming Inclusive Peace report will show, the array of unofficial, peacebuilding initiatives which have emerged over the course of the conflict have struggled to influence the high-level talks.

However, the ways in which those traditionally marginalised and excluded from peace negotiations can be included within peace processes are wide-ranging and flexible.

More fundamentally, peacebuilding can take a multitude of different forms and titles, involving myriad actors, organisations and spaces.

In Kenya, for instance, a state which has contended with recurring election-related violence since the mid-1990s, peacebuilding has taken the form of mass movements, constitutional amendments, anti-corruption initiatives, civil society campaigns, dialogues overseen by the regional body the African Union (AU), transitional justice commissions, bargaining between members of the political elite, and attempts at national dialogue. These diverse efforts have all taken place in the context of light-touch international support.

Our most crucial suggestion, therefore, is that Yemenis must be afforded the space to rethink the peace process in its entirety. In doing so, they could reflect upon the following:

  • What are the flaws of current approaches to peacebuilding and peacemaking in the state?
  • What do the Yemeni people, in all their diversity, seek? How do they envision their future state? What relationship do they seek with their neighbours in the region?
  • How might Yemenis begin along a pathway towards this vision? What shape should any future peace process adopt?
  • Which pre-existing initiatives – from traditional peacebuilding to more unconventional efforts, including mass movements, campaigns, dialogues, disputes and local mediation – could be preserved, developed, fortified and capitalised upon in pursuit of this vision?
  • What form should any regional and international support take?

And by expanding the very definition of peacebuilding to encompass locally-owned, formal and informal processes, peacebuilding in Yemen will inevitably come to encompass greater swathes of society together with a broader range of themes and challenges.

While peacebuilding, in this conception, may also become more messy and prolonged, it will nevertheless represent a leap forward from the deeply frustrating, ineffectual and stubbornly conventional efforts which currently dominate the conflict resolution process.

Towards perpetual peacebuilding: time for change in Yemen

Peacebuilding is a perpetual endeavour: it does not only take place at a formal, negotiation table, and cannot be detached from the broader arc of a society’s development. Peace is negotiated and re-negotiated incessantly and pathways to peace must be home-grown. The time has arrived for third parties in Yemen and elsewhere to adapt to this reality.

In his final briefing, Griffiths concluded that his efforts over the last three years have been ‘in vain’, remarking that Yemenis deserve more than a life of ‘perpetual war’. If the newly appointed UN Special Envoy to Yemen is not to repeat these words when he leaves the position, we must see a radical shift in approach.

Read all news