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In August 2023, Gabon underwent a major power transition following a successful military coup d’état, the eighth in the region since 2023. The military’s government takeover ended the 55-year dynastic rule of the Bongo regime, which had faced long-standing accusations of widespread corruption and poor governance.

The coup occurred minutes after Ali Bongo, who had taken power following his father’s death, was declared the winner of the 2023 general elections, amid electoral fraud allegations by both the political opposition and the military.

General Nguema, Ali Bongo’s cousin, led the coup and subsequently declared himself as Transitional President in September 2023. While pledging to ensure a swift transition back to civilian rule, Nguema’s regime took several steps following the coup to consolidate the regime’s position of power. These included selecting and appointing all nine members of the Constitutional Court, as well as hosting a highly scripted National Dialogue in mid-2024, during which the military played a prominent role and 200 political parties were banned.

In November 2024, a referendum was held to obtain public approval for the proposed new constitution. The latter provides for a maximum of two presidential terms (extended from five to seven years in length), no prime minister, no dynastic transfer of power, and the abolition of the two round electoral system. The latter therefore lowers the threshold of popular support needed for a candidate to win a presidential election. The ratification of the new constitution was swiftly followed by the introduction of a new law that allows military figures to stand for election.

Post-coup legislative amendments have been viewed by some as means of reinforcing the authority of Gabon’s executive branch, which is already highly centralised. In addition, opposition parties and independent analysts have argued that such changes raise concerns of the military’s intention to remain in power by further eroding checks and balances on the government, which it currently controls.

These concerns are particularly pertinent given the announcement made by coup leader Nguema, who had been open about his intention to run for president since the coup, to announce his candidacy in presidential elections scheduled for April 12, despite the fact that transitional leaders are not usually allowed to run for office.

In March 2025, the Constitutional Court, the members of which were all appointed by Nguema following the coup, approved the coup leader’s candidacy, as well as the former PM. Only one of the eight presidential candidates is a woman.

A black woman with short hair wearing a beige vest gestures while talking to another person at a conference, with a laptop and wood-panel wall in the background.

Commonwealth observers in Gabon for presidential election 2025 | The Commonwealth 2025 © Flickr

Recent developments in Gabon seem to echo findings from a research paper recently published by Inclusive Peace regarding post-coup d’état political trajectories. Using comparative examples from other contexts, this research identified five medium-term scenarios following a successful military coup d’état.

One of these possible transitional trajectories suggests that, following a coup d’état, a military regime may take steps that indicate both a transition back to some form of civilian rule but also a consolidation of the military’s power.

Most often, this will manifest as the military regime following the transition plan to multiparty-elections, while trying to retain influence in the political sphere by either creating its own party or co-opting an existing party or candidate.

As such, the military regime’s actions in Gabon – organising presidential elections but changing the law in order to allow military figures, including the coup leader, to stand for president – may also be viewed in this light.

In addition, research shows that the return to constitutional order is not necessarily sufficient to ensure that a transition back to civilian rule is sustainable since the new constitution in any given context may not incorporate sufficient guarantees for civilian rule going forward. Gabon’s new constitution, in particular the extension of presidential terms and the elimination of certain checks on the President’s power such as the removal of the position of Prime Minister, may therefore prove to be inadequate for a lasting transition to civilian rule.

The outcome of, and the regime’s reaction to, the election on April 12 will provide greater clarity on the extent to which civilian rule in Gabon will be restored. It is possible that these elections will constitute an important step in the military’s promised transition back to civilian rule, while simultaneously working to better ensure continued military dominance of the political space and the Gabonian state.

Maura McGoldrick | Peace Process Support Analyst, Inclusive Peace

Despite the importance of reconstruction in post-conflict settings, the topic has typically been overlooked in many peacebuilding processes. Less than a third of peace agreements since 1990 have included provisions on socio-economic development. Fewer still (10%) have addressed issues pertaining to reconstruction and infrastructure (University of Edinburgh’s Peace Agreements Database). This gap may yet become even more pronounced given the decrease in comprehensive peace agreements, and with the increase in limited ceasefire or cessation of hostilities agreements. In an attempt to address this gap, this blog post explores why reconstruction must be approached inclusively. It draws insights from a recent Inclusive Peace webinar featuring three researchers and practitioners with expertise on reconstruction in the MENA region:

• Dr. Deen Sharp, Visiting Fellow in Human Geography & Environment at the London School of Economics and senior consultant and academic advisor for the Aga Khan Prize for Architecture;

• Dr Nourah Shuaibi, PhD, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University;

• Zozan Alloush, independent political and development consultant and mediator.

The topic of post-conflict reconstruction is more relevant than ever in the MENA region, including in Syria, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and Yemen, where several countries are currently undergoing significant political transitions or are engaged in peacemaking processes, which have provided an opening for reconstruction efforts. Similar to other conflict-affected contexts, the issue of reconstruction will be a significant determinant of how post-conflict societies are rebuilt in the region. Inclusive reconstruction processes will enable inclusive societies and, in turn, sustainable peace.

Similar to other conflict-affected contexts, the issue of reconstruction will be a significant determinant of how post-conflict societies are rebuilt in the region. Inclusive reconstruction processes will enable inclusive societies and, in turn, sustainable peace.

The reconstruction of public spaces and socio-economic infrastructure in post-conflict settings is not merely a technical process – it carries significant political and structural implications. Reconstruction efforts can in turn be instrumentalised to exclude certain groups from peace-making and political transition processes, or to ensure the actors and interests which were previously invested in violence, also guarantee and protect their influence and interests in any post-conflict settlement. The engagement of regional and international actors in such contexts, with their associated influence and motives, engenders further complexity.

Two boys search through rubble, carrying a large cushion amidst debris from collapsed concrete buildings in Gaza, Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Gaza, Occupied Palestinian Territories | Hosny Salah ©

Additionally, reconstruction provisions establish the new parameters of public life (e.g. accessibility to critical infrastructure, spaces for community gathering, etc.) in the post-conflict environment and can therefore serve to entrench existing structural inequalities in the new post-conflict environment. Examples of such dynamics are already visible across a number of protracted conflict settings. The potential for the enactment of further violence through the reconstruction or “post-conflict” phase is perhaps most apparent in Gaza. Continued Israeli restrictions on Palestinians’ mobility and the blockade of goods entering Gaza are actively preventing its inhabitants from clearing the rubble left in the wake of Israeli missile strikes and rebuilding, thereby further entrenching a vast and long-standing power imbalance. As such, pathways to inclusive reconstruction need to be situated in the broader context of peace-making and political transition processes.

Citing the example of the Assad regime’s weaponisation of the reconstruction process in Syria from the beginning of the civil conflict in 2011, Dr. Sharp described how laws around property rights were changed to create exclusive zones, thereby feeding certain social elites and excluding and restricting any group viewed as opposing these elites.

As a means of fostering conversation on this pertinent and underexplored topic and its link to peacebuilding in complex geopolitical contexts, Inclusive Peace recently hosted an online webinar to discuss civil society inclusion in post-conflict reconstruction. Dr. Sharp began the conversation by sharing his reflections, which, linking to the example of Gaza, centred the idea of reconstruction as violence and as facet of conflict itself, which he further elucidates in a forthcoming book (Reconstruction as Violence in Syria, 2025, AUC press). Citing the example of the Assad regime’s weaponisation of the reconstruction process in Syria from the beginning of the civil conflict in 2011, Dr. Sharp described how laws around property rights were changed to create exclusive zones, thereby feeding certain social elites and excluding and restricting any group viewed as opposing these elites. As such, reconstruction policies were utilised to serve a particular political agenda and further entrench existing inequalities.

On a global scale, as issues of conflict and urbanisation and their intersection are becoming increasingly complex, the misappropriation of reconstruction policies to feed specific political agendas is increasingly likely. Dr. Sharp emphasised that the key to the success and sustainability of any reconstruction process is to ensure that this is not exclusively conceived or implemented in a top-down manner, but rather centres the needs and desires of the inhabitants themselves who will be subject to this reconstruction. As suggested by Dr. Sharp, whilst bottom-up inclusive reconstruction is vital in post-war and peacebuilding contexts, the multilateral environment remains valid and valuable for the development of clear global principles to be laid out to guide locally led reconstruction processes. Particularly in cases where the state has been decimated by conflict, it becomes necessary to have some sources of support that are institutional and structural.

Moreover, state-building since the 1990s has included specific ideas about what a ‘new’ state should like, which has typically prioritised the establishment of some form of free-market economy and liberal economy.

Offering a differing but complementary perspective, Dr. Shuaibi argued that, in the context of increasingly complex conflict realities, for example in the MENA region, the age of multilateral frameworks established by international agencies is ending. Such frameworks, as highlighted by Dr. Shuaibi, have usually been based on a traditional state-building model and a top-down and elite-driven approach, under the supervision of international actors. Moreover, state-building since the 1990s has included specific ideas about what a ‘new’ state should like, which has typically prioritised the establishment of some form of free-market economy and liberal economy. Afghanistan and Iraq are cases in point. In today’s climate, Dr. Shuaibi suggested that a policy of what she termed “reparative justice” in processes of state-building and reconstruction, which is predicated on a grassroots and survivor-led approach including reconciliation through education and restitution, is more appropriate. Echoing Dr. Sharp’s point about the need to centre the needs and desires of inhabitants where reconstruction will take place, Dr. Shuaibi advocated for the localisation of state-building and reconstruction processes, with international actors acting only as a support system.

A man stands in a doorway of a crumbling brick structure on a clear day, surrounded by rubble and remnants of buildings in Idlib, Syria.

Idlib, Syria | Ahmed Akacha ©

Ms. Alloush, who joined the webinar from Syria, shared her impressions of the sheer scale of infrastructure destruction in the country, which far surpasses anything that could be captured in a report or statistics. She stressed that decentralised thinking and planning for reconstruction is crucial in the Syrian case, most significantly since the current authorities control only 50 percent of the country’s territory and communities in different parts of the country have different needs as they recover from years of conflict. However, the approach to this process thus far seems to have been focused on attracting foreign investment and therefore on the “strategic reconstruction” of areas most relevant for external actors looking to invest in the reconstruction process, such as airports, oil extraction sites, and ports. As such, it seems that the reconstruction process in Syria remains top-down and dominated by the new authorities, at the expense of Syrians facing the rebuilding of their lives as well as their country.

The fruitful discussion between these three speakers suggests that bridging the gap between research and practice when it comes to the issue of inclusive reconstruction in the context of peacebuilding and peace-making, whilst incredibly challenging, must involve bringing together stakeholders invested and engaged in this area in different ways, from academics to practitioners. The online webinar, whilst facilitating an interesting and engaging exchange, should therefore be seen as only the beginning of a much wider conversation.

Maura McGoldrick | Peace Process Support Analyst, Inclusive Peace

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Patriarchal backlash and increasing levels of armed conflict are currently compounding long-standing challenges to women’s meaningful participation in peacemaking and peacebuilding. In various contexts, building collaboration and coalitions have served as an effective strategy in this regard.

Comparative research shows that advocating for a common agenda can be an effective means for women to make themselves heard during and after peace and political transition processes. Burundi, Colombia, the DRC, Nepal, the Philippines, and Northern Ireland are cases in point.

Women-led coalitions’ primary purpose naturally depends on the specificities of the context women peacebuilders are operating in. A nuanced, context-specific approach is therefore key for making coalition building work.

Women coalitions emerging under conditions of escalating armed conflict usually focus on mitigating the dire consequences of large-scale combat. Sudanese women, for example, formed networks and initiatives following the outbreak of the armed conflict between the SAF and the RSF on 15 April 2023 to advocate for peace talks and women’s inclusion therein; to conduct shuttle diplomacy efforts; provide humanitarian relief; and document human rights violations committed by conflict parties.

In recent consultations organised by Inclusive Peace featuring Sudanese women, forming a coherent women-led anti-war movement that pushes for the pursuit of inclusive peace talks was cited as a key priority. Developing a joint roadmap for women from different Sudanese regions to implement the resolutions from the 2024 Geneva talks emerged as a tangible entry point in this regard.

Armed fighting obviously undermines efforts to connect individual women-led initiatives inside Sudan, while also reinforcing and shaping political and social fragmentation. However, wherever the security situation permits, efforts to strengthen collaboration and coordination among Sudanese women can facilitate their ongoing advocacy and humanitarian relief activities while also giving them a space to plan their involvement in any ongoing or future peacemaking initiative. Any related coalition building effort may also target active women fighters to give women peacemakers and peacebuilders access to the conflict parties.

A coalition building success story: The CWVND in Ethiopia

The Coalition for Women’s Voice in the National Dialogue (CWVND) in Ethiopia shows that coalition building can enhance women’s leverage over ongoing peacemaking initiatives in various ways. Importantly, this also applies to alternative peacemaking spaces like the country’s ongoing National Dialogue process, which is currently proceeding in the absence of a formal peace process.

CWVND, which was established in March 2022, currently encompasses over 50 women-led CSOs from Ethiopia. Its members’ joint commitment to ensuring women’s meaningful participation in Ethiopia’s national dialogue at the national level more broadly is the glue that holds the coalition together.

Two of CWVND’s activities are worthy of particularly close attention.

First, in 2023, the coalition planned and implemented consultations with more than 3,000 women from eight subnational regions and two city administrations. CWVND and TIMRAN (ትምራን), which serves as the coalition’s secretariat, subsequently condensed women’s priorities, concerns, and demands into a succinct 10-point women’s agenda, which they shared with the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (ENDC).

Second, CWVND and TIMRAN trained 151 women as consultation facilitators. The ENDC subsequently deployed 28 of those trained women facilitators for the regional agenda consultations under the national dialogue process.

Three key lessons emerge from the CWVND’s work regarding coalition building and its capacity to promote women’s participation in alternative peacemaking spaces like National Dialogues:

➜ Be quick: CWVND started preparing agenda setting women’s consultations soon after the ENDC officially started operating in February 2022. This short reaction period allowed CWVND to be ahead of the curve in the national dialogue process and increase its visibility during the agenda setting phase.

➜ Maximise local ownership: CWVND had significant agency throughout the agenda consolidation process. Ethiopian women hence own the resulting agenda, which provides them with a strong foundation for advocating for a transformation of women’s position in Ethiopia’s society during the national dialogue and beyond.

➜ Support women with diversifying their participation modalities in peacemaking spaces: Women-led coalitions can support women with entering and influencing peacemaking spaces in different functions. The ENDC’s decision to draw on 28 CWVND-trained women facilitators indicates that CWVND’s training interventions have strengthened women’s reputation as stakeholders with relevant thematic knowledge, skills, and expertise regarding the national dialogue. Their formal involvement as facilitators and technical experts allows women to shape the national dialogue process in various roles.

Coalition building: Challenges and implications for external supporters

Building coalitions among women comes with multi-faceted challenges. Four issues stand out. First, women are a heterogeneous group. They often pursue different political agendas and disagree on the priorities and ideal outcomes of a peace or political transition process, particularly in more polarised environments. In Nepal, for example, women representatives in the first Constituent Assembly focused on advancing the position of their respective political party rather than women’s rights.

Second, women peacemakers and peacebuilders operating in conflict-affected and more markedly patriarchal contexts often encounter severe threats and backlash in the physical and digital space. Abduction, arbitrary arrests, rape, defamation, slander, smear campaigns, and intimidation make coalition building a dangerous undertaking. Managing and mitigating those risks is therefore a key pillar of any impactful coalition building effort.

Third, women-led coalitions may only enable women’s meaningful participation if they can grow organically and make independent decisions about which activities they want to pursue. The case of the women-led civil society organisation Ugaaso in Ethiopia’s Somali region shows that strong and vocal women coalitions take time to evolve, yet can make a significant impact along the way.

Fourth, women often lack information and awareness of other ongoing women-led peacemaking initiatives, which can constrain their collaboration and coordination. In Yemen, for example, women often receive information about ongoing mediation initiatives very late in the day, if at all, which significantly constrains their efforts to collectively strategise and influence those processes.

The next iteration of this series on participation will draw on Ethiopian women’s recent coalition building experiences to highlight lessons learned regarding the practicalities of addressing some of those challenges and establishing and maintaining a women-led coalition.

In the meantime, several entry points exist for the international community to enhance women’s coalition building efforts. For example, skilful external facilitation and technical as well as financial accompaniment can help women to develop trustful relationships with each other through repeated exchanges.

External actors’ commitment to serving as a long-term companion can also bolster a women’s coalition’s development. The same holds for local ownership. As indicated above, providing on-demand, subtle support from behind the scenes allows external actors to maximise women’s agency in any coalition building initiative.

Philip Poppelreuter | Researcher, Inclusive Peace

This blog is part of Inclusive Peace’s 2025 series on women’s effective participation in peace processes. The series examines context-sensitive strategies women have successfully pursued or could pursue to shape peacemaking and peacebuilding in a changing geopolitical context marked by increasing levels of armed conflict, greater multipolarity – both in general and more specifically in terms of mediation actors – and a decline in comprehensive peace processes and agreements led by the UN. It is based on comparative findings of a project Inclusive Peace is undertaking in partnership with the Irish DFA in the run-up to the 25th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 in October 2025.

The prospect of negotiations to end the war in Ukraine starting soon has become more likely over the past three weeks, particularly following US-Ukraine talks in Jeddah this week. This blog explores entry points for preparing for comprehensive peace negotiations that can give rise to just and lasting peace in Ukraine.

Events surrounding the war in Ukraine have come thick and fast over the past three weeks, with significant progress towards a ceasefire over the past week.

US-Russia talks in Riyadh in mid-February sent a clear signal that both sides are seeking to improve their bilateral relationship and jointly discuss a potential end to the war in Ukraine. Ukraine’s absence from the talks was notable.

Subsequently, France and the UK started working on a proposed peace plan to end the war in Ukraine, including a limited one-month truce covering the seas, the air, and Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Several Western countries have also indicated their willingness to join a coalition of the willing proposed by UK prime minister Keir Starmer to back a potential ceasefire in Ukraine through boots on the ground.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy then presented a proposal for a partial ceasefire last week, and publicly expressed Ukraine’s readiness to enter ceasefire negotiations. The announcement followed the chaotic meeting between Zelenskiy, US president Donald Trump, and US vice president JD Vance at the Oval Office on 28 February and the subsequent suspension of all US military aid and intelligence support to Ukraine.

Events took another significant turn following a meeting between high-level representatives of the US and Ukraine in Jeddah on Tuesday this week. Zelenskiy publicly expressed Ukraine’s commitment to accept an immediate 30-day ceasefire covering the entire frontline, the seas, and the air as proposed by the US if Russia did the same. In return, the Trump administration announced the immediate resumption of all military aid flows to Ukraine. US representatives also committed to tabling their ceasefire proposal with Russian counterparts. Russia’s response to this development remains to be seen at the time of writing.

Novoselovka, Ukraine | Ales Uscinaw ©

Preparing for comprehensive peace negotiations

Diplomatic coordination between state leaders is only one of several preparatory activities ahead of peace negotiations. While state leaders are currently focused on reaching a ceasefire, the fact that US and Ukraine representatives agreed to set up teams of negotiators to begin preparations for a comprehensive peace negotiation process during their meeting in Jeddah this week, indicates that discussions are also looking beyond a ceasefire. Both ceasefire and comprehensive peace negotiations require thorough preparation, which can be mutually reinforcing.

Our report “Negotiating an End to the War in Ukraine” draws on comparative evidence to provide an in-depth discussion of six tangible entry points for preparing a comprehensive peace negotiation process. Each preparatory activity adheres to the core principle that any future negotiation process must involve Ukraine to enable a just and sustainable peace.

Preparatory activity 1: Deepening coordination among states who are willing to support negotiations

A higher number of supportive states amplify the financial, technical, and human resources available to enable comprehensive peace negotiations. Potential state supporters of negotiations could therefore proactively highlight the value of their inclusion in the negotiation process to the conflict parties. Previous exploratory initiatives from Türkiye, Brazil, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, India, China, and Indonesia indicate that these actors might be interested in supporting a negotiation process.

Coordinating and streamlining planning activities of interested states can enhance the preparation for peace negotiations. Division of labour and allocation of roles in the negotiation process are two key themes for states to discuss. France and the UK could draw on their nascent ceasefire initiative to reach out to state leaders from the Global South to strengthen and diversify diplomatic coordination mechanisms among state supporters for peace negotiations.

France and the UK could draw on their nascent ceasefire initiative to reach out to state leaders from the Global South to strengthen and diversify diplomatic coordination mechanisms among state supporters for peace negotiations.

Following initial discussions, state supporters of negotiations could discuss the establishment of an institutionalised coordination platform for the entire peace process. Contact groups, groups of friends supporting the mediator(s), and groups of monitors that served as guarantors for an agreement are examples for diplomatic coordination mechanisms in previous peace processes.

Preparatory activity 2: Preparing the substance for the negotiation agenda

A major part of the preparation for negotiations involves discussing the substance of the prospective discussions. State actors and experts from civil society and business could conduct a comprehensive conflict analysis to identify the most salient issues that negotiations will likely have to address.

Negotiation parties could draw on the conflict analysis to establish thematic working groups to prepare the substantive discussions under each agenda item. Individual states, multilateral actors such as the UN, or large civil society organisations with thematic expertise could facilitate those working groups. Frequent exchange between the individual thematic working groups could enable informed decisions regarding the sequencing of agenda items during negotiations.

Preparatory activity 3: Setting up thematic expert groups that accompany the substantive, logistical, legal, and administrative preparations

Legal advisors, businesspeople, administrative and logistical, as well as country and regional specialists, among others, have relevant expertise that can enrich the discussions of the thematic working groups mentioned above. This pertains to potential compromises for addressing specific drivers, the evaluation of peace process design options as well as logistical tasks related to peace negotiations.

Informal expert groups comprising think tanks and other non-state actors can also support thematic working groups, the mediator(s), and civil society groups with the various facets of their preparatory work. Drafting confidential thematic non-papers and offering capacity building exercises are two tangible entry points in this regard.

Preparatory activity 4: Tapping into peace process support expertise

Academic and civil society actors and institutions with a track record in peace process support can help conflict parties and mediators to anticipate and deal with various scenarios in which peace negotiations might unfold. Peace process support experts, once connected with conflict parties and mediator(s), can provide ideas, options, and guidance on how to:

➜ Sequence agenda items

➜ Enhance negotiating parties’ trust in the viability of the negotiation process;

➜ Mitigate external pressure for rushed negotiations;

➜ Mitigate potential sources of resistance to negotiations;

➜ Deal with situations where negotiations get stuck or risk being derailed.

Peace process support experts can also enhance civil society actors who seek to shape the preparations for as well as the actual negotiation phase.

Makariv, Ukraine | Dmitry Zvolskiy ©

Preparatory activity 5: Forming civil society alliances to shape and enhance preparations for negotiations and thereby strengthen national ownership

Civil society actors have vast subject matter expertise, networks, and mediation skills, which can enhance preparations for negotiations. They can also serve as intermediaries between state actors preparing for negotiations to the broader population and vice versa.

Creating dedicated spaces for Ukrainian civil society, women’s organisations, religious groups, the business community, and diaspora members to flag their priorities and positions around anticipated negotiation topics could allow them to complement the preparatory work of Ukrainian state representatives. Strong connections between those civil society spaces and the formal preparatory and negotiation process would also be conducive to enhance feelings of national ownership in the process. External actors could provide on-demand financial and technical facilitation accompaniment support to any informal consultations among Ukrainian non-state actors.

Civil society actors have vast subject matter expertise, networks, and mediation skills, which can enhance preparations for negotiations. They can also serve as intermediaries between state actors preparing for negotiations to the broader population and vice versa.

Recent dynamics suggest that Ukrainian civil society inclusion in the negotiation process is likely to be unrealistic. The prospect of involvement or consultation of Russian civil society actors is essentially nil. Working on strategies to gradually enhance the inclusivity of the negotiation process can help non-state actors to prepare for the scenario under which potential mediators/facilitators or certain conflict parties push for exclusive peace talks.

Preparatory activity 6: Developing communication strategies to build public trust in the negotiation process

Media and communication experts, policy makers, and civil society representatives could jointly work on consistent messaging on why and how preparing for negotiations strengthens Ukraine’s position. Public events such as panel discussions or workshops as well as media coverage of peace process support experts could enhance public knowledge about the role negotiations play in ending wars.

Conflict parties and states involved in the negotiation process would ideally also prepare a communication strategy for the pre-negotiation and negotiation phase. Any such communication strategy could define the amount of information and the frequency of updates on the negotiation process that will be relayed to the public. Specific strategies to deal with misinformation campaigns and prevent information leaks during the negotiations would be equally key.

Philip Poppelreuter | Researcher, Inclusive Peace

For the key insights, have a look at our briefing note.

Ready for a deep dive? Read the full report.

The 2014 and 2015 Minsk Agreements are a cautionary tale of the need to ensure Ukrainian interests are not sidelined and to include Ukraine in any peace negotiations.

Next week will mark the third anniversary of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Three years on, the chances of either side achieving an outright military victory that would realise their respective stated aims continue to appear slim.

Since initial negotiations several weeks after the full-scale Russian invasion, public diplomatic exchanges between Ukraine and Russia have been limited, focusing on grain exports and prisoner exchanges. Publicly acknowledged diplomatic activity towards negotiations over the past two years has comprised the Ukrainian government’s 10-point peace formula, and other exploratory initiatives involving actors like Türkiye, Brazil, China, seven African states, the Vatican, and Saudi Arabia. The flurry of diplomatic activity over the past week has brought negotiations to end the war squarely into view. Despite some (how to put this diplomatically…) mixed messaging from the new U.S. administration about their intentions for the composition of peace negotiations, Donald Trump and Keith Kellog have stated that peace talks would involve Ukraine, and Marco Rubio confirmed last Sunday during a visit to Jerusalem that Ukraine and European states would be involved in any “real” negotiations.

Amid all the bloviation, false claims, and empty self-aggrandising rhetoric, this provided a measure of reassurance – at least temporarily – to everyone who is deeply invested in a just and sustainable end to the war. But any repetition of the message that Ukraine and Europe would have to be involved in any substantive talks and that a durable settlement would have to respect Ukrainian sovereignty were conspicuous by its absence during the U.S.-Russia talks in Riyadh on Tuesday.

Beyond the fairly intuitive proposition that any agreement to end the war is unlikely to be just or sustainable if it excludes the party that was invaded, the very recent history of the Russia-Ukraine armed conflict in the form of the 2014 and 2015 Minsk Agreements also provides a cautionary example of the need to ensure Ukrainian interests are not sidelined and to include Ukraine in any negotiation format both in the spirit, and to the letter, of “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.”

Both Agreements presented a settlement that was acceptable to Russia (at the time) and Ukraine’s patrons in France and Germany, but side-lined Ukrainian interests. This led to a lack of both elite and popular support in Ukraine for either agreement. An absence of confidence-building measures also perpetuated the low level of trust between Ukraine and Russia. All of this – along with other shortcomings of the Agreements, including the lack of clarity in the sequencing of implementation, the unclear obligations and roles of states in implementation, and the ensuing room for markedly different interpretations of the agreements by different parties – meant that the Minsk Agreements neither constituted a viable compromise nor managed to end the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Bilateral talks between Ukraine and Russia are the default format option for ceasefire and peace negotiations. But given the multidimensional nature of the war and the need to integrate a regional security dimension, involving additional parties in the talks will be a key consideration.

The war in Ukraine is a multidimensional conflict encompassing two levels: a “hot” inter-state war between Russia and Ukraine and a “cold” war between NATO and Russia. The fact that the Trump Administration is seemingly in the process of reversing anywhere between four years and four generations of U.S. foreign policy orthodoxy towards the USSR/Russia doesn’t automatically mean that the NATO-Russia “cold” war has entirely thawed let alone already being on a path to resolution.

With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the centre of contested geopolitical gravity in Europe shifted east. During the Cold War, the two Germanies (and particularly the division of Berlin, physically manifested in the form of the Berlin Wall) came to symbolise the two competing blocks. However, with the enlargement of NATO and EU expansion following the Cold War, Ukraine became the front line of the competing spheres of regional influence. Diplomatic initiatives like the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, under which Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons arsenal in exchange for territorial integrity and independence assurances by Russia, the US, and the UK, or the Minsk I and II Agreements failed to promote enduring stability in the region. As such, one of the main underlying causes of the current war can be seen in the unresolved renegotiations of the post-Cold War political and security order between Ukraine and Russia and between Russia and the combination of NATO and the EU. Negotiations to end the war in Ukraine will de facto involve a discussion of regional security, and can thus be taken as an opportunity to proactively address new terms for the regional security architecture and also its global dimensions. A more comprehensive negotiation format could help to address these related but distinct conflict dimensions.

Our report “Negotiating an End to the War in Ukraine” draws on comparative evidence to develop ideas and options for a negotiation process design that can maximise the chances of producing a sustainable and just settlement. It also discusses entry points for other stakeholders’ direct or indirect involvement in the talks, including European/NATO states – and potentially non-aligned states from the Global South – and representatives from civil society, business, and faith organisations.

A small group of states could be given official roles in Ukraine-Russia talks short of full participation; or a multi-party format could be used to foster a more cooperative dynamic by giving a degree of representation to a larger number of actors. Both these options could also include a small group of third-party states, and actors from civil society, business or faith organisations as participants or guarantors or in other roles. External intermediaries, including state and non-state actors, could play different roles including as mediators, facilitators, and guarantors.

The way the talks are structured can also help Ukraine, Russia, and any other actors involved to manage the complexity of issues and parties. Different thematic components of the negotiation process can take place in parallel or sequentially, and different negotiation tracks can feature different compositions of parties. A multi-party format typically involves specialised working groups or commissions that support the work of the respective thematic tracks. This allows for flexibility in the sequencing of negotiations in relation to questions that might be unanswerable when negotiations begin, such as whether a ceasefire can be reached while other issues remain unresolved.

Whenever negotiations ultimately materialise and whatever the process design that is adopted, one thing is patently clear: for any agreement to end the war to have a chance of being just and sustainable Ukraine must be involved in negotiating it. The sooner that is universally and irrevocably recognized, the sooner the important business of planning and preparing for negotiations can begin in earnest.

Alex Bramble | Head of Research, Inclusive Peace

For the key insights have a look at our briefing note.

Ready for a deep dive? Read the full report.

On 01 January 2025, Inclusive Peace enters a new stage in its organisational growth as a world-class facilitator of inclusive peacemaking and peacebuilding in some of the world’s most complex and protracted political processes.

For the past five years, Inclusive Peace has been led by Dr. Thania Paffenholz, who founded the organisation 10 years ago through its transition from the Inclusive Peace and Transitions Initiative hosted at the Geneva Graduate Institute.

At the end of December, Thania will step down from her role as Director and take on a new function as a Senior Advisor. Thania made this decision to dedicate more time to developing innovative avenues for creating broader impacts for peace and inclusive societies within and beyond the peacebuilding field to engage with global audiences, networks, and movements, including the next generation of societal and political change-makers. While exploring these new opportunities, Thania will also remain engaged in supporting peace and political change processes alongside Inclusive Peace’s partners.

The organisation will continue to benefit from Thania’s wealth of experience in this new function. To further strengthen Inclusive Peace’s position and build on the legacy of its founder, the organisation will be led by the current management team – with Zachary Taylor, Managing Director, and Alex Shoebridge, Head of Peace Process Support playing more prominent roles, complemented by a wider set of research, peace process support, and operations colleagues based across East Africa, Europe, and Asia/Pacific.

This includes a diversified portfolio of work across three continents supported by an advisory board comprised of a number of prominent figures from the world of mediation, diplomacy, security, and peacebuilding and a broadened partnership base spanning foreign ministries, development agencies, and foundations, and a renewed sense of direction.

Inclusive Peace wishes to thank Thania for the extraordinary contribution she has made towards putting inclusivity at the heart of conflict management and peacebuilding around the world, and we look forward to the next chapter Inclusive Peace continues to pursue its vision and mandate “to set change in motion” by supporting actors to engage and shape peace and political transition processes.

In this piece, we highlight the need to bring indigenous cultural and scientific knowledge into peacebuilding. In this Q&A with renowned peacebuilder Binalakshmi Nepram, she shares why the world of today needs indigenous knowledge more than ever and why indigenous peacebuilding should inform peace research.

As a child, Binalakshmi Nepram did not realise that she grew up in a war zone. She thought living amidst violent conflict was normal. She wanted to go into science and be a physicist, but her journey took a different route. At some point, she realised that growing up in conflict should not be considered normal for any child. Binalakshmi Nepram grew up in Manipur, a former nation-state located now in India’s North Eastern part, bordering Myanmar. She is the founder of the Global Alliance of Indigenous Peoples for Gender, Justice, and Peace and she is an advocate for not only victims of the forgotten conflict in Manipur but also of the power and wisdom of indigenous peacebuilding.

Inclusive Peace recently talked to Binalakshmi Nepram over a Zoom connection from her in a hotel room in New York in between her meetings during UNGA week about what the world can learn from indigenous peacebuilding.

How did your journey as a peacebuilder start?

My journey as a peacebuilder did not start as a project or a career choice. It started with trying to find answers to bring peace to one of the world’s most forgotten conflicts. I saw my 14-year-old niece die, my parents nearly being shot, and I, myself, have been threatened multiple times. My journey as a peacebuilder started with the spirit to be alive, to stay safe, and to be able to bring peace to the villages in my home region in the mountains of Manipur.

There are more than 134 armed conflicts [including intra-state conflicts: Source] in the world [including state-based intra-state and non-state conflicts, see more here], many of which you do not even know about. The conflict that I come from, the Manipur conflict, is one such conflict. My starting point as a peacebuilder was trying to find solutions to a crisis that the world does not acknowledge or understand. As someone caught in this conflict, I must spread awareness and offer my knowledge in search of solutions.

What is the type of knowledge that indigenous peacebuilding offers?

We live in an era of information and knowledge, but not all knowledge is considered equal worth. Indigenous knowledge is an example of a type of knowledge that is not always being taken into account. 476 million indigenous people are living in 90 countries and territories, and currently, 80% of the world’s conflicts are happening in biodiversity hotspots, where indigenous people live. In many of the peace agreements, peace talks, and peace conferences, I hardly see indigenous people at center stage. How can we try to resolve the conflicts of today, if we do not acknowledge the wisdom and power of indigenous knowledge and peacebuilding?

Our work is not just to be angry about what happened to us – our work is to engage and inform the right people, policymakers, and people who are working in different parts of the world on peacebuilding to include indigenous peoples in peacebuilding. The first objective is to convenience decision-makers to engage with Indigenous peoples. Do not just ignore them – listen and engage. Ask what wisdom they carry and what are some of the innovative methods they have evolved in their communities to coexist with one another despite differences.

How to do that?

To convince, decision-makers and nation-states, we need research and network. There is very little research done on the indigenous methodology of peacebuilding. We have started in the last year and a half to work on this, but there is still much more to do. We have to ensure that wherever we are working, we can sit down with indigenous people, learn from them, and weave their wisdom into peacebuilding methodology. Then we need convening spaces. This year, the first global summit on Indigenous peacebuilding in April was held, which brought together 120 Indigenous peacebuilders from 30 countries and territories from seven social and cultural zones of the world. At the summit, we launched the global network of indigenous peacebuilders, mediators, and negotiators. The aim is that this network of indigenous leaders, elders, women, and youth will eventually be able to enter conflict zones and negotiate meaningful peace.

Finally, we have now the International Declaration on Indigenous Peacebuilding. We would like the world’s decision-makers to take a look at that declaration and to ensure that decision-makers calculate the principles in the declaration. The blueprint for how to meaningfully integrate indigenous peacebuilding into mediation, negotiation, peacemaking, and conflict resolution is already there – now it needs to be applied. Currently, we are working closely with the United Nations to ensure that indigenous peacebuilding, indigenous mediation, and indigenous forms of negotiation in resolving and mitigating violent conflicts in included in the wider field. I repeat; when 80% of the world’s conflicts are happening in biodiversity hotspots, which is linked to environmental violence, the protection of people, peace, and the planet, will have to include and put indigenous people at the center stage if we want to build a more sustainable world that works for all.

But for all of our work on research and convening to have an impact, there has to come to both acknowledgment and investment from nation-states. First of all, acknowledge that indigenous peoples exist. Countries like China and India do not recognise indigenous peoples. Bangladesh has thrown out the term indigenous peoples and called them ethnic minorities. Nation-states need to embrace indigenous peoples and make them a part of the governance structure. It is time to learn from indigenous people and include them in this local, national, and multilateral decision-making.

Then comes investment. Indigenous peoples are one of the poorest communities in the world because of how post-colonial structures work. It is time for nation-states to apologise and help indigenous peoples live up to their potential. This also means investing in preserving indigenous ways of life, language, cultural and scientific knowledge such as music, medicine, and crafts and finally, wisdom. Indigenous people may just be 6% of the world, but they take care of 80% of the world’s biodiversity. And then, there needs to be investment in indigenous peacebuilding which means resources for research and resources for indigenous peoples to travel to conflict areas to engage.

Why is indigenous peacebuilding more important today than ever before?

The world is hurting, and the people of the earth are hurting because we have forgotten that we belong to each other. We are living under structures that dictate competition and sovereignty to kill. Indigenous people have done things differently. They have said that human beings are not alone in the Anthropocene world. We are not at the top. We are just one of the many elements. Our way of life is to live in humility with the world around us, and not with the arrogance that we think that we can control and conquer everything. Greed and the human search for power have destroyed our world. Indigenous peoples’ worldview and their cosmic vision bring peace and not war. They talk about coexistence, not annihilation. They talk about spirituality and not the domination of one or two religions. They talk about coexistence with the natural environment around us, and not to extraction and depletion of Mother Earth.

I grew up in an indigenous community in Manipur, but I am also a citizen of the modern world. I see two worlds, the indigenous world, and the non-indigenous world, and I realise that the more I go into the non-indigenous world, I feel that we are hurting ourselves. The indigenous worldview is like a bond on a wounded soul. It will bring that peace, that seven billion people on this planet deserve.

There is still a long way to go before the power asymmetries in the peacebuilding field between Northern and Southern peacebuilding actors are dissolved, but what does it take to change this? Peacebuilding experts from Sub-Saharan Africa share their points of view.

Recent online consultations with peacebuilding experts from Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, and Sudan, show that despite a positive change in the donor-recipient relationship over the past years, local peacebuilding actors remain in an inferior position to international donors.

The peacebuilding experts described the relationship in various ways: International donors looking down on local actors, lacking respect towards local actors, or treating them as employees rather than partners on equal footing.

So what does it take to change that? In this blog, we highlight the innovative suggestions from the peacebuilding experts for creating a donor-recipient relationship on equal footing.

Rethinking How We Talk About and Support Local Peacebuilding Efforts

Participants suggested two main ways to improve how we think about and support local peacebuilding efforts.

1. Updating Terms and Concepts:

Change the Language: Instead of using the term “localisation,” which can seem vague and gives the impression that local agency depends on international donors’ localisation efforts, we should focus on “local ownership.” This means emphasising the role of local people in leading peacebuilding efforts.
Define “Local” Clearly: There should be a common understanding of who counts as “local.” This could be done by mapping out who is involved in peacebuilding locally and deciding which groups should get support from outside sources. Creating consortia of local peacebuilders working together can help with this.

2. Improving Communication Between Local and International Actors:

Donor Behaviour: International donors should be clear about their supportive but less central role in peacebuilding efforts. They should highlight the skills and achievements of local peacebuilders rather than just their needs. Donors could also work on strategies that present both local and international actors as equal partners working together to address security issues.
Local Efforts: Local peacebuilders should promote their skills and achievements publicly. They could run campaigns to showcase what they can contribute to peacebuilding, rather than focusing on what they need.

Promoting Local Leadership Early On

To boost local peacebuilders’ influence from the start the experts suggested to

Involve Local Experts: Involve local knowledge and expertise right from the planning stages of peacebuilding projects to better address local security challenges.
Local Decision-Making: Ensure that local peacebuilders have leadership roles in international NGOs and decision-making bodies that control peacebuilding funds. This inclusion can be further enhanced by having a localisation expert in leadership teams.

Improving Collaboration Between Donors and Local Peacebuilders

Create Inclusive Spaces: Set up shared spaces where local and international actors can work together to plan and monitor peacebuilding projects. This collaboration should continue throughout the project, including developing joint monitoring and evaluation plans.
Widen Local Engagement: Donors should expand their reach by mapping out local peacebuilders, offering training on international standards, giving local groups more time to develop necessary skills, and committing to direct partnerships with a range of local organisations.
Local Networks: Local peacebuilders could form consortia to handle interactions with international donors more effectively. Networking among local actors will help create stronger connections with donors.

Reworking the Funding System

Institutional Funding: Shift towards providing institutional funding, which can help local organisations offer competitive salaries and maintain independence. This type of funding can also support effective monitoring and evaluation and allow organisations to focus more on their work rather than fundraising.
Flexibility in Support: Donors should be flexible in supporting peacebuilding efforts in countries facing international sanctions to avoid situations like in Sudan, where sanctions have diverted funds away from essential peacebuilding work. Flexible funding would also allow local peacebuilding actors to adapt their programs to rapidly changing security or political conditions.

Strengthening Local Networks

Collaborate, Don’t Compete: Local peacebuilders should focus on cooperating rather than competing. Professional local NGOs and grassroots organisations should work together to strengthen their influence over donors. Agreeing on certain principles can also help ensure that international donors commit to supporting local peacebuilders more consistently.

Navigating Local Government Challenges in Peacebuilding

When working on peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected areas, it’s important to adjust strategies based on the local political environment.

In More Open Contexts:

Localisation Advisors: In countries where the government is more open, appointing advisors to work with different government ministries can help boost support for local peacebuilding efforts. This can strengthen local involvement in peacebuilding projects.

In Authoritarian Contexts:

Protecting Peacebuilders: In countries with repressive governments, the focus should be on protecting local peacebuilders from government crackdowns. It’s crucial to ensure they have the financial and technical resources they need.
Peer Support: Encouraging peacebuilders to share experiences and strategies, both within their country and internationally, can help them better navigate challenging political environments.

Inclusive Peace, as part of the Women, Peace, & Security (#WPS) Working Group for the Arab States, recently convened with fellow members in Geneva to tackle a pressing goal: advancing regional policies that strengthen women’s roles in peacebuilding ahead of the upcoming 25th anniversary of the WPS agenda in 2025.

Press release

Geneva, Switzerland – October 2, 2024 – The Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Working Group for the Arab States convened its second meeting in Geneva from September 30 to October 2, 2024, as part of its commitment to establishing a regional mechanism to inform and shape WPS policies across the Arab region in anticipation of the 25th anniversary of the WPS agenda in 2025.

The 25th anniversary of the agenda provides a critical opportunity to assess its effectiveness and to redefine its relevance, particularly within conflict-affected regions such as the Arab states. Over the past two decades, the WPS agenda, enshrined in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325 (2000)), has aimed to enhance women’s participation in peace processes and ensure their protection in conflict and post-conflict settings. Despite the milestones achieved through UNSCR 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions, the Arab states region continues to grapple with deeply entrenched barriers, particularly in relation to women’s meaningful participation in peacebuilding and governance processes.

Building on the momentum from the inaugural meeting in Amman, Jordan, last June, the second meeting of the WPS Working Group brought together WPS practitioners, policy experts, academics, and peacebuilders, hailing from Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Sudan and Syria. Discussions centered on the identification of priority areas for the WPS agenda for the next decade, and on the existing gaps and challenges in the implementation of the agenda in the Arab Region. A central theme that arose from the discussions was the need to ensure the protection of women peacebuilders, activists and human rights defenders as an enabler for their meaningful participation in peace, political, humanitarian and conflict prevention efforts, which are urgently needed in the region.

During the meeting, focus was also given to further refining a white policy paper which proposes actionable recommendations for the implementation of the WPS agenda in the region. The evolving white policy paper will serve as a vital resource for stakeholders throughout the 25th anniversary year to include the narrative and amplify the voices of women WPS actors from the Arab States in high-level WPS policy discussions and fora. Hosted at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung offices, the meeting included consultations and external engagements with representatives from the Women, Peace and Humanitarian Fund, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The meeting also coincided with the Human Rights Council’s 57th annual session, allowing the Working Group participants to attend annual discussions of the council on gender as well as relevant side events, providing opportunities to engage with a broader network of international stakeholders in Geneva.

In honor of the Working Group meeting, a reception was hosted by the Swedish Dialogue Institute at the Swedish Permanent Mission Residence in Geneva. The reception provided an opportunity for the Working Group to meet, foster relationships, and engage in dialogue with Geneva based organizations and diplomats, including representatives from Permanent Representations in Geneva.

One participant remarked,

“Creating a safe space for dialogue, where we can listen to diverse viewpoints and address the challenges and gaps faced by women in the Arab region, offers a valuable opportunity to learn, find solutions, and reflect on our situation as women in relation to Women, Peace, and Security issues.” She further emphasized, “Meeting with women from various conflict-affected countries across the Arab region has enabled us to draw comparisons and explore ways to strengthen the role of women in peacebuilding, fostering international alliances, and even promoting healing and recovery.”

Given the growing instability in the Arab States Region and the well-documented disproportionate impact that conflicts and crises have on women and girls, the working group is a timely initiative aiming to foster solidarity among WPS actors and to influence peace and security policy spaces to encourage the full and meaningful implementation of the WPS agenda in the region. The rotational nature of participants of the Working Group ensures that consultations have a wide reach and that experts from diverse backgrounds enrich future dialogues with fresh perspectives.

The aim of the meeting is to further develop the WPS white paper, initially drafted during the working group’s first meeting in Amman. This paper outlines the priorities, challenges, and recommendations that need to be considered in advancing the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. The goal is to eventually present the white paper to the UN Security Council as we approach the 25th anniversary of the adoption of UNSCR 1325 next year. – Heba Zayyan, Regional Women, Peace, Security and Humanitarian Action Advisor at UN Women Regional Office for the Arab States.

As the working group moves forward, it remains steadfast in its commitment to fostering collaboration among diverse stakeholders, advocating for meaningful policy change, and creating a more inclusive and equitable environment where women’s voices are amplified, their rights are safeguarded, and their contributions to peace are recognized and valued.

About the WPS Working Group for the Arab States:
The WPS Regional Hub at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (IFI) at the American University of Beirut leads the WPS Working Group in partnership with the UN Women Regional Office for the Arab States, GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), the Swedish Dialogue Institute for the Middle East and North Africa, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung MENA, the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, Inclusive Peace, the Arab Reform Initiative and the Embassy of Switzerland to Lebanon and Syria.
The WPS Working Group is committed to advancing gender equality, peace, and security in the Arab Region, as enshrined in the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions.

Women and girls in the Arab region, which is often ranked as the least peaceful globally, are disproportionately affected by armed conflicts and political instability. They face challenges such as marginalization, violence, and significant hardships in accessing essential resources. Yet, evidence shows that women across the region have been making significant contributions to the stability and security of their communities through their leadership in mediating and preventing conflict.

By fostering collaboration among diverse stakeholders and advocating for policy change, the Working Group for the Arab States aims to create a more inclusive and equitable environment where women’s voices are heard, their rights are protected, and their contributions to peace are valued.

Note
This initiative is supported by UN Women as part of the programme “Enhancing Women’s Leadership for Sustainable Peace in Fragile Contexts in the MENA Region”, funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in cooperation with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.

This initiative is also supported by FES as part of the BMZ’ special means fund to address core reasons of flight and migration. Other organizing partners also play a vital role by contributing financially to the organization of meetings for the WPS Working Group, ensuring the success and continuity of these collaborative efforts.

Each year on Mandela Day, South Africans dedicate 67 minutes to community service in memory of Nelson Mandela’s 67 years of social justice work. Lerato Selekisho recently joined our team as a Special Assistant and here reflects on what Mandela Day means to her.

As a young born-free South African, I am grateful for the legacy of Nelson Mandela and the values he embodied. Mandela Day, celebrated on July 18th each year, his birthday, serves as a reminder of his commitment to service and social justice. The idea of dedicating 67 minutes of our time to community service in honor of Mandela’s 67 years of social justice work is a powerful reminder of the values he stood for. These 67 minutes are dedicated to serving and bringing people together worldwide to fight poverty and promote peace, reconciliation, and cultural diversity. This initiative embodies the spirit of Ubuntu, the African philosophy that emphasizes all people’s interconnectedness and shared humanity.

While Mandela is widely revered as a hero and symbol of reconciliation, his leadership and legacy elicit mixed perspectives. Some criticize his compromises during the transition to democracy, while others praise his commitment to social justice and equality. Regardless of these differing views, Mandela’s sacrifices and contributions are undeniable. Mandela demonstrated what it means to be selfless and to place the needs of a nation before personal needs, family, friends, and ambitions. His dedication to fighting against oppression and injustice inspires us to continue working toward a more just and equitable society.

The famous African philosophy of Ubuntu is particularly significant on Mandela Day, reminding us of value systems that emphasize the interconnectedness of individuals with their societal and physical worlds. “Ubuntu” is often translated as “I am because we are.” I grew up in a Christian and politically aware home and Mandela Day was always taken seriously. Our activities ranged from handing out Bibles and making period hampers to organizing soup days in townships and distributing food parcels. For me, these acts served as a reminder that even one person can be a changemaker within their sphere.

While some may argue that dedicating just one day a year to service is insufficient, for me, we must recognize the significance of Mandela Day as an opportunity to raise awareness and inspire action. However, it is equally important to continue our efforts beyond a single day and incorporate them into our daily lives. Food parcels and soup kitchens may seem like small gestures, but they have the power to make a big difference in the lives of those struggling with hunger and poverty. By volunteering our time and resources on Mandela Day, we can help alleviate some of the hardships our fellow South Africans face.

Mandela Day is not about grand gestures or flashy displays of charity. It is about taking small steps towards creating lasting change in our society. As change-makers, we can shape the future of our country through acts of kindness and compassion. Now more than ever, in a world often marked by division, this Mandela Day serves as a time to remember and promote peace, reconciliation, and cultural diversity. It is a moment to embrace the philosophy of Ubuntu.

Mandela Day is not about grand gestures or flashy displays of charity. It is about taking small steps towards creating lasting change in our society. As change-makers, we can shape the future of our country through acts of kindness and compassion