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# Mapping Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Ukraine:

Peacebuilding by Any Other Name

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## 1. Introduction

This report was prepared by the Mediation and Dialogue Research Center, Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Ukraine at the request of the Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative (IPTI), Geneva, as part of its Impact Local Peace project (2018-2019). The purpose of the mapping was to provide contextual knowledge and form a basis for reflection and exchange with local partners and stakeholders. The mapping contributed to the following objectives:

- to produce a preliminary overview of the civil society constituencies, dynamics and peacebuilding functions in Ukraine;
- to initiate a mutual learning exercise on the applicability and relevance of IPTI's Civil Society and Peacebuilding conceptual framework in the context of Ukraine.

The report is based on the following sources:

- Dr. Tatiana Kyselova's twenty plus years of research and experience working with mediation practitioners in Ukraine;
- Dr. Tatiana Kyselova's two empirical research studies on dialogues at the civil society level in Ukraine (including interviews and focus-groups)<sup>1</sup>;
- Nine follow-up interviews with Ukrainian and international experts (see Annex 1);
- Desk research comprising academic literature, Internet and Facebook sources on civil society in Ukraine with specific reference to peace and conflict; major policy documents relevant to peacebuilding by international organizations (UN, OSCE, EU) and the Ukrainian Government;
- Feedback from Ukrainian national and regional CSOs working on all of the peacebuilding functions from two validation workshops in February 2019 in Kyiv.

Given the main objective of the report, it does not provide an exhaustive list of all organizations working in peacebuilding in Ukraine or all activities that fit into IPTI's functional approach, nor does it give any evaluation of the effectiveness of activities, specific organizations or functions. The report provides examples of the activities and respective actors for each peacebuilding function and offers some tentative suggestions as to the gaps and possible synergies within and between different peacebuilding functions in Ukraine. The study is primarily concerned with Ukrainian civil society and excludes analysis of international non-governmental organizations unless internationals are the only ones who pursue a particular activity.

### *IPTI Functional Approach and its Adaptations to the Ukrainian Context*

The Report is based on the methodology of IPTI's functional analysis of civil society in peacebuilding<sup>2</sup>. The approach stems from the comparative research project "Civil Society & Peacebuilding – A Critical Assessment" (2010), which studied how different civil society actions in diverse contexts contribute to broader peacebuilding goals. The findings pointed to a pattern in terms of what civil society can do, and factors that enabled or limited the impact for peace. The various con-

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1. Tatiana Kyselova, "Understanding Dialogue: Survey-Based Study," (Kyiv: Mediation and Dialogue Research Center, 2018); Tatiana Kyselova and Julia von Dobeneck, "Track III Dialogue in Ukraine: Major Patterns and Resulting Risks," (Frankfurt/Oder: Center for Peace Mediation, 2017), <https://md.ukma.edu.ua/publications/>

2. Thania Paffenholz, *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Lynne Rienner Boulder, 2010).

tributions of civil society were categorized into seven possible functions that civil society can fulfil at different stages of a conflict/peace process:

1. **Protection** of people and communities against violence from all parties where the state can't or won't fulfil this role, and as a precondition for all other peacebuilding activities;
2. **Monitoring** of conflict trends and issues, including human rights violations, ceasefire and peace agreement implementation and early warning information;
3. **Advocacy** for peacebuilding agendas and human security issues, through public communication, mass action, or “behind the scenes” advocacy;
4. In-group **socialization** to foster attitude change and build capacities for a culture of peace, and to empower marginalized groups;
5. **Social cohesion** activities that bring together people from adversarial groups towards peaceful coexistence;
6. **Intermediation and facilitation** between citizens, the state or conflict parties, often in support of other peacebuilding functions;
7. **Service delivery and development** as entry points for peacebuilding.

The understanding of each function, and the types of activities performed, varies according to the context. Depending on their mandate and thematic focus, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) may focus on one particular function, or they – often – combine them in a simultaneous strategy. Civil society is not necessarily the sole peacebuilding actor performing the function, but may play a particular role alongside state actors such as international peace operations, regional or government initiatives.

The functional approach allows for a broader look at all existing social forces that can contribute to peacebuilding, rather than focusing solely on a specific sector or type of organization. The mapping of Ukrainian civil society using this framework was an opportunity to test its usefulness as a typology, and as an analytical and strategic tool. It helped to get an overview of and communicate about the different aspects of civil society peacebuilding; served as a starting point for reflection on what is needed in a particular conflict or process phase; and mapped out who is doing what in peacebuilding in Ukraine.

In general, the application of the IPTI functional approach to the Ukrainian context was a fruitful exercise. The main conclusion of the study was that this methodology is well suited for the Ukrainian context with all the peacebuilding functions being identifiable albeit to a varied extent. Nevertheless, some adaptations were necessary.

In the Ukrainian context there were difficulties in dealing with two functions – socialization and social cohesion. Given the multiple deeply ingrained conflict narratives and consequently contradictory perceptions as to who the conflict parties are, the initial IPTI distinction between socialization as in-group activities and social cohesion as bringing people from different conflict groups together, was problematic. In the Ukrainian context, bringing together people may be considered both “in-group” and “inter-group” activity at the same time depending upon the chosen conflict narrative and the underlying theory of change of the particular organization that conducts these activities. These issues are rather difficult to identify due to methodology of this research (desk and Internet research in many cases does not provide information on the theories of change of organizations, and all relevant organizations cannot be covered by interviews). Nevertheless, the distinction between socialization and social cohesion was maintained in this report in the following way: Socialization includes activities aimed at the culture of peace, such as peace education, peace

journalism, etc. Social cohesion might include the same types of activities as socialization but expressly involving people from different societal groups irrespective of how these groups have been defined and identified (for example, people from the east and the west of Ukraine; IDPs and local communities; Ukrainian and Russian civil society, etc.).

Additional functions that were suggested by the participants of validation workshops include trauma healing (which is in this report collated with the seventh function, service delivery) and legislative drafting (currently integrated within the advocacy function). The latter might require a separate analysis because Ukrainian civil society with its high level of professionalization and rich pre-conflict experiences spends considerable time and effort drafting laws and is capable of doing so without the assistance of international experts. This report follows the initial seven functions of the IPTI methodology leaving additional functions for further research.

## 2. Conflict Context

The pre-2014 societal context in Ukraine was characterized by an unfinished post-totalitarian transition to a democratic form of governance resulting in a hybrid democracy or competitive oligarchy with weak democratic institutions, low trust in the government and public institutions, and a judiciary perceived as corrupt which was at least partly the reason for the crisis. In 2014, the Ukrainian Government had no experience of dealing with large scale armed violence, nor was Ukrainian civil society prepared to deal with it.

At the same time, Ukraine had a vibrant and rapidly developing civil society, including a pool of local mediators and facilitators who were trained long before 2013.<sup>3</sup> There was degree of freedom of the mass media – multiple competing mass media outlets, with many of them controlled by oligarchs, but some truly independent; and a high level of popular access to the Internet and social media.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, Ukraine was not a failed state either before or after 2014 – its functioning state institutions did not collapse even in the most threatening periods of the crisis.

Since 2014 Ukraine has experienced a violent armed conflict. In the spring of 2014, the Crimean peninsula was illegally annexed by the Russian Federation. Since 2014, parts of Eastern Ukraine have witnessed armed fighting around two self-proclaimed and unrecognized separatist entities – the so-called “LNR/DNR” – on the eastern border between Ukraine and Russia. Around 8% of Ukrainian territory is currently not controlled by the Ukrainian Government. The conflict has claimed the lives of more than 13,000 people.<sup>5</sup> While two cease-fire agreements – Minsk I and Minsk II – were signed in 2015, mediated by the OSCE, they remain unimplemented and the low intensity shelling from both sides continues at the time of publication of this report (June 2019).

The conflict is characterized by the high level of uncertainty and hybridity in almost every aspect. The root causes of the conflict do not refer to any single source; neither ethnic, linguistic, nor political differences, or structural economic inequalities between the regions could have triggered the armed fighting alone. Most researchers agree that without the external intervention of Russia to instigate, direct and support the uprising in some parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions the armed conflict could not have come to pass.<sup>6</sup> Russia continues to support two self-proclaimed separatist entities with military, human, financial and organizational resources thereby creating a hybrid conflict that combines elements of external aggression and localized conflict. The official Russian and Ukrainian narratives diverge in that Ukraine places entire responsibility on Russia for external intervention and inter-state war in Ukraine; while Russia completely denies its presence in Ukraine and promotes the narrative of internal inter-ethnic civil war in Ukraine.<sup>7</sup>

The international community responded to the conflict by imposing economic sanctions and political pressure upon Russia, including public statements denouncing the Russian aggression against Ukraine, and providing military assistance and weapons to the Ukrainian Army. On the other hand, peace negotiations were initiated as early as summer 2014. Furthermore, the first civil society peacebuilding projects were funded by international donors in autumn 2014.

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3. Tatiana Kyselova, “Professional Peacemakers in Ukraine: Mediators and Dialogue Facilitators before and after 2014,” *Kyiv Mohyla Law and Politics Journal* 3, no. 1 (2018): 117-36, <https://md.ukma.edu.ua/publications/>

4. More on media and the conflict, see <http://ijnet.org/en/blog/interview-alisa-sopova-lessons-state-ukrainian-media>

5. <https://www.unian.info/war/10416549-donbas-war-death-toll-rises-up-to-nearly-13-000-un.html>

6. Tatyana Malyarenko, and Stefan Wolff, “The Logic of Competitive Influence-Seeking: Russia, Ukraine, and the Conflict in Donbas,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 34, no. 4 (2018): 1-22; Andrew Wilson, “The Donbas in 2014: Explaining Civil Conflict Perhaps, but Not Civil War,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 68, no. 4 (2016): 631-52.

7. Valeria Lazarenko, “Conflict in Ukraine: Multiplicity of Narratives About the War and Displacement,” *European Politics and Society* (2018): 1-17.

The conflict is characterized by intra-societal conflict divides that are spread all over the country and are not solely focused along the current line of contact where the fighting is taking place. The multiple conflict divides are not based on the grounds of belonging to a certain ethnic or other community but depend on individual self-identification and comprise multiple elements (ethnic, linguistic, religious, historical, demographical, political, economic, etc.). Furthermore, identities are not stable, but instead are constantly shifting and mixing, and it is likely that even ethnicity is shifting as well – some people who live in Ukraine and used to identify themselves as ethnic Russians in 2003 now might identify as ethnic Ukrainians and vice versa.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, the conflict has no clearly identifiable sets of conflict parties and therefore the target groups of reconciliation also remain unclear.

Finally, Ukraine is experiencing almost all conflict phases simultaneously. Conflict prevention measures are taking place in the East as well as in the West and South. Hot conflict is evident around the contact line and the adjacent gray zone in the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Post-conflict recovery is taking place in the areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk region which were de-occupied by the Ukrainian Army in 2014-2015. Yet, given that the armed conflict is firmly constrained in the East of Ukraine, the rest of the country is not directly experiencing the consequences of the war but lives in an uncertain state of “neither peace nor war”.

In general, the level of violence and polarization in society is not extremely high but is constantly increasing, especially during significant political periods such as elections. While the level of direct armed violence is currently being contained along the line of contact by the Ukrainian Army and monitored by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission,<sup>9</sup> distrust and hatred is increasing among people on the both sides of the contact line. Furthermore, inside the controlled territories, there is increasing polarization and fragmentation of the society at all levels including civil society itself, and radicalization of political and societal sphere including the rise of rightwing nationalist movements.<sup>10</sup>

The mass media and political discourse contributes to and manipulates the polarization of population along political lines (government v. civil society activists); along the contact line (people from both sides of the contact line); along political constituencies (pro-European v. pro-Russian) etc., especially within the context of the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019. Finally, the pre-election year of 2018-2019 was marked by a series of violent physical assaults against civil society activists throughout Ukraine (more than 50 according to Freedom House). The case of Kateryna Gandziuk, an activist from Kherson who died in November 2018 after an acid attack, is the most publicized one. The impunity of the attackers and the slow reaction of the police and other state bodies, led some commentators to conclude that there is “shrinking space for civil society” or even a “war on civil society” in Ukraine.<sup>11</sup>

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8. Volodymyr Kulyk, "Identity in Transformation: Russian-Speakers in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 71, no. 1 (2019): 156-78; Gwendolyn Sasse and Alice Lackner, "War and Identity: The Case of the Donbas in Ukraine," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 34, no. 2-3 (2018): 139-57.

9. <https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine>

10. Vyacheslav Likhachev, "Far-Right Extremism as a Threat to Ukrainian Democracy," *Nations in Transit Brief* (2018).

11. <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/in-ukraine-attacks-on-civil-society-spread-to-the-regions>

### 3. Civil Society in Ukraine

Generally, the understanding of civil society in Ukraine is similar to the Western understanding of civil society. Civil society in Ukraine is defined as “a domain/area of social/civil relations beyond the family/household, state and business where people get together to satisfy and/or promote joint interests and to defend common values.”<sup>12</sup> For the purposes of this report all organizational forms of formalized Ukrainian civil society will be referred to as Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and public organizations (*hromadski organizatsiyi*) as NGOs. According to various sources the number of registered CSOs in Ukraine is around 250,000 whereas NGOs make up the largest share of CSOs - more than 80,000 organizations.<sup>13</sup> Active CSOs are estimated to comprise around 20,000 organizations.<sup>14</sup>

The general characteristics of Ukrainian civil society in terms of its strengths and weakness and relationship with the state remain ambiguous. Before 2014 many experts characterized it as weak and unable to influence governmental policies.<sup>15</sup> After the Euromaidan events in 2013-2014, Ukrainian civil society gained momentum, “reinvented itself” and currently remains on the rise – a trend that is strongly supported by the international donor community.<sup>16</sup> At the same time, five years after Euromaidan, some experts have concluded that the unprecedented rise in charitable donations and volunteer activism,<sup>17</sup> the influx of civil society activists into government, and the establishment of multiple bureaucratic mechanisms to connect government with civil society, have nonetheless not resulted in civil society meaningfully infiltrating the political sphere to the extent of being able to influence it.<sup>18</sup> While the number of CSOs and people taking part in their activities is rising, the overall engagement of the Ukrainian population into civil society activity remains low. A DIF survey found that 83% of respondents have never belonged to a CSO, only 2.2 % were members of a CSO, and 6.6% were engaged in a CSO’s work.<sup>19</sup>

For more a comprehensive overview of Ukrainian civil society, see the studies by Natalia Shapovalova,<sup>20</sup> and the special issue of the Kyiv Mohyla Law and Politics Journal.<sup>21</sup> Below are a number of characteristics of civil society that are relevant to peacebuilding and this study.

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12. L. Palyvoda, Vinnikov, O., Kupriy, V., , *Defining Civil Society for Ukraine – Research Report* (Kyiv, 2016), 12, <http://dhrp.org.ua/en/news/1159-20160422-en>

13. Susan Worschech, “New Civic Activism in Ukraine: Building Society from Scratch?,” *Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal*, no. 3 (2017): 23-45., page 30

14. EU Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Ukraine 1918-2020, [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/59934/ukraine-eu-country-roadmap-engagement-civil-society-2018-2020\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/59934/ukraine-eu-country-roadmap-engagement-civil-society-2018-2020_en)

15. Povilas Žielys and Rūta Rudinskaitė, “Us Democracy Assistance Programs in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47, no. 1 (2014): 81-91; Victor Stepanenko, “Civil Society in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Civic Ethos in the Framework of Corrupted Sociality?,” *East European Politics and Societies* 20, no. 4 (2006): 571-97; Kseniia Gatskova and Maxim Gatskov, “Weakness of Civil Society in Ukraine: A Mechanism-Based,” (IOS Working Papers, 2012).

16. Olga Burluk, Natalia Shapovalova, and Kateryna Zarembo, “Civil Society in Ukraine: Building on Euromaidan Legacy,” *Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal*, no. 3 (2017): 1-22.

17. Worschech, “New Civic Activism in Ukraine: Building Society from Scratch?,” 31.

18. ICDS, *National Resilience Building: Whole-of-Society Security in Ukraine* (2016), 5, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2016/ukraine>

19. USAID, *Civic Engagement Poll* (2017), <https://dif.org.ua/uploads/pdf/17388921135a2ea86ba91ea7.14461295.pdf>

20. Natalia Shapovalova, *Assessing Ukrainian Grassroots Activism Five Years after Euromaidan* (Carnegie Europe, 2019); USAID, *Ukraine Civil Society Sectoral Assessment* (2018), [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PA00TD05.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00TD05.pdf)

21. <http://kmlpj.ukma.edu.ua/issue/view/7148/showToc>

### 3.1. Civil and Uncivil Society

Generally experts highlight that the distinctive feature of Ukrainian civil society is “adherence to values that are generally positive, and not based on hatred and different forms of discrimination, that are based on the rule of law, respect for rights and freedoms, public morale, civil activism, etc.”<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, participants of the validation workshops for this study did identify several parts of formally registered civil society in Ukraine that they would possibly consider as “uncivil” and would not want to be associated with.

First, the rise of rightwing nationalism was recently highlighted in Ukraine. Although current polling data indicates that far right groups have no real chance of being a dominant force in society, they are stoking ethnic and religious intolerance and engaging in violent attacks against feminists, the LGBT community, different ethnic communities and refugees. The most threatening sign is that the Ukrainian Government does not seem to have a strategy to deal with these groups and in many cases acts of violence remain unpunished.<sup>23</sup> In 2017-2018, a nationalist political party National Corps<sup>24</sup> created a paramilitary wing – *Natsionalni Druzhyny*<sup>25</sup> that actively recruited people, including former combatants, through their website. It remains unclear how numerous these *Druzhyny* are and in what regions they operate (presumably all over Ukraine). *Druzhyny* are legitimately based on the 2000 Law of Ukraine that allows for the establishment of paramilitary groups in order to assist the police in maintaining order in communities.<sup>26</sup> Although according to the Law, *Druzhyny* have no mandate to use violence against citizens and must act in coordination with and under close supervision of the police, a lot of concerns have been raised that *Druzhyny* exceed their mandate and can actually destabilize the situation.<sup>27</sup> It was the opinion of the participants of the validation workshops that these groups cannot be considered as civil society.

Second, Ukraine has always had a minority part of civil society labeled as “pocket” civil society (similar to GoNGOs). These are CSOs that are registered according to law and are formally led by activists but in fact are inspired and supported by the government or political parties. In the absence of research, it remains unclear to what extent these groups can or cannot be regarded as part of civil society, or even how to identify them.

Finally, non-state armed actors who take part in armed fighting in the conflict zone were clearly seen by the participants of the validation workshops as not belonging to civil society but rather to criminal groups.<sup>28</sup>

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22. Palyvoda, *Defining Civil Society for Ukraine – Research Report*, 12.

23. Vyacheslav Likhachev, “Far-Right Extremism as a Threat to Ukrainian Democracy,” *Nations in Transit Brief* (2018).

24. <http://nationalcorps.org/>

25. <http://ndrugua.org/about-us/>

26. On Citizens' Participation in the Protection of Public Order and State Border: Law of Ukraine No. 1835-III of 22.06.2000, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1835-14>

27. BBC Ukraine «Who and Why Has Established National Druzhyny?», <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-42859649>

28. For detailed analysis of the role of non-state armed groups see Vladimir Rauta, “Proxy Agents, Auxiliary Forces, and Sovereign Defection: Assessing the Outcomes of Using Non-State Actors in Civil Conflicts,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 16, no. 1 (2016): 91-111.

### 3.2. Professionalized and Grassroot, Central and Regional CSOs

The current research on civil society offers competing perspectives on grassroots activism in Ukraine.

On the one hand, Ukrainian law and policies offer a rather favorable environment for CSOs. The registration procedure is fairly simple and non-discriminatory, and the state does not generally restrict the rights of registration for civil society. It is therefore not surprising that the number of CSOs is rocketing. Furthermore, where, in other countries, informal groups and self-organization structures can exist without legalization, in Ukraine such groups must be legalized and registered (religious groups, active intellectual elites such as writers, artists, singers, academic researchers, etc.; people in rural and urban communities at the level of building, street, block, etc.). The registration system is fairly comprehensive and offers organizational forms for most civil society activities.<sup>29</sup>

On the other hand, recent research by Natalia Shapovalova is more critical about the dominance of formal civil society and the disregard of grassroots activism. She suggests that “despite an abundance of enthusiasm for local engagement, grassroots activism in Ukraine increasingly bowls alone, often invisible to many donors and donor-funded professional NGOs based in Kyiv.”<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, “foreign donor funding is weakly diversified with project grants mostly available for professional CSOs with previous grant history. Newly-established and small CSOs as well as informal civic initiatives lack funding.”<sup>31</sup> Despite obvious critiques, the size and actual composition of unregistered grassroots civil society in Ukraine remains unclear as systematic and comprehensive research on this topic is currently lacking.<sup>32</sup>

Interviewees for this study stated that grassroots civil society is very unstable, fluctuating between formal and informal forms.<sup>33</sup> For example, many local activists do have some formal links to local NGOs but on many occasions prefer to act on their own. The opposite may also be true – as soon as donors or international organizations get in touch with grassroots activists, they get an incentive to formalize themselves as NGOs which is easily done according to Ukrainian legislation. Thus, it is very likely that the nature of interaction between formal professional NGOs and informal grassroots activists is very flexible, the borders are blurred and shifting, and it is hard to determine “who is who”.

Furthermore, the 2014 crisis has become a milestone in Ukrainian civil society development with respect to the reconfiguration of CSOs’ capacities. A lot of new CSOs emerged after 2014 and began competing with those who have been in place long before.<sup>34</sup> The post-2014 CSOs were able to react to population needs and donor requests with greater speed and flexibility; the whole new volunteer movement emerged to respond to the humanitarian needs of the conflict-affected population. Those CSOs that are physically located in the East and South of the country have received more attention from donors and international organizations due to their proximity to the conflict zone. This has resulted in some tensions between old experienced central/national CSOs and new, unexperienced CSOs located in the conflict region thereby intensifying funding competition.

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29. Palyvoda, *Defining Civil Society for Ukraine – Research Report*, 51.

30. Shapovalova, *Assessing Ukrainian Grassroots Activism Five Years after Euromaidan*.

31. USAID, *Ukraine Civil Society Sectoral Assessment* (2018), 5, [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PA00TDQ5.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00TDQ5.pdf)

32. <https://mistosite.org.ua/uk/articles/the-development-of-urban-grass-roots-initiatives-network-in-5-ukrainian-cities-kyiv-kharkiv-lviv-ivano-frankivsk-and-odesa>

33. Interview with the Director of an international peacebuilding NGO working in Ukraine, September 23, 2018

34. Global Office NGO, *The Dynamics of the Public Sector Development in the East of Ukraine* (2018), <http://globaloffice.org.ua/en/doslidzhennya-goeast-dinamika-rozvitku-gromadskogo-sektoru-shodu-ukrajini/>

Based on the interviews for this study, the local CSOs complain that “Kyiv people” do not understand the local cultural context and circumstances of war; while central CSOs complain that newer CSOs lack expertise and exploit their geographical competitive advantage. According to an interviewee of this study,

There are chaotic initiatives around peacebuilding. Lugansk and Donetsk oblast are turning into “trash”. There are numerous new unclear NGOs without expertise and training, but with a “grant-eating” attitude to civil society activity. These are small organizations created for one day (“odnodnevki”). They are small, but there are many of them. And this trend is provoked by the donors themselves who ask, for example, to conduct dozens of one-day trainings and requesting Human Right and mediation curriculum – all in one day!<sup>35</sup>

Furthermore, there is a noticeable problem of brain drain from local CSOs to international organizations, donors and national CSOs located in Kyiv.

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To conclude, although the Ukrainian civil society generally is rather similar to civil society in the Western context, it is not homogeneous and united. This study had difficulty in reaching out to local grassroots civil society. To meet this challenge, this project convened a validation workshop for representatives of local CSOs mostly from the East of Ukraine known to be of the grassroots type (7-8 February 2019). Yet, it must be acknowledged that the resources available for the study and its methodology, as well as the lack of research on the grassroots civil society in Ukraine did not allow for a full picture of peacebuilding and its functions at the grassroots level.

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35. Interview with Ukrainian peacebuilder, September 30, 2018

## 4. Peacebuilding in Ukraine – “Avoidance of Peace Terminology”

### 4.1. No Clarity in Defining Peacebuilding in Ukraine

To start with, the term “peacebuilding” does not translate well into Ukrainian/Russian. Based on the current usage, the term is translated either as “peacemaking” (*myrotvorchist*) or “building of peace” (*rozbudova myru*). The term “peacebuilding” as such (*myrobuduvannia*) did not exist in Ukrainian before the crisis but has been recently introduced within civil society and might become more widely used. This report uses the term “rozbudova myru” in accordance with the 2019 Glossary of Terms for Armed Conflict in Ukraine by the Ministry of Temporary Occupied Territories and IDPs of Ukraine.<sup>36</sup>

The usage and meaning of the term “peacebuilding” within the whole body of Ukrainian civil society (more than 250,000 CSOs) remains unclear and requires separate research. This study has only identified a few definitions of peacebuilding that derive from some CSOs. For example, the Ukrainian Peacebuilding School defines civic peacebuilding (*hromadska myrotvorchist*) as “a complex series of measures aimed at prevention and transformation of violent conflicts by civil society”.<sup>37</sup> Yet, what measures exactly are considered as peacebuilding remains unclear. Another attempt to define priorities for civic peacebuilding in Ukraine was done by the Global Partnership for Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC, Ukraine) in 2017.<sup>38</sup> The priorities were defined as follows:

1. Consolidation of Ukrainian society, strengthening confidence between the different groups by involving the public in constructive cooperation aimed toward developing an effective democratic government and public institutions.
2. Facilitating integration of communities including the new traumatized groups (IDPs, ATO veterans, etc.).
3. Developing spaces, mechanisms and practices to support successful prevention of violence, search for win-win solutions in situations of conflict.
4. Working with the population that became hostage to the political situation, including “re-humanizing”, creating conditions for the peaceful interaction of people who found themselves on different sides of the conflict divide.<sup>39</sup>

There is no evidence that the above definitions/priorities of peacebuilding have been incorporated into other documents or in other ways supported by other CSOs.

The Ukrainian Government relies on the definition of peacebuilding established by the UN and other international organizations. In its 2019 Glossary, the Ministry of Temporary Occupied Territories and IDPs recommended that peacebuilding should be understood in line with the State Target Program of Recovery and Peacebuilding which in turn borrowed the definition from the UN/EU/World Bank “Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment”. Yet, the definition of peacebuilding in these documents is still rather vague and coupled with social resilience:

Peacebuilding and social resilience include establishment of mechanisms for social unity and trust building, promotion of cultural dialogue and tolerance, enhancing the role of civil society, provision of psycho-

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36. Ministry of Temporary Occupied Territories and IDPs of Ukraine, *Glossary of Terms for Armed Conflict in Ukraine*, 2019, <https://mtot.gov.ua/files/uploads/082efe10-a3e0-11e9-9b89-731f32e113d5.pdf>

37. <https://peace.in.ua/holovna/about/>

38. GPPAC, *Civil Peacebuilding Strategy for Ukraine* (2017) (on file with the author)

39. Ibid.

logical and social assistance to population affected by the conflict, development of local self-governance in the context of decentralization, development of self-sustainable territorial communities (hromady) capable of self-development and enhancing protection of population and human security.<sup>40</sup>

Thus, when peacebuilding is used by the Ukrainian Government, it emphasizes the concept of “positive peace” connected to socio-economic recovery and democratic reforms while omitting direct references to “negative peace” (termination of the armed violence in the East of the country) and reconciliation.

Finally, international organizations and the donor community working in Ukraine rely on definitions of peacebuilding coming mostly from the UN documents,<sup>41</sup> and give only some clues about what peacebuilding can mean in the Ukrainian context. For example, the UN/EU/World Bank “Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment” (RPA) states that

the social resilience, peacebuilding, and community security component of this RPA considers issues related to restoring the social fabric, which is a critical foundation for any effective and sustainable recovery process. This includes supporting the early recovery of conflict-affected populations... by providing livelihoods support and protection; and promoting reconciliation, peacebuilding, and access to justice”.<sup>42</sup>

Within these multiple approaches to peacebuilding,<sup>43</sup> the de-facto pragmatic approach that seems to have emerged among international organizations and donors is that any activity carried out within the (often arbitrarily drawn) geographical zone of conflict is considered as peacebuilding. For example, constructing a school or an administrative building within the conflict zone is considered as peacebuilding, whereas similar constructions slightly further West – outside the imaginary conflict zone – is not considered as peacebuilding and falls under other funding lines.

## 4.2. Politization and Marginalization of Peace Discourse and Peacebuilding

It is not surprising that during on-going fighting in a situation of external Russian aggression, peace as a concept is extremely controversial in Ukraine. According to one of the interviewees in this study, there are several competing approaches to peace in Ukraine: “First – peace with the aggressor is impossible; how you can reconcile if we are victims. Second – peacebuilding may be possible only after Ukraine restores control over its borders. Third – peace is best achieved through military victory – peace by violence (*myr shlyahom nasylstva*).”<sup>44</sup>

The overall impression from interviews for the 2016-2017 dialogue study by Tatiana Kyselova was that the current public discourse in Ukraine marginalizes the concept of peace as a whole.<sup>45</sup> Other

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40. Ministry of Temporary Occupied Territories and IDPs of Ukraine, *Glossary of Terms for Armed Conflict in Ukraine*, 2019, <https://mtot.gov.ua/files/uploads/082efe10-a3e0-11e9-9b89-731f32e113d5.pdf>

41. Protection Cluster, *Guidance Note «Peacebuilding and Reconciliation in Ukraine»* (2018), <http://www.unhcr.org/ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/38/2018/05/Peacebuilding-And-Reconciliation-Guidance-Note-Final-ENG-1.pdf>

42. UN, EU, World Bank, *Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Vol. 2*, 106, <http://www.un.org.ua/en/publications-and-reports/un-in-ukraine-publications/3738-ukraine-recovery-and-peacebuilding-plan-volume-2>

43. Similar conclusion about the lack of clarity about peacebuilding has been reached by the International Center for Policy Studies, see ICPS, *Analytical Report: International Peacekeeping and the War in Eastern Ukraine: Are there any Points of Contact?* (2016), 15-16, <http://icps.com.ua/en/our-projects/publications/international-peacekeeping-and-the-war-in-eastern-ukraine-are-there-any-points-of-contact/>

44. Interview with the Director of an international peacebuilding NGO working in Ukraine, September 23, 2018

45. Kyselova and von Dobeneck, “Track III Dialogue in Ukraine: Major Patterns and Resulting Risks.”

researchers have reached a similar conclusion: “civil society voices emphasizing the need for dialogue in different forms are present, yet largely marginalized.”<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, the term “peace” is open to political manipulations and the peace agenda was twisted in various directions by many political forces during the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections.<sup>47</sup> In some cases, the terms “peace” and “peacebuilding” are used to mean things which are completely opposite to the spirit of peace and have nothing in common with the way in which these terms are interpreted by classical textbooks.<sup>48</sup>

As a result, according to the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, peacebuilding civil society groups, especially those working on cross-border cooperation and dialogue with people from non-government controlled areas of eastern Ukraine (NGCA) or Russia are:

often subject to smear campaigns, being labeled as ‘enemies of the state’, ‘traitors’, ‘pro-Russian’ or ‘pro-separatist’. ... Dialogues bringing together representatives of civil society from Ukraine, Russia and the non-government controlled territories are portrayed as inherently dangerous and those engaging in such activities as either unwittingly, or wittingly, becoming agents of “the enemy”.<sup>49</sup>

There is also some evidence of active opposition of some civil society groups to dialogue efforts across the contact line. For example, in March 2017 thirteen Ukrainian women’s rights activists issued a public statement “Under the Cover of Women and Peace”.<sup>50</sup> This statement accused dialogue initiatives between Ukrainian and Russian civil society of “psychological disarmament of Ukrainians during the war, manipulation with the concepts and imposition of guilt and responsibility for the situation upon Ukrainians under the cover of women and human rights organizations, which are sponsored by international donors, international organizations or Russia”.<sup>51</sup> Petitioners also asked to “establish a Parliamentary Commission to investigate activity of peacebuilding initiatives that are carried out under cover of women and human rights movements”.<sup>52</sup> Although, according to interviewees in this study, this clash was admittedly triggered by interpersonal relations among leaders of different NGOs, it still demonstrates the deep divide of Ukrainian civil society on peacebuilding and reconciliation.

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46. Cristescu and Matveev, *The Challenge of Inclusiveness in the Peace Processes in Ukraine*.

47. “We will kill you for peace”. Main Trends in Informational Environment, 15–21 July 2019: Election Detector by Detector Media, <https://vybory.detector.media/2019/07/22/za-myr-povbyvajemo-holovni-tendentsiji-infoprostoru-15-21-lypnja-2019-roku-detektor-vyboriv/>

48. Ibid.; See also website “Peacemaker” <https://myrotvorets.center/about/> that includes the following information: “Center for Research of Signs of Crimes against the National Security of Ukraine, Peace, Humanity, and the International Law. Information for law enforcement authorities and special services about pro-Russian terrorists, separatists, mercenaries, war criminals, and murderers.”

49. Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, *Obstacles to Women’s Meaningful Participation in Peace Efforts in Ukraine* (2017), 4–6, [https://wilpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/UKRAINE.UPR\\_JointSubmission-30-Mar-2017.pdf](https://wilpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/UKRAINE.UPR_JointSubmission-30-Mar-2017.pdf)

50. NGO Statement of 4 March 2017, *Under Cover of Peace and Women*, accessed 11 June, 2019, <http://www.ukrpress.info/2017/03/05/pid-prikrittiam-miru-y-zhinok-zayava-nou/>

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

### 4.3. Some Legitimacy of the Power-Based Approaches to Peace within the Hybrid War Scenario

Within the complex environment of hybrid conflict, the power-based approaches – fighting against Russia’s aggression by all means – remains a dominant paradigm of public discourse and many civil society activists. Although it is at odds with the conventional theories of conflict transformation, this report cannot exclude it completely from the analysis or render it absolutely irrelevant. Instead, we would like to highlight several aspects of this phenomenon.

First, most interviewees in this study as well as many participants in the validation workshops suggested that although the “peace by violence” approach cannot be legitimized as the sole or the primary approach to conflict transformation, many conventional peacebuilding strategies that originate from other contexts of internal civil wars are not directly applicable here. The external aggression element should be taken into account when designing any peacebuilding intervention, including security aspects and the impact on the geopolitical level of the conflict. To illustrate the point, see for example the Report “Enhancing Civil Society’s Impact in Donbas” that included military intervention and peace enforcement alongside other issues as a part of the peacebuilding focus.<sup>53</sup>

Second, it should be taken into account that up until now there has not been “societal mobilization for peace” in Ukraine while “societal mobilization for war” has been quite obvious. The 2014 mobilization of civil society was focused on providing aid to the Ukrainian Army that gave rise to a very distinct movement of Army volunteers to defend the country.<sup>54</sup> Civil society played a paramount role in responding to the armed violence in the East of the country. While in the first months of the conflict the Ukrainian Army was not able to fully mobilize to defend territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, civilian volunteers were providing the Army with all necessary supplies, and initially fighting in volunteer armed groups – volunteer battalions. After 2015, as a result of international support and internal efforts, the Ukrainian Government was able to mobilize the regular Army for military operations and the volunteer battalions were restructured and integrated within the regular Army structures. At present, volunteers who do not fight but provide assistance to the Ukrainian Army continue to work under the auspices of their CSOs. They seem to remain in the paradigm of peace by force, which is still perceived as legitimate in the face of the external Russian aggression. We do not know whether volunteer fighters and civil society that help the Ukrainian Army actually see themselves as bringing peace or not. They have thus not been included as peacebuilding actors in this report.

Third, it must be acknowledged that many of the peacebuilding functions that are analyzed in this report are indirectly influenced by the external aggression factor. On several occasions it was difficult to distinguish the conflict responses of civil society that were aimed at peacebuilding and those that were of a more militarized nature. For example, a very successful public advocacy campaign called “Invisible Battalion” by the Ukrainian Women Fund<sup>55</sup> that started as a

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53. DRA, *Enhancing Civil Society's Impact in Donbas* (2017), 19, <https://www.austausch.org/news-details/follow-up-report-enhancing-civil-societys-impact-in-donbas/>

54. Montana Hunter, “Crowdsourced War: The Political and Military Implications of Ukraine's Volunteer Battalions 2014-2015,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 18, no. 3 (2018); Ilmari Käihkö, “A Nation-in-the-Making, in Arms: Control of Force, Strategy and the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions,” *Defence Studies* 18, no. 2 (2018): 147-66; Emmanuel Karagiannis, “Ukrainian Volunteer Fighters in the Eastern Front: Ideas, Political-Social Norms and Emotions as Mobilization Mechanisms,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 16, no. 1 (2016): 139-53; Kateryna Karhina et al., “Voluntary Work During Times of Military Crisis: What Motivates People to Be Involved and What Are the Effects on Well-Being,” *Psychology* 8 (2017): 1601-19; Kateryna Zarembo, “Substituting for the State: The Role of Volunteers in Defense Reform in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine,” *Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal*, no. 3 (2017): 47-70.

55. [https://www.uwf.org.ua/en/project\\_activities/invisible\\_batallion](https://www.uwf.org.ua/en/project_activities/invisible_batallion)

research project on women's participation in the armed conflict in the Donbas by the Kyiv Mohyla Academy<sup>56</sup> resulted in a change of legislation to improve women's rights in the Ukrainian armed forces.<sup>57</sup> Although the improving situation of women in the armed forces is a part of the Ukraine Action Plan for the Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, it can hardly be seen as a peacebuilding but rather (as mentioned by one of the participants of the validation workshop) as a part of the societal militarization.

Thus, the hybrid scenario of the conflict in Ukraine has influenced civil society's response, including a certain degree of societal legitimization of the power-based responses to the conflict. This report excludes analysis of the CSOs that pursue straightforward power-based approaches to the conflict, such as Army volunteers and nationalist groups, but it does highlight the importance of a contextual approach to designing peacebuilding interventions to account for the hybrid nature of the conflict.

#### 4.4. Strategies to Do Peacebuilding without Naming it

Within the polarized public environment, the scenario of hybrid war and on-going armed conflict, peacebuilding is inevitably a challenging activity for Ukrainian civil society. Therefore, after 2014, to our knowledge, most CSOs have refrained from including the word "peace" in the title of their organization even if they have peacebuilding as a part of their mandate.<sup>58</sup> For example, out of 877 NGOs listed in the NGO Forum database, 156 (18%) name peacebuilding as a part of their activities but not a single one contained the word "peace" in their title.<sup>59</sup> Similarly, CSOs seem to avoid peace terminology in naming their projects. Out of 373 active projects of international technical aid to Ukraine, only 8 contained the words "peace" or "peacebuilding".<sup>60</sup> Finally, peacebuilding is not seen as a separate sector by Ukrainian civil society researchers. For example, the Ukraine Civil Society Sectoral Assessment does not mention the word "peace" or "peacebuilding" even once, with the main emphasis on the Resilience to Conflict and Disinformation as a "capacity to distinguish disinformation, fact checking and skills of critical thinking".<sup>61</sup>

Instead, this study has identified several strategies that some NGOs and think tanks who work on peacebuilding in cooperation with international organizations use to avoid the problem of peace terminology:

- dealing with peace issues through terminology of Human Rights, tolerance and inclusion of various groups of the population that do not have direct links to the armed conflict (LGBT, people and children with special needs, women);<sup>62</sup>
- substituting a "culture of peace" for a "culture of dialogue", as dialogue seems to be a much more acceptable term than peace both to the government and to international organizations;
- substituting discourse on peace journalism for discourse on professional ethics and standards of journalists;

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56. Ukrainian Woman's Fund, *Invisible Battalion* (2016) [https://www.uwf.org.ua/files/invisible\\_battalion\\_eng\\_short.pdf](https://www.uwf.org.ua/files/invisible_battalion_eng_short.pdf)

57. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invisible\\_Battalion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invisible_Battalion)

58. However, a few known cases include post-2014 organizations Ukrainian Peacebuilding School, Coalition "Justice for Peace in Donbas". Institute for Peace and Common Ground was registered before the crisis - in 2012.

59. <http://www.ngoforum.org.ua/>

60. Registry of the Technical Aid Programs, <http://proaid.gov.ua/en>

61. USAID, *Ukraine Civil Society Sectoral Assessment* (2018), 53-54, [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PA00TDQ5.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00TDQ5.pdf)

62. See, for example, ICPS Project "Envoys of Tolerance", <http://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/operations/get-involved/reinvent-respect-campaign/tolerance-envoys.html>; and the handbook "Culture of Peace: Handbook on Tolerance Promotion in Ukraine", <http://icps.com.ua/en/culture-of-peace-handbook-on-tolerance-promotion-in-ukraine/>

- using “double translation” – using different terms in Ukrainian and English to mean the same thing. For example, “territories not controlled by the Ukrainian government” (NGCA) in English and “temporary occupied territories of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts” in Ukrainian;<sup>63</sup>
- using abbreviations without explaining them, for example, “CivilM+” Platform, which stands for the “Civil Minsk Plus” Platform.<sup>64</sup>

These and other creative strategies of Ukrainian civil society that work for peace require additional research.

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To conclude, within “pro-war” public environment and hybrid security threats of the on-going armed conflict, civil society which is working in peacebuilding do so under enormous pressure from outside as well as from inside. In these circumstances, they generally refrain from using the terms “peace” and “peacebuilding” in public sphere and try to use various creative strategies that allow them to do peacebuilding without naming it.

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63. This report also uses double terminology “non-governmentally-controlled territories” in English and “temporary occupied territories of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts” in Ukrainian according to the current Ukrainian legislation (See Ministry of Temporary Occupied Territories and IDPs of Ukraine, *Glossary of Terms for Armed Conflict in Ukraine*, 2019, <https://mtot.gov.ua/files/uploads/082efe10-a3e0-11e9-9b89-731f32e113d5.pdf>)

64. See for example, <https://civilmplus.org/en/>

## 5. Civil Society in Peacebuilding in Ukraine – General Remarks

### 5.1. Small Peacebuilding Community and Multiple Communities of Practice Bubbles

Within the general context of “peace terminology avoidance”, civil society that is directly or indirectly involved into peacebuilding remains marginal in terms of numbers. As a very rough estimation, the number of CSOs that expressly or implicitly fulfill at least one of the peacebuilding functions surveyed in this report does not exceed 100-200 (against more than 80,000 registered NGOs). To support this assessment, for example, the Peace Insight database lists 21 CSOs active in peacebuilding in Ukraine;<sup>65</sup> the NGO Forum database contains 156 Ukrainian NGOs with peacebuilding as one of their many activities;<sup>66</sup> a research of the non-governmental sector in the East of Ukraine by the Global Office NGO did not identify any type of activities connected to peace among 96 surveyed NGOs.<sup>67</sup>

Given that in general civil society in Ukraine was fairly professional and developed long before the outbreak of violence in 2014, the current peacebuilding sector is comprised of organizations that come from pre-existing community of practice “bubbles”. These bubbles remain relatively independent of each other and unconnected. They are evident both at the national as well as the grassroots level (except think-tanks that are almost entirely concentrated in the center). All bubbles work across multiple peacebuilding functions on many topics.

The two biggest bubbles have contrasting approaches to conflict – the community of Human Rights practitioners who pursue a rights-based approach to conflict, and the community of mediators and dialogue facilitators who pursue an interest-based or needs-based approach. Other smaller bubbles include women CSOs and activists; think-tanks; and humanitarian aid organizations. These bubbles fluctuate between two paradigms of rights-based and interest-based approaches to conflict and sometimes work simultaneously in both paradigms through different projects.

Women CSOs seem to be especially active in the peacebuilding field, increasing in size and consolidating their efforts through coalition building. Special attention to gender issues by international organizations as well as the UN Women, Peace and Security Agenda seems to increasingly empower women activists, although the scope and dynamics of this empowerment requires separate research.

Finally, the smallest bubble that has only recently become visible comprises religious organizations representing different denominations in Ukraine. Under the umbrella of the Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations they published the Strategy of Peacebuilding “Our Common House” in December 2017. Yet, on the general picture, the peacebuilding activity of the religious organizations remains marginal.

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65. <https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/ukraine/>

66. <http://www.ngoforum.org.ua/>

67. <http://globaloffice.org.ua/en/doslidzhennya-goeast-dinamika-rozvitku-gromadskogo-sektoru-shodu-ukrayini/>

Although Global Office has not found any peacebuilding in their study, according to IPTI logic some identified activities might be labeled as peacebuilding or might include a peace component – for example the development of local communities, the integration of IDPs and war veterans, and psycho-social assistance.

## 5.2. Unconscious Peacebuilding and Conscious Non-peacebuilding

Most CSOs are included in this report as peacebuilding organizations based on the functions that they perform. In reality most of them focus on narrowly defined activities such as defending Human Rights or professional mediation/facilitation and may not be fully aware that they “do peacebuilding” or might even object to this labeling.

The opposite may well be true – those CSOs that officially put “peacebuilding” as a secondary mandate of their organizations in public communications (supposedly for funding purposes) may not perform any meaningful peacebuilding functions. For example, 18% of the NGOs in the NGO Forum database (156 out of 877) include peacebuilding in their profile. However, there is no evidence that certain organizations in this database, for example the Artemivsk Branch of the Donetsk Regional Association of Tax Payers, do anything that falls under the peacebuilding functions according to IPTI’s methodology.<sup>68</sup>

## 5.3. Human Rights v Dialogue (Justice v Peace) Divide

As discussed in section 4.3, this report excludes an analysis of CSOs that pursue power-based approaches to conflict resolution. Two remaining conflict approaches (rights-based and interest-based approaches) are in a certain state of tension in Ukraine, which has also been problematic in many other conflict contexts in other countries.

Most Human Rights groups working in Ukraine promote an ideology of non-violent fighting for Human Rights including the punishment of perpetrators and compensation for victims, advocacy campaigns, monitoring of abuses, rights-awareness campaigns, legislative drafting, non-violent protests, etc. Dialogue facilitators and mediators, in contrast, are not concerned with the question of blame and punishment, but rather with the restoration of trust and mutual understanding between people and communities, finding mutually acceptable solutions to meet the interests and needs of all stakeholders, including those in power. Although successful conflict transformation requires both types of approaches, there are currently tensions between these groups of NGOs in Ukraine which have been highlighted by all interviewees for this study.<sup>69</sup> Recently some Human Rights organizations have started inviting dialogue facilitators to facilitate their events, but the two professional communities still rarely interact and prefer to have separate events and strategies.

Some attempts to bring together Human Rights and dialogue facilitation professionals were made by the German organization DRA (“Deutsch-Russische Austausch e.V.”) through their workshops although currently we do not have information about where these attempts have led.<sup>70</sup> There are also some grassroots attempts to bridge the “peace and justice” gap. For example, five Human Rights NGOs<sup>71</sup> have published the Slov’yansk Book of Reconciliation with the personalized stories of the people from Slov’yansk about their experiences of conflict. Although the book is based on the methodology of documentation of Human Rights abuses, the purpose of the book was to relate how

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68. <http://www.ngoforum.org.ua/>

69. See also, DRA, *Enhancing Civil Society's Impact in Donbas* (2017), <https://www.austausch.org/news-details/follow-up-report-enhancing-civil-societys-impact-in-donbas/>

70. Ibid.

71. Vostok SOS, Civic Committee on Protection of Constitutional Rights and Freedoms, Moloda Prosvita Zakarpattia, Center for Human Rights Protection “Alternatyva”, East Ukrainian Center of Civic Initiatives.

the armed conflict has changed the life of the whole town in 2014 and is still influencing people. Some of the editors – Human Rights activists – took part in the dialogue initiatives of the professional community of facilitators and were therefore very cautious about the language used in the book. Therefore, the text of the book was proofread by the professional dialogue facilitator to ensure the language of the text was reconciliatory. This was one of the very few interactions between two communities of practice identified by this study.

#### 5.4. Problematic Coordination

Generally, coordination within civil society in Ukraine remains problematic which is an issue in all conflict zones all over the world. This has been anticipated in Ukraine since the beginning of the violence in 2014. After 2014 a number of international donors have sponsored several competing platforms for general NGO coordination.<sup>72</sup> Neither of the platforms seems to have gained overwhelming national recognition among NGOs.

Specifically, in the peacebuilding sector, attempts were made to separately bring together the Human Rights community (through the Coalition “Justice for Peace in Donbas”)<sup>73</sup> and the dialogue facilitators community (through the Dialogue Support Platform). The latter was discontinued in 2016 and currently OSCE PCU and several other international organizations are continuing attempts to coordinate the dialogue facilitators community. The only known attempt to bring together Human Rights and Dialogue practitioners is the CivilM+ Platform organized by the DRA.<sup>74</sup>

So far one of the very few successful national coordination schemes was the establishment of the National Association of Mediators of Ukraine (NAMU) in 2014.<sup>75</sup> After several failed attempts by international donors, it was set up by local mediators relying on their personal funds without any donor input (although after being established and launched NAMU started to cooperate with donors and international organizations).

To conclude, it seems to be a rule in Ukrainian civil society that top-down attempts at coordination and “bringing civil society people together” initiated by donors or international organizations irrespective of resources invested and seeming initial support of locals, are very problematic.

#### 5.5. What about Non-Government Controlled Areas of eastern Ukraine (NGCA) and Crimea?

This report deals primarily with civil society and peacebuilding in the territory of Ukraine. Territories currently not controlled by the Ukrainian Government in the east and in Crimea were out of reach for this research. Nevertheless, building peace requires all sides to be represented, so it is extremely important not to forget about them and to indicate that peacebuilding does take place even there, albeit in a very limited form.

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72. <http://www.ngoforum.org.ua/>, <http://ednannia.ua/177-vektor/11791-trendy-rozvytku-hromadianskoho-suspilstva-na-2016-rik>, <http://globaloffice.org.ua/en/goeast/>

73. <https://jfp.org.ua/coalition/pro-koalitsiiu>

74. <https://civilmplus.org/en/>

75. <http://namu.com.ua/ua/>

As for the NGCA, some civil society organizations are active there but most of them are controlled by the *de facto* authorities. Most of NGOs that were active before the crisis disintegrated but some individual activists remain and support connections to their colleagues in the Ukrainian government-controlled areas. Nearly all the visible activity of these activists in NGCA is focused on humanitarian aid.

The situation in Crimea is different. While NGCA remain in the focus of all peacebuilding actors, Crimea was seen by the participants of the validation workshops as nearly excluded from the peacebuilding agenda. Although quite a few organizations work in human rights monitoring in Crimea,<sup>76</sup> there is silence on other peacebuilding issues such as dialogue. According to the participants of the validation workshops, the exclusion of Crimea as an issue from the peacebuilding agenda in Ukraine was not seen as due to civil society but rather to donors and the Ukrainian government:

When we (as dialogue facilitators) come to donors and talk about Donbas they are happy but when we talk about Crimea the doors get closed.

They [the government] suggest that we need to build peace in Donbas first and only later we will deal with Crimea. Today Crimea is excluded from dialogues and the government does everything possible to exclude it

In light of the current political developments and the Minsk negotiation process, these issues continue to be highly problematic.

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To conclude, Ukrainian civil society working in peacebuilding comprises a small segment of civil society in Ukraine. Yet, even within a small community of peacebuilders there are many dividing lines in terms of approaches to conflict resolution, attitudes to coordination, professionalization, use of donor support, and issues on the peace agenda such as dialogue with people from Crimea, NGCA or Russia.

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76. Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR) [http://www.ucipr.org.ua/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=featured&Itemid=154&lang=en](http://www.ucipr.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=featured&Itemid=154&lang=en) See also list of organizations-members of the Coalition "Initiative Group on Human Rights in Crimea", <http://coalition.crimeahr.org/en/members/>

## 6. Main Civil Society Peacebuilding Actors Based on the Functional Framework

### 6.1. Protection

Many CSOs who took part in the validation workshops for this study were surprised to learn that protection can be done by civil society in a scenario of armed conflict. Although the term “protection” is familiar and straightforward in Ukrainian language, it was necessary to explain that apart from physical protection of civilians, protection can take other forms – such as information protection, community security, etc. When understood in this broader way, the need for protection in the context of peacebuilding was well recognized by the participants of the validation workshops.

Generally, the function of civilian protection in the Ukrainian territories bordering the self-proclaimed entities (the so-called “LNR” and “DNR”) is overtaken by the Ukrainian government which is supported by the international community, in particular by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine.<sup>77</sup> During the first years of the war (2014-2015) there were some CSOs and local activists who contributed to the protection of civilians and military personnel during the armed violence (evacuation or medical treatment) or helped to identify the bodies of dead soldiers. Several of them continue their activities today (see for example the organization Black Tulip).<sup>78</sup> Nevertheless, physical protection of civilians during the armed conflict is carried out by the Ukrainian Army, government and international organizations, including several INGOs.<sup>79</sup>

This study has identified some other activities referring to the other types of protection that are fully or partly performed by civil society in Ukraine:

- **DDR programs.** This study has identified only one DDR project – by the Ukrainian NGO Institute of Peace and Common Ground (IPCG) in 2016 which connected DDR experts and ATO veterans to local communities through dialogues and training. Most programs with DDR as a title seem to be implemented by governmental agencies<sup>80</sup> in cooperation with international organizations<sup>81</sup> with little or no participation of CSOs (the latter taking part only in a “reintegration” component” such as dialogues involving ex-combatants).<sup>82</sup> Generally, participants of the validation workshops were unaware of how civil society can take part in disarmament and demobilization components of the DDR programs.
- **Community security.** Security is a primary concern of the Ukrainian Government and international organizations working in the conflict zone, while the role of Ukrainian civil society in security reform remains unclear. Although several nation-wide mappings of se-

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77. <https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine>

78. <https://naidy.org.ua/en>

79. Center for Civilians in Conflict, <https://civiliansinconflict.org/our-work/where-we-work/ukraine/>; Geneva Call <https://genevacall.org/country-page/ukraine/>

80. See, Ministry of Internal Affairs [http://mvs.gov.ua/ua/news/12773\\_Ukrainski\\_pravoohoronci\\_pereymayut\\_dosvid\\_inozemnih\\_koleg\\_shchodo\\_diy\\_u\\_postkonfliktnih\\_umovah\\_ta\\_reintegracij\\_FOTO.htm](http://mvs.gov.ua/ua/news/12773_Ukrainski_pravoohoronci_pereymayut_dosvid_inozemnih_koleg_shchodo_diy_u_postkonfliktnih_umovah_ta_reintegracij_FOTO.htm); Ukroboronprom <https://en.uos.ua/uslugi/gumanitarnoe-razminirovanie> ; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine <http://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2014/07/21/czentr-rozminuvannya-zbrojnih-sil-pidsilyue-pidrozdili-ato-grupami-rozminuvannya/>

81. UN has translated into Ukrainian “UN Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament”, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (2017) [http://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/library/democratic\\_governance/DDR-operational-guide.html](http://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/library/democratic_governance/DDR-operational-guide.html)

82. Anna Bulakh, Mapping “Supporting Ukraine’s Security Sector Reform”, RKK ICDS, 2018, [https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ICDS\\_Analysis-Security\\_Sector\\_Reform\\_in\\_Ukraine-Anna\\_Bulakh-February\\_2018.pdf](https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ICDS_Analysis-Security_Sector_Reform_in_Ukraine-Anna_Bulakh-February_2018.pdf)

curity sector reform in Ukraine did include civil society, they mapped the projects aiming at empowering civil society as a beneficiary, rather than security projects implemented by civil society.<sup>83</sup> According to the participants of the validation workshops for this study, Ukrainian civil society is taking an active part in the projects on human security, in particular on community policing where dialogue is seen as a valuable mechanism to connect people, local authorities, law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders.<sup>84</sup> Safety of people at the check points and those living in the gray zone along the line of contact has become a concern for many Human Rights organizations that monitor Human Rights violations in the conflict zone.<sup>85</sup> At the same time, community security, even in places close to the contact line, is not directly connected to the armed conflict as such. For example, a UNDP study of security in Luhansk and Donetsk oblast has identified that poverty, unemployment, corruption and alcoholism are four major security threats as perceived by people, while mines, unexploded devices, shelling and increased violence in the community are of less concern to people.<sup>86</sup> It seems therefore that most community security programs would deal with issues not directly related to the armed conflict.

- **Information and cyber security** are extremely important issues in conditions of hybrid warfare. Although the government plays a leading role in this activity (the government adopted a National Cyber Security Strategy in 2016 and published several other legislative acts)<sup>87</sup> civil society support and response to information threats is hugely important. Activities in this area are targeted mostly at different types of mass media including social media in order to detect fake news and propaganda and to educate experts and the wider population about practical tools and skills to deal with these issues. See for example, the NGO “Information Security”,<sup>88</sup> the NGO “Ukrainian Academy of Cybersecurity”,<sup>89</sup> Project “Resilient Ukraine”,<sup>90</sup> the NGO “Detector Media”.<sup>91</sup>
- **Creating safe space for marginalized groups.** Some activities of civil society that fall under other functions such as social cohesion or socialization may also create physical spaces that offer shelters for marginalized groups (or example, women who suffer from domestic violence, marginalized national minorities like the Roma, etc.).<sup>92</sup>

**GAPS:** Participants of the validation workshops suggested that civil society could play a more active role in raising mine awareness among the population including children; and in the area of the “protection of protectors” – civil society activists – including physical protection from attacks,

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83. Ibid.

84. See [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322764981\\_Dialog\\_policii\\_ta\\_gromadi\\_ak\\_socialna\\_tehnologia\\_vprovadzen-na\\_principiv\\_community\\_policing\\_u\\_miscevij\\_gromadi](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322764981_Dialog_policii_ta_gromadi_ak_socialna_tehnologia_vprovadzen-na_principiv_community_policing_u_miscevij_gromadi)

85. <https://www.clovekvtisni.cz/en/this-is-us-this-is-ukraine-a-series-about-ordinary-people-living-through-war-on-the-eus-doorstep-5646gp>

86. UNDP, *Security and Justice Ukraine Report* (2018), <http://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/library/recovery-and-peacebuilding/security-and-justice-in-Ukraine-2018.html>

87. Asters, *Getting the Deal Through: Cybersecurity* (2018) [https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/NationalCyberSecurityStrategy\\_Ukraine.pdf](https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/NationalCyberSecurityStrategy_Ukraine.pdf). For overview of legal regulation in cyber security see [https://www.asterslaw.com/press\\_center/publications/getting\\_the\\_deal\\_through\\_cybersecurity\\_2018\\_ukraine/](https://www.asterslaw.com/press_center/publications/getting_the_deal_through_cybersecurity_2018_ukraine/)

88. <http://inform-security.com/>

89. <https://uacs.kiev.ua/en/>

90. <https://icds.ee/a-route-to-national-resilience-building-whole-of-society-security-in-ukraine/>

91. [https://detector.media/doc/images/news/archive/2016/136017/AReport\\_Massmedia\\_Feb2018\\_v2.pdf](https://detector.media/doc/images/news/archive/2016/136017/AReport_Massmedia_Feb2018_v2.pdf)

92. <http://www.avp.org.ua/en/homepage/>

provision of psycho-social help and retreats to counter professional “burn-out”. See, for example the Memorandum on the Creation of a Coalition for the Protection of Civil Society in Ukraine, Helsinki Human Rights Union.<sup>93</sup>

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To conclude, civilian protection is currently performed mostly by governmental agencies and international organizations, and civil society has a minor role in it compared to other peacebuilding functions.

## 6.2. Monitoring

Generally, Ukrainian civil society has a good understanding and prior experience of monitoring. Monitoring activities most relevant to peacebuilding fall into two parts: monitoring of Human Rights violations; and early-warning systems. There are also many monitoring projects carried out by civil society in the areas of anti-corruption, government transparency, decentralization, judiciary and other reforms.

### 6.2.1. Monitoring of Human Rights Violations

Ukraine has a long tradition of a Human Rights movement and a strong cohort of CSOs that have been working in Human Rights defense for many years. After the conflict evolved in 2014, most of the Human Rights NGOs got involved in conflict-related Human Rights activities. This led to increased competition between long-established NGOs and newly established ones from conflict-affected regions (see section 3.2. of this report).

Due to the high level of professionalization within the field, many NGOs form coalitions. Based on the interviews for this study, there are several coalitions (in alphabetical order, the list is non-exhaustive and only covers Ukrainian CSOs):

- Civil Network OPORA, founded in 2005 with a dozen local chapters, works in the area of election rights monitoring mostly unrelated to the armed conflict;<sup>94</sup>
- Coalition “Justice for Peace in Donbas”, founded in 2014 to monitor HR violations in the conflict zone and to provide legal aid to victims of HR violations. The website of the coalition states that there are 17 member organizations;<sup>95</sup>
- Committee of Voters of Ukraine, founded in 1994, currently with 125 local chapters all over Ukraine, works in the area of election rights monitoring mostly unrelated to the armed conflict;<sup>96</sup>
- Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU). Initially created in 1976 as an umbrella organization for 29 other HR organizations,<sup>97</sup> UHHRU now works as an analytical center and other organizations work as their partners rather than being part of UHHRU;

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93. <https://helsinki.org.ua/en/articles/memorandum-on-the-creation-of-a-coalition-for-the-protection-of-civil-society-in-ukraine/>

94. <https://www.oporaua.org/en/about>

95. <https://jfp.org.ua/coalition/pro-koalitsiiu>

96. [http://www.cvu.org.ua/eng/page/about\\_cvu](http://www.cvu.org.ua/eng/page/about_cvu)

97. <https://helsinki.org.ua/en/members-of-the-union/>

- Coalition “Initiative Group for Human Rights in Crimea”<sup>98</sup> – based on the information from the website, it has 15 Ukrainian organizations as members, as well as organizations from Russia, Belarus and other countries. This study has not identified information about this coalition beyond 2016.
- Various coalitions and networks of women NGOs (for example, network of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom,<sup>99</sup> the network of the Ukrainian Women’s Fund,<sup>100</sup> networks of La Strada Ukraine<sup>101</sup>).

A number of free-standing organizations (which are also part of some of the above coalitions) were also mentioned by the interviewees: Crimean Human Rights Group,<sup>102</sup> Crimea SOS,<sup>103</sup> Democracy Development Center,<sup>104</sup> Donbas SOS,<sup>105</sup> Center for Civil Liberties,<sup>106</sup> Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group,<sup>107</sup> Lugansk Regional Human Right Center “Alternatyva”,<sup>108</sup> ZMINA Human Rights Information Center,<sup>109</sup> Vostok SOS.<sup>110</sup>

Most of these organizations are currently involved in monitoring Human Rights violations in the government-controlled territories as well as at NGCA including enforced disappearances and places of illegal detention; gender-based violence; Human Rights at the check-points along the contact line, etc.<sup>111</sup> Human Rights monitoring thus seems to be a reasonably professionalized and competitive field of civil society activity in Ukraine.

### 6.2.2. Community Early-Warning Systems

Early warning systems (EWS) and the notion of early warning as such is a new concept in Ukraine which has been brought by international organizations after 2014 and remains highly specialized terminology used by a narrow circle of conflict resolution and security experts. Usually it refers to “a process that: (a) alerts decision makers to the potential outbreak, escalation and resurgence of violent conflict; and (b) promotes an understanding among decision makers of the nature and impacts of violent conflict.”<sup>112</sup>

Early warning systems in Ukraine are currently provided to the Ukrainian Government by international organizations, in particular the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission. The role of civil society in early-warning systems remains marginal. Yet, civil society projects aimed at early warning seem to have increased in recent years but due to the confidential character of this activity, there is not much public information about these projects.

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98. <http://coalition.crimeahr.org>

99. [https://www.wilpf.org/st\\_country/ukraine/?fbclid=IwAR1bcBammJb327Xw9RPPq0o3RyQM3plzAWLZ4Jhlb9Gt8hgZe2IEcxr\\_BZE](https://www.wilpf.org/st_country/ukraine/?fbclid=IwAR1bcBammJb327Xw9RPPq0o3RyQM3plzAWLZ4Jhlb9Gt8hgZe2IEcxr_BZE)

100. <https://www.uwf.org.ua/en/>

101. <https://la-strada.org.ua/>

102. <https://crimeahrg.org>

103. <http://krymsos.com/en/>

104. <http://ddcentr.org.ua/>

105. <http://www.donbasssos.org/en/>

106. <http://ccl.org.ua/en/pro-nas/>

107. <http://khp.org/en/>

108. <https://alterpravo.wixsite.com/alterpravo>

109. <https://humanrights.org.ua/en>

110. <http://vostok-sos.org/prava-lyudyny-v-okupovanykh-donetskii-ta-luhanskii-oblastiakh-lypen-2018/>

111. See Reports at <https://alterpravo.wixsite.com/alterpravo/zviti>

112. OECD, *Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse* (2009), <https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/preventing%20violence%20war%20and%20state%20collapse.pdf>

This study has identified the following civil society EWS and conflict-analysis projects:

- Some projects implemented by the Ukrainian Peacebuilding School had EWS elements;<sup>113</sup>
- The project “Increasing Capacities of Local Communities in Donetsk region” implemented by the Institute for Peace and Common Ground. This project relied on the dialogue as a response mechanism to security threats identified by the monitors.<sup>114</sup>
- The project by the NGO “Regional Analytical Center” from Izmail, Odesa oblast to monitor and map conflicts in five local communities in Odesa region, the results of this mapping have been made public in the form of an interactive map;<sup>115</sup>
- The project by the Association for Promotion of People’s Self-Governance to analyze and map conflicts in 10 local amalgamated communities all over Ukraine.<sup>116</sup>

Supposedly, as a part of early warning programs or as an assistance to internal strategy development there are frequent missions by international organizations and local CSOs to conduct conflict monitoring in conflict-affected regions. For example, GPPAC Ukraine does such missions once a year, and International Alert engaged local Ukrainian experts to conduct a study at the end of 2018 in three regions in Ukraine.<sup>117</sup> Apart from the East of Ukraine adjacent to the conflict zone, two other localities – South Besarabia, and Zakarpatje – have emerged as target regions of EWS projects.

To conclude, community early warning projects identified in this study are limited primarily to local conflict analysis which is not connected to the broader geopolitical analysis of the conflict. Furthermore, most conflict analysis reports remain unpublished and are not shared among Ukrainian CSOs and/or international organizations. Finally, this study has not identified a single EWS project involving civil society that went beyond conflict-analysis to the establishment of a viable system of response to conflict threats.

### 6.2.3. Other Types of Monitoring

**Conflict-related gender-based violence** is constantly monitored at the line of contact by international women’s organizations and local partners – Human Rights NGOs.<sup>118</sup> Participants of the validation workshop suggested that gender-based violence was a problem in 2014-2015 but it is currently decreasing.

**Mass media** monitoring for fake news, hate speech and journalist ethics (for example, Detector Media;<sup>119</sup> Donetsk Institute of Information<sup>120</sup>);

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113. Ukrainian Peacebuilding School, *Strategies of Transformation and Prevention of Borderland Conflicts in Ukraine 2014-2015* (in Ukrainian), <https://peace.in.ua/strategiji-transformatsiji-i-preventsiji-prykordonnnyh-konfliktiv-v-ukrajini-zbirka-analitychnyh-materialiv-2014-2015/>

114. <http://ipcg.org.ua/proekti/>

115. <http://rac.od.ua/map>

116. [https://issuu.com/irf\\_ua/docs/conflicts](https://issuu.com/irf_ua/docs/conflicts)

117. <https://www.international-alert.org/publications/ukraine-synthesis-situational-assessment-report>

118. Justice for Peace in Donbas, Eastern-Ukrainian Center for Civic Initiatives, *Unspoken Pain: Gender-Based Violence in the Conflict Zone of Eastern Ukraine* (2017), <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Unspoken-Pain-web.pdf>; The Strategy for Prevention of and Response to the Conflict Related Sexual Violence in Ukraine (2019), <http://eca.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2019/04/the-strategy-for-prevention-of-and-response-to-the-conflict-related-sexual-violence-in-ukraine?fbclid=IwAR1gk4U-pDFtnl77D5tf8TzTmwnumXdtgxHwtcSLIDsaSwLn4nIK8Wz00Xs>

119. <https://detector.media/category/monitoring/>

120. <http://dii.dn.ua/en/news/310-over-20-per-cent-of-news-in-media-of-the-so-called-dpr-contains-hate-speech-research>

**Monitoring of peacebuilding interventions** – the first attempt to systematically monitor dialogue initiatives in Ukraine was made in 2015 by the Brussels-based organization MediatEUr through the IT Platform – “Dialogue Support Platform”. Since 2018, the Mediation and Dialogue Research Center at Kyiv Mohyla Academy has been conducting surveys of dialogue participants and monitoring of the field,<sup>121</sup>

**Anti-corruption monitoring** – this is a big sector of Ukrainian civil society that is currently well supported by international donors<sup>122</sup>

**GAPS:** While Human Rights monitoring is a well-developed activity, conflict early warning by civil society is mostly limited to local conflict-analysis with most reports remaining unpublished, and the connection between conflict analysis and response continues to prove problematic.

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To conclude, the monitoring function includes monitoring in very different areas. While Human Rights monitoring seems to be well developed, monitoring for early warning of conflicts appears to be an emerging practice in Ukraine. Thus, assessments of each type of monitoring should be done separately.

### 6.3. Advocacy and Public Communication

In Ukraine, advocacy is a relatively new concept; there is no Ukrainian word for advocacy and in most cases it is simply transliterated (*advokatsia*). It has been brought to Ukraine by foreign NGOs and is generally understood in line with the Western notion – as an approach to change policies, practice and public attitudes through coordinated campaigns, dissemination of information, communication through mass media and social networks, and other types of mobilization.<sup>123</sup> Participants of the validation workshops for this study suggested that in Ukraine, advocacy campaigns are or should be directed at concrete outcomes – particularly legislative change on specific issues. IPTI’s definition of public advocacy includes “demonstrations, press releases, petitions, or other statements in support of a specific demand”, or “behind the scenes” advocacy where civil society engages policymakers through more discrete dialogue and influence away from the public eye.<sup>124</sup>

The advocacy campaigns that are listed below are public; it is likely that informal advocacy campaigns do take place but there is no information about them. Also, this study has not identified any activity in the areas of creating public pressure (mass mobilization for peace negotiations or against the recurrence of war); international advocacy for specific conflict issues (e.g. banning landmines, blood diamonds, and child soldiers). Instead, advocacy in the context of peacebuilding in Ukraine falls into three parts – Human Rights advocacy related and unrelated to the armed conflict, and advocacy for peaceful resolution of the armed conflict. Advocacy activities connected to the wider notion of positive peace such as reforms of decentralization, courts or anti-corruption, although relevant, were not included in this analysis of advocacy as all these activities would be nearly impossible to cover.

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121. Mediation and Dialogue Research Center, Kyiv Mohyla Academy, <https://md.ukma.edu.ua/>

122. RPR, *Anti-Corruption Policy in Ukraine: First Successes and Growing Resistance* (2017), [https://rpr.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Renaissance\\_A4\\_4Anti-Corruption-Policy.pdf](https://rpr.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Renaissance_A4_4Anti-Corruption-Policy.pdf)

123. <https://www.culturepartnership.eu/ua/publishing/advocacy-course/what-is-advocacy>

124. Paffenholz, *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment*.

### *Human Rights advocacy, unrelated to the armed conflict*

The number of actors in this activity is substantial; most of the Human Rights and women's rights NGOs are involved (see the list of Human Rights organizations in the section 6.2.1. of this Report). Examples of campaigns include:

- Gender equality (increasing women's political participation and countering domestic violence);<sup>125</sup>
- LGBT rights;<sup>126</sup>
- Rights of people with disabilities;<sup>127</sup>
- Rights of ethnic minorities (for example, Roma, Hungarians, Romanians, Crimean Tatars, etc.).<sup>128</sup> At the same time this type of advocacy seems to omit issues connected to the Russian ethnic minority.
- Inclusive school education for children with disabilities.<sup>129</sup>

### *Human Rights advocacy, related to the armed conflict.* Advocacy for:

- Rights of IDPs – for example, the advocacy campaign for Voting Rights of IDPs by OPO-RA, the Danish Refugee Council in Ukraine and others;<sup>130</sup> the “Start and Finally Do” (“*Pochui, nareshiti vykonay*”) campaign for IDPs rights;<sup>131</sup>
- Gender equality (women's political participation, conflict-related gender-based violence) within the framework of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda by UN Women and other women's NGOs;<sup>132</sup>
- Release of Ukrainian political prisoners from Russian prisons and prisons in the so-called “LNR/DNR”, for example, campaigns connected to Oleg Sentsov's hunger strike, and a campaign to release Ukrainian sailors arrested by Russia in the Kerch accident;<sup>133</sup>
- Better public attitudes towards people from Donbas, including those residing at NGCA, for example, campaigns by “Donbas Think Tank”<sup>134</sup>, Kalmius Group,<sup>135</sup> Donetsk Institute of Information;<sup>136</sup>
- Tolerance and culture of peace by the think tank International Center for Policy Studies (ICPS) “Envoys of Tolerance” with the slogan “reinventing tolerance”. The project

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125. For example, campaigns by Democracy Development Center, <http://ddcentr.org.ua/en/>; La Strada, Ukraine, <https://la-strada.org.ua/>; Ukrainian Women's Fund, <https://www.uwf.org.ua/en/>. For an overview of gender equality policies, See UN Overview of Gender Equality Policies in Ukraine, <http://www.un.org.ua/en/resident-coordinator-system/gender-equality>

126. For example – Razom, *Inclusion of LGBT People in Ukraine* (2018), <https://razomforukraine.org/projects/policyreport/inclusion-of-lgbti-people-in-ukraine/>

127. For example, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, *Rights of People with Disabilities* (2016), <https://helsinki.org.ua/en/rights-of-people-with-disabilities/>

128. For example, Roma Women Fund “Chirikli”, <http://www.chirikli.com.ua/index.php/en/> [https://www.academia.edu/1140961/Dialogics\\_of\\_Development\\_NGOs\\_European\\_Integration\\_and\\_the\\_Roma\\_in\\_Ukraine](https://www.academia.edu/1140961/Dialogics_of_Development_NGOs_European_Integration_and_the_Roma_in_Ukraine)

129. For example, Inclusive Education in Ukraine: Step by Step, IRF, 2018, [http://www.irf.ua/allevents/news/inklyuzivna\\_osvita\\_v\\_ukraini\\_razom\\_krok\\_za\\_krokom/](http://www.irf.ua/allevents/news/inklyuzivna_osvita_v_ukraini_razom_krok_za_krokom/)

130. <http://www.ifes.org/news/uniting-electoral-rights-ukraines-internally-displaced-community>

131. <https://vykonai.in.ua/>

132. Lauren van Metre, *Building Gender Equality in Ukraine*, U.S. Civil Society Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security (2017), <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/us-cswg-policy-brief-building-gender-equality-in-ukraine.pdf>

133. <http://letmypeoplego.org.ua/>

134. <https://www.facebook.com/thinktankdonbas/>

135. [https://www.kalmiusgroup.org/2018/04/blog-post\\_13.html#more](https://www.kalmiusgroup.org/2018/04/blog-post_13.html#more)

136. <http://dii.dn.ua/en>

supports talks and public events by Ukrainian leaders of public opinion – writers, artists, actors, pop-singers – on tolerance regarding ethnic minority groups, people with disabilities, women, etc.<sup>137</sup>

**Advocacy for peaceful resolution of the armed conflict (peace advocacy as such)**

- Research and public campaigns for legislation on transitional justice. In anticipation of the reintegration of the territories currently non-controlled by the Ukrainian government, the Helsinki Human Rights Union<sup>138</sup> and other Human Rights organizations are developing strategies of post-conflict justice and reconciliation including drafting legislation on amnesty (draft laws on amnesty or forgiveness; on responsibility for collaboration, etc.);<sup>139</sup>
- The only identified permanent advocacy platform that is closest to peace advocacy is a platform for “Dialogue on Peace and Safe Reintegration” and “Public Marathon – Why Should We Stay Together?”.<sup>140</sup> The platform is convened by the Ukrainian think tanks and organizations – Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR),<sup>141</sup> the Center for Problems of Security and Development, and the Platform of Social and Humanitarian Innovations “Single Coordination Center.”<sup>142</sup> The platform organizes regular round-tables with the participation of MPs, representatives of the Ukrainian Government, in particular the Ministry of Temporary Occupied Territories and IDPs<sup>143</sup> bringing in international experts to share experiences of peaceful conflict resolution in other countries. The platform’s round-tables attract certain coverage by mass-media reaching out to up to 5 million people.<sup>144</sup> Yet, the very possibility of such a platform happening in Ukraine was secured by the “protection” of an international actor – the Finnish Crisis Management Initiative.

**GAPS:** Advocacy related to peacebuilding is generally a weak function, with advocacy for peace almost absent. For example, the Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index 2017 listed issues that were targeted by advocacy campaigns in Ukraine, and neither peace nor issues related to the armed conflict were the focus of campaigns.<sup>145</sup>

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137. <http://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/operations/get-involved/reinvent-respect-campaign/tolerance-envoys.html>

138. See, Conference Materials, *Post-Conflict Justice in Ukraine*, [https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Blok\\_80.pdf](https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Blok_80.pdf); Ukraine Helsinki Human Rights Union activities in Transitional Justice, 2017 <https://helsinki.org.ua/en/activities/transitional-justice-en/>; Ukraine Helsinki Human Rights Union, *Research Report on Implementation of Transitional Justice in Ukraine* (in Ukrainian), (2017), <https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Summary-final-dlya-sajtu.pdf>

139. <https://hromadskeradio.org/programs/kyiv-donbas/zakonoproekty-pro-kolaboraciyu-probachyty-vsih>

140. <https://www.facebook.com/chomumyrazom/>

141. [http://www.ucipr.org.ua/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=featured&Itemid=154&lang=en](http://www.ucipr.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=featured&Itemid=154&lang=en)

142. <http://sii-platform.org/>

143. <http://mtot.gov.ua/zaporukoyu-vidnovlennya-tsilisnosti-ukrayiny-ye-zberezheniya-zv-yazkiv-z-gromadyanamy-na-okupovanyh-terytoriyah-vadym-chernysh/>

144. <http://cmi.fi/2018/06/12/cmi-supports-10th-regional-public-dialogue-ukraine/> <http://cmi.fi/2018/11/28/dialogue-helps-heal-divisions-caused-war-ukraine-people-realise-purpose-together/> <http://cmi.fi/2018/12/14/restoration-of-trust-a-necessary-condition-for-secure-reintegration-of-ukraine/> <http://cmi.fi/2019/03/27/8th-session-of-the-national-platform-held-in-ukraine/> <http://cmi.fi/2019/04/16/discussing-ideas-for-ukraines-peaceful-future/>

145. Biggest focus in 2017 was on anti-corruption efforts, pension reform, judicial matters, education, health, electoral reform, and decentralization. <https://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/resource-civil-society-organization-2017-regional-report.PDF> at p 224.

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To conclude, it remains unclear to what extent advocacy for Human Rights unrelated to the armed conflict relates to peacebuilding. Straightforward peace advocacy – advocacy for peaceful settlement of conflict – is nearly non-existent in the current situation of on-going armed conflict. Peace advocacy events listed in this section are generally limited to public communication through media and public events lacking any meaningful demands on the Ukrainian Government. Furthermore, these events are initiated by the foreigners. Local Ukrainian CSOs are currently reluctant to get involved in peace advocacy. As explained by an interviewee for this study: “[peace advocacy] is perceived as a call to surrender to Russia and as treason (*zrada*), CSOs are afraid or do not see any sense to do it, or they think that this will damage Ukraine.”<sup>146</sup>

## 6.4. Socialization – Attitudinal Change towards Culture of Peace

The term “socialization” as understood by IPTI’s methodology does not exist in Ukrainian and each time requires explanation as to what exactly is meant by “socialization”. This report and the validation workshops used “attitudinal change towards culture of peace”.

As it is difficult to establish conflict parties and conflict groups in the conflict in/around Ukraine, identification of such groups depends upon the conflict narrative of specific organizations. Consequently, there is no clear-cut distinction between in-group and inter-group activities. This section lists activities that the report considers can be regarded as in-group because they do not expressly require the participation of people from different conflict groups (however the groups are conceptualized) and are aimed at attitudinal change for culture of peace generally in the whole of Ukraine.

Given the repressive context (see section 4.2), the term “culture of peace” is not widely used in public discourse. Therefore, “culture of peace” is often substituted for “culture of dialogue” which is seen more neutral and well-supported by internationals. “The culture of dialogue” is publicly represented as missing in Ukrainian society and requiring continuous efforts to be developed. “Culture of dialogue” has become a kind of cliché used at public events and is becoming increasingly popular with the Ukrainian Government, CSOs and international organizations. Often, Ukrainian officials expressly request CSOs and foreign donors to develop it in Ukraine (for example, at the OSCE PCU conferences and round-tables). Yet, in their discourse “culture of dialogue” remains remote from the armed conflict in the East and focuses on dialogue within the government, in Parliament, and dialogue on current political reforms to connect the government and civil society.

Activity on the promotion of a culture of peace and dialogue can be classified into several groups – peace education, peace journalism, facilitated dialogues and other activities.

### 6.4.1. Peace Education

The term “peace education” is not used in public discourse for the reasons discussed above. According to the interviewees for this study, many organizations who functionally do peace education would object to being labelled this way; they instead prefer to be associated with “civic education” (*hromadyanska osvita*).

The Ukrainian Peacebuilding School<sup>147</sup> has developed a Framework Strategy of Peace Education in Ukraine that can be found on their website. The Strategy defines peace education as “educa-

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146. Interview with the head of Ukrainian NGO active in peace education and dialogue facilitation, 1 August 2018, Kyiv

147. <https://peace.in.ua/holovna/koalitsiya-orhanizatsij-uchasnykiv-proektu-ukrajinska-myrotvorcha-shkola/>

tion that promotes culture of peace through development of knowledge, skills, attitudes and values that facilitate non-violent conflict transformation”.<sup>148</sup> It is considered an integral part of the civil education and includes the following tasks: (1) training of civic activists; (2) development of programs/modules/cases and teaching materials for school system and extra-school curriculum; (3) development of peace education standards for civil society and journalists; (4) monitoring and support of local initiatives of educators; (5) setting up a network of civic activists with peacebuilding competencies for local, intersectoral, inter-regional and international cooperation.<sup>149</sup> However, according to the interviewee for this study, the Framework Strategy of Peace Education was not supported by the Ukrainian Government and the work on its promotion has been suspended.<sup>150</sup>

Practical initiatives that have been identified by this study as functionally similar to peace education can be divided into initiatives within the formal state education system (from nurseries to universities) and informal education through ad hoc trainings.

#### *Formal peace education:*

- **Multicultural education curriculum** in schools. The NGO “Integration and Development Center for Information and Research”<sup>151</sup> has been active in development and implementation of the curriculum “Culture of Good Neighborhood” for more than 15 years in kindergartens, secondary schools and universities all over Ukraine. It officially partners with the Ministry of Education and integrates this course within curriculums of selected educational institutions.
- **School peer-mediation programs** as a part of the school curriculum. Since 2003 the Institute for Peace and Common Ground (IPCG) has been implementing school mediation programs in secondary schools in Ukraine. After 2014 school mediation has become extremely popular with donors and consequently CSOs. Now many CSOs have received support for such programs mostly in the conflict-affected Eastern part of the country. See, for example, La Strada Ukraine school mediation training program and text-books<sup>152</sup> and Legal Development Network projects.<sup>153</sup> The Ministry of Education has officially stamped a lot of teaching materials for school mediation programs. Some coordination among the school mediation centers is evident – IPCG has initiated a networking platform for the school mediation programs,<sup>154</sup> there are annual Forums of School Mediation.<sup>155</sup> According to the estimate of the interviewee, there are all together around 100 school mediation centers in Ukraine.
- **Peaceful/Restorative School approach** – a holistic approach to the culture of peace in schools according to the methodology of Belinda Hopkins.<sup>156</sup> It is currently being piloted by the Institute for Peace and Common Ground in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and other partners.<sup>157</sup>

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148. Ukrainian Peacebuilding School, *Strategy of Peacebuilding Education in Ukraine*, <http://peace.in.ua/ramkova-stratehiya-myrotvorchoji-osvity-v-ukrajini-2020/>

149. Ibid.

150. Interview with Ukrainian peacebuilder, May 13, 2019

151. <http://idcir.com/uk/>

152. [https://la-strada.org.ua/ucp\\_mod\\_news\\_list\\_show\\_614.html](https://la-strada.org.ua/ucp_mod_news_list_show_614.html)

153. <https://ldn.org.ua/event/startuvav-proekt-rozvitok-skilnih-sluzb-porozuminna/>

154. <http://safeschools.com.ua/>

155. <https://ldn.org.ua/event/shkilni-mediatorij-zibrals-na-mizhrehionalnyj-forum-zhyttja-bez-konfliktiv/>

156. <https://transformingconflict.org/teachers/belinda-hopkins/>

157. <http://ipcg.org.ua/en/>

- ***New Ukrainian School (NUS)***<sup>158</sup>. The Ministry of Education has recently launched a new nationwide secondary school reform that introduces conflict resolution skills into the curriculum. Several NGOs are currently involved in this reform – for example, EdCamp.<sup>159</sup>
- ***Civic education curriculum*** in schools. Civic education was introduced in 2018 as a course for students in grade 10 (15-16 years old) by the Ministry of Education, and civil society took an active part in its development in cooperation with the Ministry.<sup>160</sup> The content and main principles of civic education remain unclear as the Ministry of Education only drafted the Concept Paper in March 2019<sup>161</sup> and civil society suggests multiple and often contradictory approaches. At the moment, the civic education curriculum seems to prioritize Human Rights and active citizen participation.<sup>162</sup> For the list of civil society actors involved into this process, see the report “Civic Education in Ukraine”.<sup>163</sup>
- ***Anti-bullying programs in schools***. Although anti-bullying is a topic in most peace education programs, there are separate projects that deal specifically with bullying, see for example the NGO “Alternatives for Violence, Ukraine”,<sup>164</sup> and on-line course on anti-bullying for teachers.<sup>165</sup>

### *Informal peace education*

- ***Trainings in Human Rights*** are organized by all Human Rights NGOs listed in section 6.2.1 of this report. They are widely supported by donors and target various groups (from school children to ex-combatants and IDPs)
- ***Trainings in dialogue and conflict resolution skills*** are organized by most mediation and dialogue facilitation NGOs listed in section 6.4.3 of this report. Although there are some stand-alone projects that offer conflict-resolution trainings to the general public (librarians, civil society activists, teachers, etc.), most trainings of this type are organized within frameworks of the larger programs that aim to initiate dialogues or mediation schemes. For example, some dialogue projects first choose the local community where these projects aim to establish a dialogue scheme, and then offer a series of trainings in mediation/dialogue/conflict resolution skills to select potential facilitators/mediators from the local community and to educate them for further independent work as dialogue facilitators. Therefore, interviewees for this study were not sure whether these trainings can be deemed part of a systematic peace education effort or rather ad hoc educational events to support dialogues.
- ***Other trainings, children’s camps, and other educational events*** by a multitude of SCOs in topics related to peace education, school reforms, leadership skills for children, for

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158. <https://nus.org.ua/>

159. <https://www.edcamp.org.ua/>

160. For the analysis of the civil society engagement into Civic Education curriculum, see Report “Civic Education in Ukraine” [https://rpr.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/171108\\_citizenship-education-Ukraine-ukr\\_YB.pdf](https://rpr.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/171108_citizenship-education-Ukraine-ukr_YB.pdf)

161. <https://mon.gov.ua/ua/news/mon-proponuye-dlya-gromadskogo-obgovorennya-strategiyu-rozvitku-gromadyanskoyi-osviti-na-period-do-2022-roku>

162. According to the program, the basic concepts of civic education are the following: human-being, person, citizen, human rights, rule of law, inclusiveness, civil society, community, civic participation, democracy, state, responsibility. <http://nus.org.ua/questions/kurs-gromadyanska-osvita-dlya-10-klasnykiv-shho-proponuye-programa/>

163. [https://rpr.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/171108\\_citizenship-education-Ukraine-ukr\\_YB.pdf](https://rpr.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/171108_citizenship-education-Ukraine-ukr_YB.pdf)

164. <http://www.avp.org.ua/en/homepage/>

165. [https://courses.prometheus.org.ua/courses/course-v1:MON+ABI01+2019\\_T2/about](https://courses.prometheus.org.ua/courses/course-v1:MON+ABI01+2019_T2/about)

example by the following organizations: “Other Education” (*Insha Osvita*),<sup>166</sup> EdCamp,<sup>167</sup> Alternatives to Violence, Ukraine,<sup>168</sup> Ukrainian Peacebuilding School<sup>169</sup> and many others.

#### 6.4.2. Peace Journalism

As discussed earlier in this report, the term “peace journalism” is hardly used in public discourse; instead the discourse focuses on professional standards of journalists. A number of NGOs in Ukraine are working in the mass media sector conducting monitoring of professional standards of journalists, including the code of ethics, hate speech or information security issues (section 6.2.3 of this report).

In the narrow sense, peace journalism includes conflict-sensitive reporting of events connected to violence and armed conflict. This study has not identified organizations working specifically on peace journalism in this narrow sense, and has identified only one project entitled “School of Peace Journalism” by the Odesa Regional organization of “Committee of Voters”.<sup>170</sup> The visible activities in this area were publications on the conflict-sensitive reporting by the international organizations – for example, OSCE PCU,<sup>171</sup> and Thomson Foundation.<sup>172</sup>

#### 6.4.3. Facilitated Dialogues in the Territory Controlled by the Ukrainian Government

It has been a challenge during the initial state of the armed conflict to understand what is meant by dialogue and to sort out various activities under the label “dialogue”. Eventually, by 2018, the professional community of mediators and facilitators was able to develop their understanding of dialogue in the document called Standards of Dialogue: Definition and Main Principles.<sup>173</sup> The same definition is included in the 2019 manual on dialogues published by the OSCE PCU.<sup>174</sup> Facilitated dialogue is defined in these documents as:

a specially prepared group process that takes place with the help of a facilitator, aims to improve the understanding/relationships between participants, and may also have the goal of making decisions about common actions or the resolution of a conflict in a way that provides equal opportunities for the participants of the meeting to express their opinions.

Although this is not the only dialogue definition used by Ukrainian dialogue facilitators, it provides a basis to sort out and to monitor activities in dialogue field. The specificity of professionally facilitated dialogue in Ukraine is that it includes inter-group dialogue as well as problem-solving workshops/events under the label of “dialogues”.<sup>175</sup>

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166. <http://insha-osvita.org/en/>

167. <https://www.edcamp.org.ua/>

168. <http://www.avp.org.ua/en/homepage/>

169. <http://peace.in.ua/category/sluzhbovi/english/>

170. <https://www.prostir.ua/?news=v-odeskij-oblasti-tryvayut-medijni-myrotvorchi-initsiatyvy-zhurnalistiv-ta-bloheriv>

171. OSCE, *Conflict Sensitive Journalism: Best Practices and Recommendations* (2016), <https://www.osce.org/ukraine/254526?download=true>

172. Thomson Foundation, Ukraine: Reporting Conflict: A practical Guide for Journalists (2015), [http://www.thomsonfoundation.org/media/33401/ukraine-guide\\_2303\\_x-la\\_sl.pdf](http://www.thomsonfoundation.org/media/33401/ukraine-guide_2303_x-la_sl.pdf)

173. *Standards of Dialogue: Definition and Principles*, IPCG, (2018), <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JN3QRE8EXU5D1FvY3Go1H19Z-vRNHNxAo/view>

174. Kateryna Guseva, Diana Protsenko, *How, When, Where Does Dialogue Work? Practical Guide*, OSCE PCU (2019), <https://www.osce.org/uk/project-coordinator-in-ukraine/422831>

175. Kyselova, “Understanding Dialogue: Survey-Based Study.”; Kyselova and von Döbenack, “Track III Dialogue in Ukraine: Major Patterns and Resulting Risks.”

Facilitated dialogues do contribute to the function of promotion of the peace/dialogue culture in Ukraine, even if they do not involve people from NGCA. It is a widely acknowledged understanding of international organizations as well as Ukrainian dialogue facilitators that any dialogue on any topic involving any kind of participants promotes the culture of peace/dialogue. Furthermore, the research demonstrates that majority of dialogues in Ukraine (2014-2018) dealt with rather technical issues (solving community problems, implementing reforms, involving civil society into governmental decision-making) that often do not require representation of groups with adverse political views.<sup>176</sup> Thus, a lot of facilitated dialogues are aimed at building trust among Ukrainians, to collectively solve problems at all levels and to improve social cohesion and the resilience of Ukrainian society thereby not expressly aiming to bring together people who are separated by the current line of contact in the East. As was mentioned by the interviewee for this study: “When I ask – who should have dialogues with whom, people tell me “everyone with everyone, everyone who has disagreements”.”<sup>177</sup>

The situation in Ukraine differs from other countries in that Ukraine has a well-developed professional community of highly competent local mediators and dialogue facilitators. Even before 2013, there were around 3,000 Ukrainians trained in mediation skills. This professional community currently comprises the backbone of the peacebuilding community working on the interest/needs-based paradigm of conflict transformation. In summer 2017, the Ukraine Dialogue Support Platform offered information about 24 Ukrainian NGOs active in dialogue facilitation in Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, Donetsk oblast, Dnipro, Kryvyi Rih, Kherson, Kremenchuk and other places. The 2018 survey of the dialogue participants has identified 66 organizations in Ukraine that have conducted facilitated dialogues in 2014-2018 with the first ten organizations responsible for 2/3 of all dialogues in Ukraine.<sup>178</sup> For a more detailed description of the dialogue facilitators’ community of practice see other research by Tatiana Kyselova.<sup>179</sup>

Based on the previous research<sup>180</sup> and interviews conducted for this study, there are several NGOs of the network/coalition types working in dialogue facilitation in the peacebuilding sphere in Ukraine (only Ukrainian CSOs, in alphabetical order, non-exhaustive list):<sup>181</sup>

- Institute for Peace and Common Ground, Kyiv - NGO with around 10 other NGOs in its network, mostly in the East;<sup>182</sup>
- National Association of Mediators, Kyiv - although not expressly including reference to dialogue in their mandate, this national association coordinates dialogue activities on capacity building of facilitators through its cooperation with OSCE PCU;<sup>183</sup>
- Network of Dialogue Facilitators, Kyiv - informal unregistered network of professional facilitators with different backgrounds who coordinate certain ethical and professional issues among themselves;<sup>184</sup>

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176. Kyselova, "Understanding Dialogue: Survey-Based Study."

177. Interview with Ukrainian facilitator, September 30, 2018.

178. Kyselova, "Understanding Dialogue: Survey-Based Study," 22.

179. "Professional Peacemakers in Ukraine: Mediators and Dialogue Facilitators before and after 2014."

180. "Understanding Dialogue: Survey-Based Study."; Kyselova and von Dobeneck, "Track III Dialogue in Ukraine: Major Patterns and Resulting Risks."

181. There is also a National Association of Facilitators of Ukraine (NAFU <http://nafu.com.ua/>) active in more technical type of facilitation – moderating forums, conferences and other public events; strategic planning sessions, team-building and problem-solving.

182. <http://ipc.org.ua/en/>

183. <http://namu.com.ua/ua/>

184. <https://www.facebook.com/dialoguesnetwork/>

- Peace Engineers, Kyiv - the project of the NGO Dignity Space that is currently developing its network in the East of the country and in other regions;<sup>185</sup>
- Ukrainian Peacebuilding School (UPS) - a network of NGOs and activists based in Kyiv, Kharkiv and other places in Ukraine. UPS do not train dialogue facilitators but rather grassroots activists who they call “social intermediaries” (*sotsialni poserednyky*). UPS conduct model games with activists and local government in local communities that might be akin to dialogues.<sup>186</sup>

Other organizations active in dialogue facilitation include: Center of Law and Mediation, Kharkiv;<sup>187</sup> “Dialogue in Action” initiative of “Spirit and Letter” Publishing House, Kyiv;<sup>188</sup> Donbas Dialogue, Svyatohirsk, Donetsk oblast;<sup>189</sup> Fund of Local Democracy/Laboratory of Peaceful Solutions, Kharkiv;<sup>190</sup> Odesa Regional Mediation Group, Odesa;<sup>191</sup> Ukrainian Center for Concordance, Kyiv.<sup>192</sup>

Finally, the precise number of facilitated dialogues in Ukraine remains unexplored. The 2018 survey of dialogue participants identified 157 facilitated dialogues within the period 2014–first quarter 2018 through methodology of on-line survey, which captured only a fraction of all dialogues in Ukraine. According to an interviewee for this study, the Institute of Peace and Common Ground conducted 31 community dialogues within 12 months between April 2018 and 2019. Dialogues are currently taking place mostly in the East of the Ukrainian territories controlled by the Ukrainian Government and on rather “technical” issues such as reforms, involving civil society in decision-making, community problems, Human Rights, integration of war veterans and IDPs into host communities. Dialogues on historical memories, religion, political views, war, conflict narratives happen much less often (in 2019 – 10% as compared to “technical issues”).<sup>193</sup>

#### 6.4.4. Other Activities to Promote Culture of Peace

- **Art projects.** Currently there are a number of CSOs who work in the creative art sector promoting Human Rights, tolerance, and diversity through different forms of art.<sup>194</sup> However, there are very few organizations that work specifically to promote peace and conflict resolution skills through art. The NGO “Force of the Future” (*Syla Maibutnioho*) is one example.<sup>195</sup> Many art projects connected to the conflict include photo or art exhibitions depicting the war in Ukraine and stories of people’s suffering.<sup>196</sup>
- **Forum-theater performances** – for example, the NGO “Theater for Dialogue” relies on the methodology of “the theater of the oppressed” and stages performances about Human Rights, civic activism of youth and women, and other topics.<sup>197</sup>

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185. <https://peaceengineers.com/en/>

186. <http://peace.in.ua/znayomtes-ia-sotsial-nyy-poserednyk/>

187. <http://www.centerlawmediation.com/>

188. <https://duh-i-litera.com/> <https://www.facebook.com/dialogue.in.action/>

189. <https://www.donbassdialog.org.ua/>

190. <http://fmd.kh.ua/>

191. <https://www.facebook.com/OdessaGroupMediation/>

192. <http://concordance.org.ua/>

193. Kyselova, “Understanding Dialogue: Survey-Based Study.”

194. See for example, NGO « Almenda» <http://almenda.org/category/about-us/about-org/>

195. <https://www.facebook.com/mitcizgodi/>

196. <http://www.library.kpi.ua/node/1115> <https://www.stalkerzone.org/background-exhibition-irina-lashkevichs-look-eyes-donbass-photo-project/>

197. <http://tdd.org.ua/en/empowerment-civil-society-non-violent-conflict-transformation-local-communities>

- ***Peace Camps for Youth*** – for example, Peace Camp for children from the East (IDPs and those who were affected by the war);<sup>198</sup>
- ***Conflict Narratives*** - working with narratives and storytelling about the conflict. Depending upon the methodology this kind of project may or may not engage opposing conflict groups in discussions on people’s understanding of the conflict. One of the examples – the Power of Goodness project<sup>199</sup> that was piloted in 2015 through the Odesa Regional Mediation Group and is currently being extended to other parts of Ukraine.
- ***Capacity-building projects*** in local communities that do not make references to opposing social groups. See for example, the project “Empowerment of civil society for non-violent conflict transformation in local communities” by the Theater for Dialogue.<sup>200</sup>

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To conclude, it is unclear to what extent socialization is developed compared to other functions as these activities are done rather uncoordinated by a large number of organizations who do not form a single coherent community of practice.

## 6.5. Social Cohesion – Bringing People Together

The term “social cohesion” was not commonly used by Ukrainian civil society in the Ukrainian language before 2014. The term has been translated as “*sotsialna zгуртовanist*” (see for example, Social Cohesion Index research in Ukraine).<sup>201</sup> Nevertheless, in practice, understandings of social cohesion in Ukraine vary. Social cohesion as a function of peacebuilding according to IPTI methodology means “bringing people together across conflict divides”.<sup>202</sup> As discussed above, there are no fixed conflict parties in the armed conflict in and around Ukraine. Depending upon conflict-analysis of the implementers, and their personal views and values, the groups of people who are brought together can be the following:

- IDPs and host communities;
- Ex-combatants and local communities where they reside;
- Civil society and government at all levels;
- Majority and minority societal groups (ethnic, sexual, etc.);
- Ukrainians with divergent political views;
- “people from the east” and “people from the west” of Ukraine;
- Ukrainians residing in government-controlled and non-government-controlled territories of Ukraine;
- Citizens of Ukraine and citizens of Russian Federation.

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198. <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-presshall/2309715-proekt-mandrivnij-tabir-miru-prezentacia-dosagnen-i-napracuvan.html>

199. <http://power-of-goodness.info/>

[https://www.facebook.com/groups/308101576357991/?multi\\_permalink=551845721983574&notif\\_id=1551022061770399&notif\\_t=feedback\\_reaction\\_generic](https://www.facebook.com/groups/308101576357991/?multi_permalink=551845721983574&notif_id=1551022061770399&notif_t=feedback_reaction_generic)

200. <http://tdd.org.ua/en/empowerment-civil-society-non-violent-conflict-transformation-local-communities>

201. <https://www.scoreforpeace.org/en/easternUkraine/about>

202. Paffenholz, *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment*.

### 6.5.1. Bringing People Together Through Professionally Facilitated Dialogue

Professionally facilitated dialogues that bring together specific groups of the population are conducted by the same organizations as listed above in section 6.4.3. Dialogues that were identified by the 2018 study<sup>203</sup> as most likely dealing with divergent groups included the following:

- **Cross-contact-line dialogues** – bringing together Ukrainians residing on controlled and non-controlled territories of Ukraine. The 2018 study identified 17 dialogues in which some residents of the non-controlled territories took part (in 2014-2018). On top of these dialogues, Donbas Dialogue conducted 7 dialogue marathons on different topics from 2014-2019 that involved residents of the non-controlled territories through online technologies as well as face-to-face interaction.<sup>204</sup> Another semi-public project of this kind is a long-term (now more than five years) project involving women from NGCA by the Ukrainian NGO – Ideas for Change and their international partners.<sup>205</sup> Other projects work under cover and there is no information about them. These types of dialogues are most often held outside Ukraine and Russia in a third neutral country (Georgia, Belarus, Turkey).
- **Russian-Ukrainian dialogues** – dialogues bringing together citizens of Ukraine and Russia, most often civil society activists. The 2018 dialogue study identified 10 dialogues that engaged several citizens of the Russian Federation. There is even less information about this type of dialogue. The only semi-public initiative identified by this study was the women dialogue by the Ideas for Change. Apart from women from the NGCA this dialogue engages women activists from the Russian Federation and other countries.<sup>206</sup> These dialogues also tend to be held in third countries.
- **Dialogues on integration of war veterans and IDPs.** The 2018 dialogue study identified 24 dialogues involving host communities and ex-combatants or IDPs as distinct groups. The problems discussed at these dialogues ranged from finding employment opportunities for ex-combatants and IDPs within local communities, provision of housing, humanitarian aid and psycho-social aid; to relations between ex-combatants and IDPs with other members of the local community, competition between different groups of veterans and security in the community. For an example of this type of dialogue see the dialogue success story published by the Institute of Peace and Common Ground.<sup>207</sup>
- **Dialogue between the government and civil society.** Although the issue of interaction between government at all levels and civil society almost inevitably arises in most dialogues, the 2018 study identified 13 dialogues where these two groups were expressly brought together. These dialogues were entitled “Government and Citizens” (“*vlada-hromadyane*”, “*vlada – hromada*”), Police and Civil Society. For an example of a dialogue between police, civic activists, bloggers and representatives of the city council in Chuhuiv, Kharkiv oblast, see the dialogue conducted by the Peace Engineers Project.<sup>208</sup>
- **Dialogues between majority and minority groups** (examples of minority groups include: women, people with disabilities, LGBT community, parents of children with special

203. Kyselova, “Understanding Dialogue: Survey-Based Study.”

204. <https://www.donbassdialog.org.ua/>

205. <https://www.facebook.com/IdeasForChangeUkraine/>

206. <https://www.facebook.com/IdeasForChangeUkraine/>

207. IPCG, *Community Dialogue: Recommendations for Local Self-Government* (2018), 15, <https://issuu.com/ipcg/docs/imip-dialogue-print>

208. <https://peaceengineers.com/en/news/dialogue-meeting-of-national-police-officers-civil-activists-and-deputies-was-held-in-chuhuyev-33/>

needs, ethnic communities of Roma, Hungarian, Romanian, Bulgarian and others) to talk about Human Rights and inclusion of these groups. The 2018 study identified 22 such dialogues. For an example, see dialogues by the NGO “Theater for Dialogue”;<sup>209</sup> and OSCE PCU dialogue on language and ethnic minorities in Ukraine.<sup>210</sup>

- ***Dialogues between people with divergent political views.*** Political views as well as national identities are categories which are extremely diffuse and blurred in Ukraine. In 2014-2016 it was still possible to identify and bring together people holding pro-Maidan and anti-Maidan political views (those who supported the Revolution of Dignity in Kyiv in 2013-2014 and those who did not). For an example of such dialogues see the project “Odesa Our Common House” by the Odesa Regional Mediation Group.<sup>211</sup>

### 6.5.2. Bringing People Together Through Various Other Activities

All activities listed under “socialization” – art projects, trainings, working with narratives, etc. may be seen as “social cohesion” provided they expressly engage different societal groups however they are framed. For an example see the project by the NGO “Country of Free People” on Peacebuilding School for Youth that expressly engaged young people from the East and the West of Ukraine as well as NGCA and North Caucasus.<sup>212</sup>

Additionally, there is one type of activities that can only be performed through “bringing people together” – various exchanges that are often framed as bringing together “people from the East and from the West of Ukraine”. For example, exchanges of students, women, retired persons from different regions of Ukraine, or exchanges of people from professional communities from different regions of Ukraine (NGO managers, small businesses, etc.).<sup>213</sup>

In terms of actors, social cohesion activities that are not connected to professionally facilitated dialogues, are performed by the multitude of (often post-2014) NGOs, both central and local, that do not have an established focus of activity and do not form identifiable coalitions. Often, these activities are performed under the label of “youth organizations” or “women’s organizations”. To reach civil society working in this function, it is possible to look at the respective donors or specific line of funding.<sup>214</sup>

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To conclude, social cohesion, which is understood here as activities to bring people from different groups together (professionally facilitated dialogues and other activities), is relatively developed in Ukraine compared to other peacebuilding functions. At the same time, the scope of activities in this function might be insufficient if judged against the huge needs in a country of 45 million people.

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209. <http://tdd.org.ua/uk/projects>

210. IPCG, *Community Dialogue: Recommendations for Local Self-Government* (2018), 17, <https://issuu.com/ipcg/docs/imip-dialoge-print>

211. Center for Peace Mediation, *Dialogue in Odessa, Ukraine* (Frankfurt/Oder, 2017), [http://www.peacemediation.de/uploads/7/3/9/1/73911539/odessa\\_dialogue\\_study\\_final.pdf](http://www.peacemediation.de/uploads/7/3/9/1/73911539/odessa_dialogue_study_final.pdf)

212. <https://kvl.org.ua/mizhnarodna-mirotvorcha-shkola-%C2%ABcherez-mistecztvo-dialoga-k-miru%C2%BB>

213. <http://www.kultura.org.ua/?p=1207>

214. Active Citizens program by the British Council <http://www.britishcouncil.org.ua/en/active-citizens/projects>, Reweaving the Ukrainian Social Fabric project by the International Alert <https://www.international-alert.org/projects/reweaving-ukrainian-social-fabric>

## 6.6. Intermediation Across the Contact Line and Civil Society Connection to Track I.

There is no word for “intermediation” in Ukrainian. In the Ukrainian context, this function is focused on the armed conflict and the role of civil society in any matters connected to peace negotiations or any communication/interaction across the current line of contact which has been established by the Minsk agreements.

Most contacts across the contact line regarding issues important for local population are currently done by the Ukrainian Government and official structures of the so-called “LNR/DNR” entities, including military personnel from both sides, facilitated by the OSCE SMM and the Trilateral Contact Group process. These issues include cease-fire periods negotiation, prisoner exchanges, infrastructure repairs, water supply, humanitarian aid, and other issues. The role of civil society in the intermediation of these issues is currently marginal or non-existent. It is limited to the informational function in terms of bringing concerns of local population to the attention of the designated structures.

Ukrainian CSOs have very limited opportunities to connect to people from the other side of the contact line. Yet, contact is happening at the check points and in the borderland zone because nearly 1 million people cross the check points every month. Professionally facilitated cross-contact-line dialogues that bring together people at the civil society level from both sides of the contact line are categorized by this report as a function of social cohesion (see section 6.5.1).

Intermediation across the contact line on environmental or economic issues involving senior officials from the both sides (track 1.5) is carried out by international NGOs without apparent participation of grassroots civil society from both sides.

Connection between civil society of both sides and the official negotiation process in Minsk is currently almost non-existent, first of all because the Minsk process has not been designed to include civil society. Currently, the only option remains to search for informal solutions to connect civil society to the formal peace process for instance through informal consultations. Furthermore, the Minsk process is currently seen as deadlocked. According to the interviewees for this study the “Minsk process is ‘an imitation of a process’ and it is ‘running around in circles’”. (*Tse imitatsia protsesiv, buksuvannia na mistsi.*) Therefore, Ukrainian civil society as a whole remains reluctant to connect to the track I political negotiation process. Based on the interviews in the 2016-2017 study of dialogues, some civil society activists regard their inclusion in the track I process as meaningless or a threat to their reputation, so they do not support the results of facilitated dialogue being taken up at higher tracks.<sup>215</sup>

At the same time, this attitude of the civil society might be slowly changing. More CSOs are at least beginning to contemplate the possibility of connection to track I. For example, the CivilM+ Platform (that stands for “Civil Minsk Plus”) that brings together NGOs from Ukraine, Russia and other countries has declared an intention (at least based on the title of the Platform) to connect to the Minsk process.<sup>216</sup> Several Ukrainian women NGOs have travelled to events of the international organizations such as the UN and the OSCE and expressed their intention to connect to the Minsk process. Women NGOs who took part in the validation workshop confirmed their willingness to connect to track I processes and readiness to invest their efforts into this.

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215. Kyselova and von Dobeneck, “Track III Dialogue in Ukraine: Major Patterns and Resulting Risks.”

216. <https://civilmplus.org/en/>

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To sum up, the role of the civil society in intermediation across the contact line is not developed in Ukraine and it remains unclear how it should or can be developed. More research is thus required into this function.

## 6.7. Service Delivery as an Entry Point to Peacebuilding

IPTI's methodology describes this function in the following way: service delivery or development projects such as education, health, or relief work that can create entry points for peacebuilding. Generally, this type of civil society activity is new in Ukraine with most humanitarian aid projects initiated after 2014.

Ukrainian civil society was the first to mobilize to provide humanitarian aid to people who were affected by the conflict – IDPs, people living near the conflict zone, war veterans and their families.<sup>217</sup> In the first months of the armed conflict, spontaneous civil society initiatives were organized to help people to escape from the dangerous zones of shelling, provide temporary shelters and supply basic provisions.

After five years of the armed conflict, some CSOs who had initiated these programs, moved into the Human Rights sector by continuing to offer legal aid to IDPs and veterans, psycho-social and other assistance. Yet, other humanitarian organizations added a peacebuilding component on top of their humanitarian activities. For example, Caritas Ukraine<sup>218</sup> has initiated dialogue and mediation programs and trainings within conflict-affected communities. Another Ukrainian NGO – Slavic Heart<sup>219</sup> – works in humanitarian aid and with grassroots women activists to mobilize them for peacebuilding work. The humanitarian NGO “The Country of Free People” has initiated youth dialogues and training programs involving people from the NGCA.<sup>220</sup>

**GAPS:** Participants of the validation workshops suggested that programs of psycho-social aid can contribute to peacebuilding because people who have successfully undergone therapy potentially have the ability for greater civic activism and deeper understanding of themselves and others. They have suggested that there is insufficient information and awareness about how peacebuilding can be integrated into existing humanitarian and development initiatives.

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To conclude, most humanitarian and service provision organizations are currently pre-occupied with their main mandate and do not show an obvious willingness to be involved in peacebuilding activities, although the potential can be further explored.

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217. USAID, *Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index*, (2018), 225, <https://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/resource-civil-society-organization-2017-regional-report.PDF>

218. <https://caritas-ua.org/>

219. <https://www.facebook.com/pg/slavicheart2014/posts/>

220. <https://kvl.org.ua/mizhnarodna-mirotvorcha-shkola-%C2%ABcherez-mistecztvo-dialoga-k-miru%C2%BB>

## 7. Conclusion

Within the challenging context of the on-going armed conflict, hybrid scenario with a strong element of external Russian aggression and a moderate but stable level of violence at the contact line, the overall climate for peacebuilding in Ukraine is currently highly adverse. It remains unclear how or whether the situation will change under the Presidency of Volodymyr Zelensky who was inaugurated on 20 May 2019.

The term “peacebuilding” in Ukraine remains very vague and undefined either by the civil society or by international organizations. Within the complex hybrid war scenario, there is a certain sector of civil society that prefer power-based approaches to conflict resolution and this cannot be excluded from the analysis. In 2014, Ukrainian society experienced societal mobilization for war, while civil society mobilization for peace is not happening even in a long-term perspective. Therefore, many conventional peacebuilding strategies that originate from other contexts of internal civil wars are not directly applicable in Ukraine. This study highlighted the importance of a contextual approach to the design of peacebuilding interventions to account for the external aggression, including security aspects and the impact on the geopolitical level of the conflict.

The on-going armed conflict, hybrid security threats as well as some governmental policies and manipulations by some political elites have led to a marginalization of peace discourse and stigmatization of civil society organizations working for dialogue and cooperation with the people from the territories currently not controlled by the Ukrainian Government. In such adverse conditions, peacebuilding CSOs have to invent strategies to do peacebuilding without naming it, for example relying on Human Rights or dialogue discourse instead of peace discourse.

Within this challenging context, CSOs that have been identified as working on different peacebuilding functions by this report do so under enormous pressure from outside as well as from inside. They make up a small fraction of all civil society in Ukraine (perhaps several hundred organizations) with some emerging sense of collective identity or a new community of practice as peacebuilders.

Most of the peacebuilding work identified by this report is done by the Ukrainian CSOs which are located in the territories controlled by the Ukrainian Government. They come from the community of practice “bubbles” which existed before the 2014 crisis, in particular two large bubbles that comprise the professional community of Human Rights activists, on the one hand, and mediators and dialogue facilitators, on the other. These two communities determine the overall dynamics and the scope of activities in all peacebuilding functions. Other smaller and newer peacebuilding bubbles include women’s organizations, think tanks, humanitarian aid, and religious organizations. Women’s organizations are expanding rapidly and becoming more active in peacebuilding, including a potential connection to track I political negotiation processes.

Within the relatively small peacebuilding sector of civil society in Ukraine there are still a lot of dividing lines such as divisions between central/professionalized/formal NGOs and local grassroots activists, although the precise nature and the scope of grassroots activism remains unclear. Another division line within civil society refers to the geographical concentration of CSOs – a lot of the post-2014 NGOs are currently supported by international donors in the Eastern and Southern regions of the country due to their proximity to the war zone. Finally, the dividing line between Human Rights activists and mediators/facilitators refers to different ideologies or approaches to conflict resolution and transformation (rights-based approach of human rights activists v. interest/needs-based approach of facilitators).

In general, the application of IPTI's functional approach to the Ukrainian context was a fruitful exercise. The main conclusion of the study was that this methodology is well suited to the Ukrainian context with all the peacebuilding functions being identifiable albeit to different extents. This study has found that the functions of protection and inter-mediation across the contact line are least developed in Ukraine because they have been overtaken by the Ukrainian Government and international organizations. The function of social cohesion – bringing people together – is most developed in comparison to other functions while in respect to the overall situation in Ukraine it still requires a great deal of effort and support. Other functions such as monitoring, socialization and service provision are partially developed. Finally, the least developed activities refer to peace advocacy and peace journalism where this study has identified only a few projects mostly initiated by international organizations.

## 8. Annexes

### Annex 1. List of Interviewees and participants of the validation workshops

#### *Individual follow-up interviews:*

Iryna Brunova-Kalisetska, dialogue facilitator, independent, Kyiv, 30 September 2018  
Igor Dubrovsky, Ukrainian Peacebuilding School, 13 May 2019  
Yulia Erner, DRA, Berlin, 18 September 2019  
Max Ielgulashvili, dialogue facilitator, independent, Kyiv, 30 September 2018  
Andrey Kamenshikov, GGPAC Ukraine, Kyiv, 14 October 2018  
Vladyslava Kanevska, Dialogue Facilitators' Network, Ukraine, 11 March 2019  
Roman Koval, Institute for Peace and Common Ground, 25 May 2019  
Oleg Martynenko, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Right Union, Kyiv, 4 June 2019  
Diana Protsenko, National Association of Mediators of Ukraine, 3 June 2019

#### *Organizations that Took Part in the National Validation Workshop (for nationwide CSOs), 18-19 February 2019, Kyiv*

Ukrainian Helsinki Human Right Union, Kyiv  
Human Rights Information Center, Kyiv  
Human Rights Civic Research Center, Kyiv  
Eastern-Ukrainian Center for Civic Initiatives, Kyiv  
Coalition "Justice for Peace in Donbas", Kyiv  
Crimean Human Rights Group, Kyiv  
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Kyiv  
"Women's Perspectives" Center, Lviv  
"Theatre for Dialogue", Kyiv  
"Country of Free People", Kyiv  
"Caritas Ukraine", Kyiv  
National Association of Mediators of Ukraine, Kyiv  
"Dignity Space", Kyiv  
Network of Facilitators, Kyiv  
"Foundations for Freedom", Kyiv  
Odessa regional mediation group, Odesa  
League of Mediators of Ukraine, Kyiv  
"Promotion of the Intercultural Cooperation", Odesa  
Integration and Development Information and Research center, Kyiv  
AVP Alternative to Violence in Ukraine, Odesa  
"Center for Community Growth", Kyiv  
"Peaceful Change initiative", Kyiv  
forumZFD Programme in Ukraine, Odesa

“International Alert Network”, Kyiv  
Initiative group of the course “Culture of Neighborhood”, Skovoroda Kharkiv National Pedagogical University, Kharkiv  
GPPAC, Kyiv

*Organizations that Took Part in the Regional Validation Workshop (for regional and grassroots CSOs),  
7-8 February 2019, Kyiv*

“Kraina vilnyh ludei”, Kyiv / Kramatorsk  
“Narodny control”, Konstantinivka, Donetsk region  
“Truth hounds”, Kharkiv/Kyiv  
Charitable fund “Slavic heart”, Svyatogirsk, Donetsk region  
“Theater for Dialogue”, Kyiv  
“Territoria initsiaivy”, Rubezhnoye, Luhansk region  
“Office of Reforms”, Bahmut, Donetsk region  
“Ukrainskii razmovnyi club “Faino”, Kramatorsk, Donetsk region  
Coalition “Ukrainian Peacebuilding School”, Kharkiv  
Center for Social Initiatives and Development, Odesa  
Initiative “Donbass dialogue” Donetsk / Svyatohirsk, Donetsk region  
Charitable fund “Social Resources and Initiatives”, Chernivtsi  
“Yaranimotion”, Myrhorod, Poltava region  
“AAR of the Eastern Donbas”, Severodonetsk, Luhansk region

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Natalia Shapovalova, *Assessing Ukrainian Grassroots Activism Five Years after Euromaidan* (Carneegie Europe, 2019), [https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2-6\\_Shapovalova\\_Five\\_Years.pdf](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2-6_Shapovalova_Five_Years.pdf)

Anna Bulakh, Mapping “Supporting Ukraine’s Security Sector Reform”, RKK ICDS, 2018, [https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ICDS\\_Analysis-Security\\_Sector\\_Reform\\_in\\_Ukraine-Anna\\_Bulakh-February\\_2018.pdf](https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ICDS_Analysis-Security_Sector_Reform_in_Ukraine-Anna_Bulakh-February_2018.pdf)

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