## Name of process
Doha Peace Negotiations and Implementation

## Type of process
Peace-making

## Outcome of process
- The Doha Document for Peace (DDPD) did not succeed in stopping the violence in Darfur
- Continued violence, lack of funding, and splits within armed groups meant that the DDPD was not fully implemented

## Women's inclusion
- Direct representation at the negotiation table
- Official consultations
- Unofficial consultations
- Public consultations

## Women's influence
Moderate influence due to:
- Women’s coalition-building and advocacy and communication strategies, which brought international actors to consider the women’s agenda, and to put pressure on the negotiating parties
- UN Resolution 1325, which provided women activists with an international reference point for their demands
- Conflict parties and regional actors’ indifference to women’s preferences
- Lack of transparency and power in decision-making, which impeded women’s contribution to the final peace agreement

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**Sudan: Darfur (2009–2017)**

After the collapse of the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006, and the failure of subsequent talks, a new round of negotiations to bring peace to Darfur began in Doha, Qatar, in 2009. The Doha Document for Peace was signed in 2011. Women participated primarily in consultations, and succeeded in formulating a unified pro-women agenda that was considered both in the consultations and the final peace agreement. Their influence on the peace process was mainly enabled by effective advocacy and communication strategies, supported by international partners, coalition-building with others in Darfuri civil society, and pressure from international actors on the negotiating parties. However, the meaningful participation of civil society as a whole was ultimately impeded by a lack of decision-making power, and the negotiating parties were indifferent to women’s demands in particular. The Doha Document was never fully implemented and the situation for women in Sudan, and Darfur, has arguably worsened since negotiations began.

### I. Background

Sudan’s western region of Darfur was an independent sultanate before being integrated into greater Sudan in 1916, and has been largely marginalized by the powers in Khartoum ever
since. The population of around 7.5 million is made up of more than 30 ethnic groups. More than one-third are Fur, a non-Arab sedentary ethnic group, and other significant non-Arab ethnic groups include the agriculturalist Masalit and the agro-pastoralist Zaghawa, many of whom have turned to commerce as pastoralist livelihoods have become less viable in recent decades. There are also a number of Darfuri Arab ethnic groups, which include both sedentary and agro-pastoralist communities. The conflict has led to considerable displacement among the Fur population.

Women in Sudan face severe political, social, and economic inequality (Sudan is one of the few countries that have not signed the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women). Women in Darfur face slightly more favorable social conditions compared to other parts of the country due to a more liberal interpretation of Islam. However, war has had a significant impact on them. In conflict zones, sexual assault has been common. Displaced women and girls are particularly vulnerable to assault, both within and outside camps. Women have taken on increasing importance as household leaders and cultivators, although this has little impact on their social or political standing.

The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) began an armed insurgency in Darfur in 2003. They challenged Khartoum’s political and economic dominance in the region and demanded decentralization. In response, the Government launched a counterinsurgency, using local Arab militias (often called Janjaweed). Violence continues, although 2003 and 2004 saw the worst of the violence and fatalities. Since 2003, the Darfur conflict has killed an estimated 300,000 people and 2.7 million have been displaced.

The Government and the SLM-MM faction signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in 2006, but it failed to halt the violence. The United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) subsequently led an effort to restart formal (track one) peace negotiations under the leadership of Salem Ahmed Salim (AU) and Jan Eliasson (UN) in 2007–2008. An additional process was conducted from November 2009 to July 2011 under the leadership of UN–AU Chief Mediator Djibril Bassolé, which included periodic talks in Doha, Qatar, during which the Sudanese Government repeatedly met with JEM and a new umbrella group of several small armed opposition factions, the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM). The SLM, which enjoyed deep support among the Fur population, refused to join the process, despite intense lobbying by the mediators and the international community.

Civil society delegates from Darfur and Khartoum were invited to three official rounds of consultations in Doha. In addition, the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD) conducted consultations with civil society in Darfur and Khartoum before the negotiations. In parallel, there was a consultation with Darfuri civil society groups that had been established by the 2006 DPA, the Darfur–Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC). Additional consultative sessions were held between AU–UN Mediation and civil society groups from Darfur and Khartoum. Outputs of these processes fed into the work of the emerging Doha initiative.
The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) was finalized in July 2011; the Government and the LJM signed a commitment to the document a year later. The agreement set up the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA), which would have authority over several implementation commissions. The DDPD also provided for the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation (DIDC), aimed at broadening ownership of the peace agreement and mobilizing support for its implementation. The Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (DJAM) was to assess development needs. One year after the agreement, a referendum was to be held in Darfur on the administrative status of the region.

The JEM and SLA, which controlled the majority of armed resistance, refused to join the DDPD, and the refusal of most armed groups to join the agreement made its implementation unlikely. But many hoped that a mix of strong popular support, civil society engagement, and pressure from Khartoum would make these groups join the process at a later stage. Unfortunately, the allocation of positions in the DRA was not well planned for groups who joined later, and so it was not seriously attempted.

The DDPD was never fully implemented for a number of reasons. Instead of demobilizing militias in Darfur, the Government decided to integrate many militias into auxiliary units, and then into the army. These forces therefore continued to play a role in armed conflict. Moreover, the LJM’s unity was tenuous, and in January 2012, its leadership fractured over appointments to the DRA. Disagreements among the signatories surfaced particularly over the allocation of funding to the DRA and continued in the following years, creating uncertainty about the future of the agreement. The LJM formally split into two factions in early 2015. The referendum on the status of Darfur was held four years late, in 2016, after which the Government dissolved the DRA and placed all implementation commissions and DDPD funds under its control.

Armed conflict persisted after the signing of the DDPD. The armed opposition groups have continued to splinter and regroup, although government military offences between 2014 and 2016 have weakened JEM and the SLM-MM to the point that they reportedly have no military presence in the region, while the other main SLM faction’s capacities have been significantly reduced. Between October 2015 and March 2016, the Government held a national dialogue, with the stated aim of laying the groundwork for political and constitutional reform. Several JEM splinter groups attended the conference, but the major Darfuri armed groups rejected the dialogue, stating reservations about the design of the process, and the need to create a conducive environment and build trust by ending armed hostilities and improving the political climate. Despite a degree of women’s influence and relatively strong provisions regarding women’s rights in the DDPD, the situation for women does not appear to have materially improved. Sexual and gender-based violence continues to be reported by UNAMID as a “pervasive” feature of the conflict in Darfur.
Actors Involved in the Process

The joint UN–AU mediation and the Qatari Government invited all armed conflict parties to the negotiations in Doha. JEM held direct negotiations with the Government in February 2009 and in February 2010: the two parties agreed on ceasefires and declared their intention to engage in further peace talks. Both JEM and SLM leaders consulted with the mediators, but they boycotted the peace conference and civil society consultations, criticizing biased selection of delegates and ongoing government-sponsored violence in Darfur. The JEM-Bashar faction joined the DDPD in 2013, but only LJM consistently participated in direct negotiations with the Government, and only the Government and LJM signed an agreement committing themselves to the DDPD. The Government of Switzerland played a supporting role through shuttle diplomacy and support to the UN’s mediation efforts through the provision of situation analysis. Switzerland also hosted pre-negotiation talks among various Darfuri factions.

Participation by civil society varied: the first official civil society conference, Doha 1, hosted around 170 delegates from the three states of Darfur and from Khartoum, including registered civil society organizations (CSOs), traditional leaders, IDPs and refugees, women, youth, and nomads. Some 340 delegates attended Doha 2, representing the same groups, but with IDPs and refugees represented to a larger extent. The All-Darfur Stakeholders’ Conference, during which the mediation team sought feedback on the draft DDPD, brought more than 500 participants to Doha between 27 and 31 May 2011. Delegates included all the groups at Doha 1 and 2, as well as political parties, elected officials, and armed groups.

In addition, over 3,100 stakeholders from Darfur and Khartoum participated in consultations in late 2009. Follow-up consultations also brought together traditional and community leaders, representatives of NGOs including women and youth groups, government officials, members of political parties, and IDPs and refugees.

Women Involved in the Process

A small number of women participated in the negotiations as delegates of the Government and LJM—the precise number is not available.

Women took part in larger numbers in consultations. The DDDC in 2009 included women pastoralists, nomads, businesswomen, NGO leaders, academics, teachers, students, youth, IDPs, women’s unions, poets, religious organizations, and members of the Transitional DRA (which had been established under the 2006 DPA). The AU consultations in June 2009 included delegates from women’s CSOs such as the Sudanese Women’s Initiative for Darfur.

The Doha mediators frequently flew to Darfur to consult specifically with CSOs, including women’s groups, and women took part in all three civil society conferences.
Women also participated as co-chairs of consultations in Doha. Women also participated as co-chairs of these events. The mediation informally pursued rough quotas for specific population groups, including women, although the specific number of women’s delegations and their composition was not made public. Women were also included in the numerous consultation workshops during the implementation of the DDPD between 2011 and 2017: their proportion varied from seven to 34 percent.

Women delegates’ demands resembled those of other Darfuri civil society groups, and included an immediate ceasefire, the administrative restructuring of Darfur, an increased role for traditional authorities, increased support for Darfuri IDPs, and economic development. Women activists also promoted women’s increased political and economic participation in Darfuri society, and the peace process in particular, as well as their protection from sexual and gender-based violence.

Modalities of Inclusion of Women’s Groups

The role of the few women directly participating in the negotiations was very limited. This study will concentrate on the more significant role of women participating in consultations.

1 | Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table

A small number of women participated in the track one negotiations between the LJM and the Government. Most, but not all, were part of the Government’s delegation. Women included in the negotiations represented the agenda of their respective negotiation party delegation. Accounts vary regarding the extent of discussion of gender equality and women’s rights and the related provisions inserted into the agreement at the suggestion of the mediation—one diplomat observed that the topics were introduced and caused little controversy, while another indicated they were not discussed during official negotiations.

2 | Official Consultations

Although there are no specific numbers regarding women’s participation, a large number are observed to have attended, and the outcome documents of the two civil society conferences had a number of provisions relating to women (it is not clear how far women specifically influenced provisions beyond the issues of women’s rights and gender equality). The outcome document of Doha 1 (16–19 November 2009) recommends a 30 percent quota for women’s representation in the official negotiations and, after the signing of the peace agreement, “in all levels of authority.” The document also calls for a review and reform of laws related to women “to bring them in conformity with the international conventions ratified by Sudan.” The declaration demanded the prosecution of “perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity and serious crimes such as rape” and payment of reparation and compensation for women victims. Doha 2 (12–15 July 2010) reiterates all the provisions relating to women’s rights and gender equality in the
previous declaration and further calls for increased participation of women in police forces, the “mainstreaming of women’s education,” a “special fund for women support [sic], reproductive health services and primary health care,” as well as “psycho-social and administrative support for women victims of rape.”

Women’s groups, and women representatives of other groups, were also at the All-Darfur Stakeholders’ Conference in 2011. Women’s rights and women’s participation, both in the negotiations and in the implementation of a peace deal, were among the issues discussed at the conference.

3 | Unofficial Consultations

A variety of informal consultative workshops and events were held, either on the initiative of the mediation or mediation support organizations. Mediators consulted with women civil society representatives throughout all phases of the peace process, both in Doha and Darfur, as well as with delegations of the displaced Fur population from IDP camps and refugee camps in Chad. Mediators frequently flew to Darfur to consult CSOs, before and in parallel to the track one negotiations. The meetings were often facilitated by women CSO leaders such as Safaa Elagib Adam from the Community Development Association. Moreover, several NGOs facilitated parallel dialogue initiatives, which were endorsed by the UN–AU mediation. Most notably, the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg facilitated consultations between Darfuri intellectuals, including several women. The so-called Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue Group began work in 2006 and produced an outcome document in 2010. It contained detailed suggestions for provisions to be included in a future peace agreement, which were presented at a side event to the Doha talks in the same year. Additional consultations were held by UK-based Concordis International in support of the DDDC process and to build a common vision among Darfuri civil society.

During these events, women discussed how to stop the violence, especially the rape of women, how to protect women in IDP camps, and how to promote human rights more generally. Women at these meetings often complained about the Government’s failure to provide security for their communities. They stressed the local importance of agriculture and the need for protection for men and women carrying out agricultural activities.

4 | Public Consultations

The AUPD, chaired by Thabo Mbeki, held public hearings and conducted interviews in Darfur and Khartoum with over 3,100 stakeholders. These included representatives of women’s groups. The AUPD’s final report demanded inclusion of women in a proposed Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission. It called for women to comprise at least 30 percent in all delegations of the negotiating parties. It referred to “the disproportionate burden women have carried as a result of the conflict,” and stressed the importance of providing “particular attention and services” to a “large
number of women and girls who were raped, including some who were subjected to gang-rapes."\textsuperscript{44} Mbeki indicated that the AUPD’s consultations helped increase civil society representation in the peace process in Doha.\textsuperscript{45}

The DDDC, carried out in parallel with the AUPD’s consultations, aimed to include a broad range of IDPs and refugees, tribal leaders and administrators, women, youth, political leaders, and registered CSOs. One women-only consultation was convened in each state of Darfur, and discussed the same topics as other consultations: land and natural resources, security, identity, recovery and development, administration and democracy, and reconciliation.\textsuperscript{46} Many of the recommendations resulting from the women-only meetings stressed the need for the socio-economic and political empowerment of Darfuri women.\textsuperscript{47} Some focused on women’s peace-making roles in the conflict: the participants from North Darfur proposed that “a mechanism for women to approach armed rebel groups to encourage them to unite can help foster and secure trust among these groups.”\textsuperscript{48} The same participants proposed that the Hakkamas, traditional women singers and poets in Darfur, should promote more prominently the values of reconciliation and coexistence in Darfur communities.\textsuperscript{49} West Darfuri women suggested that women police units be set up to help protect women in IDP camps.\textsuperscript{50}

Women’s groups were also represented at preparatory public consultations in October and November 2009, organized by the mediators in partnership with the DDDC, UNAMID, the Joint UN-AU Mediation and other UN bodies. More than 200 traditional leaders and CSO leaders, among them IDPs, Arab nomads, women, and youth, discussed the role and agenda of civil society during the official consultations in Doha. Key recommendations from these meetings were presented in the Doha consultations.\textsuperscript{51}

Dissemination of the DDPD began in October 2011, and women made up 34 percent of approximately 25,000 Darfuri participants in workshops held by the signatory parties to the DDPD.\textsuperscript{52} While participants were generally in favor of the DDPD, they raised concerns about the slow pace of implementation and the lack of involvement by those armed groups who had not signed the document.\textsuperscript{53}

The Darfur Civil Society Follow-up Mechanism (FUM) began dissemination work in January 2012.\textsuperscript{54} Supported by UNAMID, the FUM organized workshops with local government representatives, women and youth groups, NGOs, technical experts, community leaders, IDPs, and members of political parties, to evaluate progress in the implementation of the DDPD.\textsuperscript{55}

Women also participated in the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission workshops. In the second half of 2012, the DJAM conducted five workshops at state level in Darfur, and a further workshop with refugee communities in Chad. Over 1,400 people participated, and there were women-only meetings.\textsuperscript{56} Women urged for increased participation of women in the implementation of the DDPD and more attention to their concerns.\textsuperscript{57} The results of the DJAM mapping exercise informed the DRA’s
Darfur Development Strategy, which promoted socio-economic support for Darfuri women and girls.⁵⁸

The Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation (DIDC) began more than three years after the DDPD. Women’s groups have generally attended DIDC meetings. During a DIDC conference in October 2016, participants requested equal representation of women in constituted political and decision-making mechanisms.⁵⁹ Consultations in East and North Darfur in April and May 2017 highlighted the need for the empowerment of women and children in efforts to resolve intercommunal conflict.⁶⁰

II. Analysis of Women’s Influence: Enabling and Constraining Factors

Women exerted a moderate influence on the negotiations in Doha. They were constrained by the indifference of the conflict parties, the exclusivity of selection criteria, and the heterogeneity of their agendas. However, the women who participated in the various consultations succeeded in establishing and communicating a common pro-women agenda that featured in the peace agreement and its implementation: the DDPD contained a comprehensive set of provisions concerning women’s rights and empowerment, including representation in political institutions and the ceasefire mechanism; gender-responsive IDP support and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration design; women’s livelihoods; sexual and gender-based violence; and conflict resolution and prevention. Key to this success was women’s coalition-building around unified positions, as well as support from international actors and mediators. The following section distinguishes between those process and context factors that enabled or constrained the influence of women in the Doha peace process.

Process Factors

1 | Indifferent Conflict Parties

There was a lack of interest among the negotiating parties in topics that women’s groups focused on.⁶¹ Some delegates of the armed conflict parties complained that the consideration of provisions on the empowerment and protection of women only served to slow down the negotiation process.⁶²

2 | Lack of Decision-making Power and Non-transparent Decision-making Processes

Despite consultations, almost all of the decision-making power within the Doha peace process was vested in the negotiating parties, mediators, and the Qatari host government. The process for reaching the Doha civil society conference outcome documents has not been elaborated. As regards the civil society debate in the All-Darfur Stakeholders Conference, delegates did not have access to the draft DDPD, therefore the debate is unlikely to have had significant influence.⁶³ Ultimately, the
The mediation team did not manage to ensure meaningful participation of civil society

Inclusion of provisions relating to women's rights and gender equality in the DDPD was ensured by the mediators, after pressure from the international community.\(^{64}\)

3 | Overwhelmed Mediators

The mediation team tried to make the Doha process inclusive and consider the opinions of a diverse group of Darfuri stakeholders, since they were convinced that the failure of the 2006 DPA was largely due to the lack of broad and meaningful participation by both conflict parties and civil society groups.\(^{65}\) The inclusion of women was seen as a particularly important step towards a more sustainable peace process.\(^{66}\)

Informal consultations, such as the Heidelberg-facilitated dialogue, were more effective in guaranteeing inclusive arrangements and making substantial contributions. Serving a preparatory function to the official talks, this dialogue established joint civil society positions that ultimately informed the content of the agreement. Nonetheless, the mediators were soon overwhelmed by the large number of delegates and the chaotic conduct of the consultations and negotiations in Doha.\(^{67}\) The final consultation, the All-Darfur Stakeholder Conference, received particular criticism. As noted above, CSOs did not even see the draft agreement that they were supposed to be discussing, and the Government reportedly intimidated participants.\(^{68}\) The mediation team and the Qatari government did not manage to ensure meaningful—not just formal—participation of civil society in the official drafting of the DDPD, including women.

4 | Non-transparent and Government-biased Selection Criteria and Procedures

The selection of delegates for the official consultations was one reason why some armed actors boycotted the talks. It was mainly carried out by the mediation team, which aimed at ensuring adequate voices from the diverse communities. Various actors, including the Government, armed groups, and CSOs, submitted lists with names of potential representatives.

The selection of women CSO representatives was vulnerable to government interference because many women CSO activists were also government functionaries.\(^{69}\) And the Government did send locally elected officials as civil society consultation delegates.\(^{70}\) However, the Government's influence did not stretch far beyond Khartoum.\(^{71}\) Moreover, the pro-government civil society representatives did not exert significant influence on other delegates.\(^{72}\)

For the public and unofficial consultations, the facilitators played the main role in selecting participants. The consultations by UNAMID and the UN-AU mediation towards the end of 2009 chose participants by peer selection within each group.\(^{73}\) The women-only consultations ensured participation of women from different states in Darfur and socio-economic backgrounds, and provided for broad and meaningful representation of all women in Darfuri society in the preparation for the
official consultations in Doha. The extent of the representation of women in other consultation meetings is not clear.

5 | Effective Transfer, Communication, and Advocacy Strategies

Women used workshops and consultation meetings to sensitize other stakeholders within the peace process to their positions. They used outcome documents to transfer and communicate their preferences to the negotiating parties. The DDDC women-only consultations each produced an outcome document with a list of recommendations that was then communicated to other Darfuri stakeholders, and the respective outcomes of the deliberations among women during the preparatory consultations in Darfur were presented to negotiating parties and civil society.

In the absence of direct transfer from women participating in consultations to women at the negotiating table, women in civil society turned to the mediators and international organizations. In June 2010, women activists discussed the implementation of UN Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security with officials representing various UN entities, such as UN Women and UNAMID. They requested UN support in their advocacy. Although some measures, including quotas, did not reach the final agreement, the international community and the mediators successfully pressured the conflict parties to include other strong provisions on women’s rights in the agreement.

6 | Successful Coalition-building

The consultations, meetings, and workshops in Doha and in the context of the DDDC and AUPD were extremely important to the outcome of the civil society conferences. It was here that civil society agreed on its agenda, which was then brought to the conferences in Doha, and it was here that women forged coalitions, unified their agenda, and pushed to get it included within the broader agenda of civil society as a whole.

7 | Support Structures for Women

The mediators convened several peace-making workshops and trainings in Doha that included both conflict parties and civil society. Women participating in the Doha peace process benefited from this, as the workshops made the conflict parties more aware of the positions and preferences of women activists.

Support from UN agencies also assisted women’s inclusion and their influence. UN Women workshops helped women activists to formulate their claims through the language of Resolution 1325.
Context Factors

1 | Positive Impact of Regional and International Actors

International support was the main enabling factor for women’s influence on the peace process. It was the international community that pressed the conflict parties and the hosting government of Qatar to include provisions on women’s rights and gender equality into the final draft of the DDPD. UNAMID and the AUDP included women in their consultations.

The Qatari Government and the mediation team did not ensure meaningful participation of civil society, including women, in the official drafting of the DDPD. Neither did they make selection and decision-making criteria and processes transparent, which impacted on women’s presence and influence. However, the AU–UN mediation and several international partners supported informal consultative processes such as the Heidelberg Dialogue, which informed the content of the agreement.

2 | Patriarchal Gender Norms

The social norms ascribed to women in Sudanese society significantly constrained their influence in the civil society consultations. Women’s increasing importance as heads of household and cultivators during the war in Darfur had not changed the general public perception that women should not play a leading role in politics. Neither traditional leaders nor the leaders of armed conflict parties—who were all men—were very receptive to the idea of women’s participation in the peace talks.

3 | Preparedness of Women

High levels of illiteracy among women in Darfur, and their exclusion from the formal economic sector, affected their capacity to contribute to the peace process. Moreover, those educated women who were active in civil society often belonged to large influential families led by traditional elites. This not only narrowed the range of women’s views and social backgrounds represented in civil society, but also meant that those who participated were susceptible to instrumentalization by the Government.

III. Conclusion

Women participated in consultations throughout the phases of the Doha peace process, and formed a coalition around a unified agenda that was not solely focused on women’s rights and gender equality but mirrored demands of other parts of Darfuri civil society. Women were able to sensitize other stakeholders to the importance of women’s representation and protection and, through international support, were able to achieve the inclusion of provisions they advocated for in the
outcomes of the official civil society conferences. Ultimately, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur included numerous clauses providing for the protection of women and girls from various forms of violence and the representation of women in political institutions.

However, provisions on gender equality and women’s rights in peace agreements are nothing new in the history of the Darfur conflict (they also featured in the DPA). It remains to be seen whether the acknowledgement of women’s political and socio-economic roles through the DDPD process translates into improvements in women’s rights and power in Darfuri and Sudanese society. Conflict continues in Darfur, and the period since the signing of the DDPD has been marked by a significant worsening of the political space for women activists, in particular those speaking out about human rights violations against women in Darfur. Women remain active, but according to Human Rights Watch, they face government reprisals for speaking out on issues such as human rights, democracy, women’s rights, protection, sexual violence, women’s participation, and promoting the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

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Women in Peace and Transition Processes

Case studies in this series are based on findings of the “Broadening Participation in Political Negotiations and Implementation” research project (2011-2017), a multi-year comparative research project led by Dr. Thania Paffenholz at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. The Broadening Participation project examined how and under which conditions various actors participated in and influenced peace and political transition processes. The project’s dataset comprises 40 mainly qualitative case studies of negotiation and implementation processes, covering 34 countries, and ranging from 1989 to 2014. These cases are categorized according to a range of groups of included actors and a framework of seven inclusion modalities developed by Thania Paffenholz. Among the case studies under review for this project, 28 included measurable involvement of women. In this context, women were defined as relatively organized groups, including delegations of women, women’s civil society organizations, coalitions or networks, which sought inclusion in peace negotiations and the implementation of agreements. The project did not investigate the role of women as mediators. For more information, see: www.inclusivepeace.org.

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