

Women in Peace and Transition Processes

April 2018



Name of process

The Chiapas peace process

Type of process

Peace-making

Outcome of the process

- Partial agreement was reached.
- Constitutional changes were made in light of the agreement, but they did not respect the agreement's ambitions for Indigenous autonomy

Women's inclusion

- Direct representation
- Consultations
- Mass action

Women's influence

High influence due to:

- Early advocacy from women's groups, preparedness, and support from the EZLN resulted in high levels of women's representation, and prominent featuring of women's preferences in the negotiations.
- Women's protection of the negotiation site allowed the negotiations to take place in secure conditions

Mexico (1994–2001)

Women participated throughout the Chiapas peace process, which lasted from 1994 until 2001. The most important phase of the process was the San Andrés dialogues, which were held from 18 October 1995 to 11 January 1997. Although negotiations broke down inconclusively in 1997, one accord was reached, the Indigenous Rights and Culture Agreements. This agreement partially reflected women's demand for a form of Indigenous autonomy that was also gender responsive, which they had articulated through mass action, consultations, and direct representation at the negotiation table. However, elite resistance to the demands of women's groups, to their participation, and to the overall outcome of the dialogues, worked as constraints on women's influence. The agreements were only partially implemented in constitutional changes, which did not take place until 2001. Nonetheless, women's coalition-building, preparedness, and support from at least one of the conflict parties were enabling factors for women's influence, and the San Andrés negotiations provided opportunities for Mexican women to build collaborative institutions that formed a basis for political activism that continues today.

I. Background

The state of Chiapas has a higher percentage of Indigenous inhabitants than any other state, and natural riches. However, it has long had the highest rate of poverty in Mexico, and in the late 1980s, Chiapas had been brought to a point of economic, ecological, and political crisis.¹

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The workloads of women in Chiapas doubled or tripled during the 1980s

During the 1980s and 1990s, the Mexican Government imposed a wave of neoliberal economic reforms and structural adjustment programs on the country. These had a severe impact on the rural population, as policies of guaranteed prices for staple crops, subsidized credit, and insurance were reduced or eliminated. Chiapas peasants responded to the changes by migrating to the United States, or by trying to extend cultivation with the occupation of areas of forest reserves in the eastern part of the state, the invasion of large landholdings, or petitioning for land grants in excess of the maximum legal landholding. Women, who migrated in far lower numbers, were often left as single heads of households. The workloads of women in Chiapas doubled or tripled during the 1980s.² Many found themselves dispossessed, as the government began a process to encourage the privatization of communal landholdings through the granting of legal title to men heads of households.³

During this period, a small armed group formed in the jungle of central and eastern Chiapas, known as the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). Its initial goals were for radical change to Mexico's government—Mexico had effectively been a one-party state since the revolution of 1910, and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) maintained power through a tightly centralized patronage system that extended to every level of government across the country.⁴ Although other political parties were permitted, they had scarcely any power, and Indigenous groups had long been marginalized. Over time, the EZLN's membership and leadership became predominantly Indigenous, and adopted Indigenous political goals, such as autonomy and self-governance for Indigenous communities, as well as access to land.

On 1 January 1994, the EZLN took up arms against the Mexican government. Between 2,500 and 4,000 Indigenous militia, of whom approximately 30 percent were women, stormed San Cristobal and three other large towns in the state of Chiapas, killing several soldiers and police.⁵ The Mexican armed forces counter-attacked and quickly drove the EZLN out of the towns, killing 145 people and wounding hundreds more.⁶ Some 200,000 protestors took to the streets in a peaceful demonstration against the violence, and public pressure contributed to the Mexican Government's unilateral declaration of a ceasefire on 12 January 1994.

Although this period of 12 days in January 1994 is commonly regarded as the armed phase of the Zapatista conflict, violence persisted throughout the period covered by this study and beyond. The EZLN mostly refrained from violence after the ceasefire of January 1994, but the Mexican armed forces and paramilitary armed groups affiliated with non-Indigenous large landowning families continued to perpetrate violence. It had a significant impact on the civilian population, particularly women. The permanent threat of murder, rape, and abduction made it difficult for women to cultivate remote fields, or transport goods to market, and interfered with everyday life by making it more difficult to bathe, wash laundry, collect firewood, etc.⁷ The conflict economy transformed the lives of women. Many turned to prostitution.⁸ Women made up the majority of the tens of thousands of people displaced from their homes and land.⁹

The conflict economy transformed the lives of women

Peace negotiations between the EZLN and the Government of Mexico encompassed two phases.¹⁰ The first, known as the Cathedral dialogues, lasted less than a month in early 1994, and was called off after the assassination of the PRI presidential candidate, which plunged Mexico into a period of uncertainty and distracted the Government from the peace talks.¹¹ The second phase, the San Andrés dialogues, held in the town of San Andrés Sakamch'en de los Pobres, Chiapas, lasted from October 1995 to January 1997. In February 1996, the parties reached an agreement on one of a planned six negotiation tables (thematic groupings of agenda items), the Indigenous Rights and Culture Agreements.¹² There were no subsequent agreements. A final phase of the process involved no real negotiation, but encompassed the efforts of the EZLN and civil society supporters of its agenda to ensure the transformation of the Indigenous Rights and Culture Agreements into constitutional amendments.

In December 2000, Vicente Fox was elected president, and this proved the most important de-escalating moment in the conflict after the 1994 ceasefire. Fox was the first non-PRI president in the post-revolutionary era of Mexico (he represented the National Action Party). He had prominently declared his commitment to making peace with the EZLN in his election campaign, and within the first months of his administration, he had closed several military bases near Zapatista communities, and reduced the size of the armed forces garrison in Chiapas.

The constitutional amendments diluted some important aspects of the Indigenous Rights and Culture Agreements

The constitutional amendments relating to the Indigenous Rights and Culture Agreements were also passed under Fox, in 2001. However, they diluted some important aspects of the agreement, and ignored others. The Mexican Constitution now guarantees Mexico's Indigenous peoples the right to "internal government," in parallel to the federal system. This is a much lesser form of autonomy than that guaranteed in the Indigenous Rights and Culture Agreements. Furthermore, the 2001 constitutional amendment does not make any references to specific welfare entitlements for Indigenous women and children, including education and vocational training, healthcare, and livelihoods support, which all feature in the Indigenous Rights and Culture Agreements. Despite women's success in influencing the negotiation agenda of the San Andrés dialogues and the resulting agreement, resistance to constitutional changes and a lack of implementation of other provisions undermined the gains made in the negotiations.

Ultimately, the lives of women in Chiapas have been more influenced by changes within the EZLN

The EZLN responded to the weak constitutional changes by abandoning attempts to achieve national political change and instead focusing on securing and maintaining its autonomy project in Chiapas, and it succeeded in carving out a partially autonomous zone in the state. An important aspect of the achievements of women in the Chiapas peace process, therefore, is the changes made to the EZLN's internal policies regarding women and gender.¹³ Ultimately, the lives of women in Chiapas have been more influenced by the changes to the EZLN's structure and policies than by the Indigenous Rights and Culture Agreements. These changes have impacted on women's lives in Zapatista communities and women members of the EZLN.

Nonetheless, Zapatista villages remain poor and pervasively patriarchal, and the situation of Indigenous people, and of women in particular, has not improved to the extent promised or imagined in the Zapatista discourse or in the civil society forums covered in this case study.¹⁴

Actors Involved in the Process

The San Andrés dialogues, consultations, and mass mobilizations involved a wide variety of actors

The San Andrés dialogues, consultations, and mass mobilizations involved a wide variety of Mexican and international civil society organizations, opposition political actors, the Catholic Church, as well as Indigenous communities and Indigenous civil society organizations.

The Government and the EZLN were the negotiating parties. They invited guests and advisors to assist in their deliberations. Bishop Samuel Ruiz Garcia of San Cristobal chaired the National Intermediation Commission (CONAI), which facilitated the dialogue. Bishop Ruiz played an important mediation role throughout the peace process, presiding over the first round of talks before the San Andrés dialogues and providing back-channel communications throughout.

Mexico's largest political parties also participated through the Commission for Concord and Pacification (COCOPA). This was a multiparty legislative commission created to oversee and facilitate negotiations, and to bring legislative proposals to Congress from the negotiation table.¹⁵ In 1996, COCOPA drafted an initial law based on the Indigenous Rights and Culture Agreements, but this was rejected by the President. A modified version was rejected by the EZLN in 1997.

Women Involved in the Process

The women involved came from a variety of backgrounds and affiliations: civil society, Indigenous community representatives, and political parties.

Women were strongly represented in a burgeoning civil society movement

Women were strongly represented in what was at the time a burgeoning civil society movement in Mexico. There were women in large mixed-gender civil society organizations, such as Civic Alliance (Alianza Civica). There were also a number of dedicated women's civil society organizations and forums. Indigenous populations became increasingly politically organized during the period of the peace process, and women from Indigenous organizations featured prominently among the civil society organizations included in the San Andrés dialogue process. Women also became involved directly from their Indigenous community, often due to their role in forums such as the State Women's Convention and ANIPA's National Encounter of Women.¹⁶ Some were from Zapatista-affiliated communities and some were not.

Broadly, Indigenous women involved in the process sought autonomy, resource sovereignty, and self-governance for Indigenous communities. They focused on mechanisms other than the peace process to improve the situation of women within

Women were confident that the increased autonomy and prosperity of the community would benefit themselves as much as men

the communities.¹⁷ Indigenous women understood that essentialist notions of culturally authentic governance could be used to oppress women; however, they had already seized the opportunity to dramatically improve their standing and opportunities in their communities before and during the Zapatista uprising. They were confident that they could continue to extend these gains and that the increased autonomy and prosperity of these communities would benefit women as much as men.

Nonetheless, women did manage to include specific rights and protections for women in the Indigenous Rights and Culture Agreements. Indigenous women focused on securing entitlements to various kinds of welfare, healthcare, and employment support from the federal government. This contrasted somewhat with the approach of non-Indigenous women, who were included as part of civil society organizations and political parties, who were more focused on securing political rights for women and their protection against discrimination.

Modalities of Women's Inclusion

Women participated in the San Andrés dialogues via several modalities.¹⁸ They participated directly in the negotiations, primarily on the EZLN side. In addition, the EZLN convened several consultations and engaged with a number of civil society-initiated dialogue forums, which effectively made these forums official consultations. Another important modality of inclusion was the expansion of the two parties' negotiation delegations with guests and advisors, drawn from civil society, whose role was to bring different perspectives to the negotiations. Women were also part of mass actions that featured prominently in the process.

1 | Consultations

Women were represented in all consultations, which were held throughout the San Andrés negotiations. The EZLN held consultations with Mexican civil society, international civil society, Indigenous *pueblos* (roughly translated as peoples), and the Zapatista base communities. Civil society also organized forums that fed into the negotiation process through the involvement of EZLN members. And members of civil society, political parties, and Indigenous communities participated in each other's forums. The consultations allowed the EZLN to understand the concerns of its constituents, as well as to position itself as a legitimate representative of Mexican civil society. The EZLN occasionally considered itself bound by the results of these consultations, e.g. when consultations with its base communities prompted the EZLN to withdraw from the round of talks before the San Andrés dialogues.¹⁹ The Government of Mexico does not appear to have held consultations.

Women came together to demand the end to violence against women, and their political and economic inclusion

Women from 25 civil society organizations were present at the National Democratic Convention in August 1994. The EZLN set up the Convention to coordinate the activities of Mexican civil society, design a transitional government, and write a new constitution, in the event of an insurrection (the insurrection did not happen).²⁰ It was a three-day workshop with 6,000 delegates and observers. Women came together and articulated demands including the end to violence against women, the end of

rape to intimidate the civilian population, the demilitarization of the state, the inclusion of women at all levels of politics, economic development programs for women, the equal status of women before the law, and access to reproductive health.²¹

A year later, on 27 August 1995, the EZLN held a national *consulta*, or plebiscite. The sixth question of the plebiscite asked whether women should be guaranteed equal representation in civil and political life. A vast majority—93.1%—of respondents agreed (the gender of respondents was not disaggregated). The outcome had an important role in shaping the EZLN's program with regard to women and gender.²²

In January 1996, the National Indigenous Forum was held in San Cristobal de las Casas, in parallel with the San Andrés talks. It yielded the basic position statements with which the EZLN returned to the negotiating table in February of the same year.²³ The Forum was supported by a high level of organization in Indigenous civil society: it was preceded by 15 Regional Indigenous Forums.

The first National Encounter of Indigenous Women gathered 700 women

The first National Encounter of Indigenous Women (Encuentro Nacional de Mujeres Indigenas) was held in August 1997 with the goal of influencing subsequent tables of negotiations, which were still anticipated. It gathered 700 women, from various Indigenous groups. It intended to analyze the San Andrés process and the substance of negotiations from a gender perspective, and coordinate further organization.²⁴ However, it had little opportunity to contribute substantive input, since the San Andrés negotiations did not resume.²⁵

In March 1999, two years after the San Andrés negotiations had ended, the EZLN organized another mass consultation with civil society throughout Mexico. Some 5,000 Zapatista delegates, traveling in pairs of one man and one woman, asked civil society's opinion about the stalled San Andrés process, Indigenous rights, and the militarization of Chiapas. The Coordinating Committees that received the delegates were primarily made up of women from civil society, which enabled greater participation of women in the consultations themselves.²⁶ The strong influence of women also contributed to the horizontal structure of the Coordinating Committees, which may have had a share in these committees becoming some of the most durable formats for Zapatista engagement with civil society (as they did not require continued Zapatista support to function). These committees were involved in follow-up to the *consulta*, including ongoing dialogues, as well as in organizing the International Women's Day marches in 2000.²⁷

2 | Mass Action

Civil society groups mobilized throughout the negotiation process. Protests calling for non-violence, dialogue, or women's rights took place in 1994, 1995, and 2000.

Around 5,000 women marched in San Cristobal on Women's Day 1995

Around 5,000 Zapatista women and civil society representatives marched in San Cristobal on Women's Day (8 March) 1995, and again in 2000. These marches were intended to raise awareness of the impacts of the conflict, especially on women; to demand an end to violence against women; and to change the EZLN's internal policies

towards women. The march in 2000 was organized by many of the women from civil society who had participated in the *consulta* of 1999.²⁸ The marches included Zapatista women, Indigenous and non-Indigenous citizens, and civil society supporters.²⁹

Women from civil society also played a prominent role in the Zapatista march to the seat of Congress in Mexico City in 2000, to petition for the full implementation of COCOPA's indigenous rights bill. Several women spoke to Congress, some of them leaders of civil society organizations formed by participants in the consultations described above.

Women's mass action was also used to a different end: it effectively protected Zapatista-affiliated communities and the negotiation site from military or paramilitary interference. During the San Andrés dialogues in 1995 and 1996, women belonging to Indigenous organizations formed human peace chains to protect the negotiation site.³⁰ Women also used non-violent obstruction strategies to protect communities in Chiapas that were affected by the violence.³¹ For example, in January 1998, women members of a pacifist Indigenous organization known as Las Abejas obstructed the entrance of soldiers into the displaced persons camp of Xoyep.³²

Women also used non-violent obstruction to protect communities

3 | Direct Representation

The San Andrés negotiations were broken into six sequential groups of agenda items (tables), and each table was further divided into a number of working groups. Bilateral dialogues between the EZLN and the Government of Mexico were interspersed with days devoted to the sequential, thematic working groups, in which negotiators from the two parties as well as large numbers of guests and advisors discussed the upcoming issues in the negotiations on a relatively horizontal basis. The guests and advisors of the negotiating parties included large numbers of participants from civil society, political parties, and Indigenous communities. They were present at the negotiations, but were also involved in the working groups taking place around the negotiations. Indigenous women and women from civil society organizations and political parties throughout Mexico were among the advisors and guests of the EZLN delegation. One woman, Magdalena Gomez, acted as an advisor for the Government of Mexico.³³

II. Analysis of Women's Influence: Enabling and Constraining Factors

Women had a significant influence on the agenda of the dialogues, and on the agreement

Women had a significant influence on the negotiation agenda of the San Andrés dialogues, as well as on the only signed agreement to emerge from these dialogues. In addition, one collection of agenda items was entirely devoted to the rights of women in Chiapas (unfortunately the negotiations broke down before this table could be discussed). Women were also influential in protecting the negotiation process, through their involvement in mass action and protest.

A set of process and context factors enabled and constrained the influence of women in the San Andrés dialogue process: strong leadership from women within the EZLN and support from the EZLN, as well as early advocacy from women's civil society organizations, all enabled women's influence. Women's civil society organizations were also well prepared, and staffed by women with long experience of civil society activism.

However, this high influence on the negotiations did not ultimately have a strong impact on the outcome because of the poor prospects of the negotiations overall, which were abandoned after reaching only one of a projected six agreements. Significant resistance from Mexican political elites to reforms sought by the EZLN meant that the women's agenda that was reflected in the negotiations and the Indigenous Rights and Culture Agreements was not fully expressed in the resulting constitutional changes of 2001.

Process Factors

1 | Strong Coalitions

The San Andrés dialogues were characterized by productive dialogue and cooperation among women from all sectors of Mexican civil society. Events held alongside the dialogues helped to build a coalition. One such example is the joint document issued by women in preparation for the National Democratic Convention, which led to the creation of the Chiapas Women's State Convention in September 1994 and a National Women's Convention in 1995.³⁴ Women's coalition-building in the mid-1990s gave rise to the establishment of women's organizations that have been active ever since, such as the National Coordinator of Indigenous Women (CONAMI).³⁵

Women built joint platforms, but there were disagreements on visions of feminism

Women built joint platforms, but remained heterogeneous, and there were disagreements on visions of feminism. The table on the Situation, Rights, and Culture of Indigenous Women proved one of most controversial and drawn-out in the dialogues. Advisors to the EZLN from the Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD) clashed with Indigenous women over the extent to which the EZLN should push for an orthodox Western feminist vision of women's rights, as opposed to the Indigenous women's own vision of how to ensure their rights and inclusion.³⁶ Similar disagreements had occurred in other consultative forums, and the large and horizontal nature of the forums meant that no clear consensus position on the subject was produced. The final agreement on Indigenous Rights and Culture expresses both perspectives, but with a tendency towards the Indigenous women's platform, reflecting a particular concern with issues of basic subsistence, access to services, and labor rights.³⁷

2 | Effective Transfer Strategies

Women's preferences were transferred to the San Andrés Dialogues through EZLN presence in, or organization of, civil society consultations. EZLN representatives

were able to form close working relationships with women in these forums. They also led to invitations for women to be guests and advisors during the negotiation.

Context Factors

1 | The High Level of Preparedness of Women

Indigenous women's groups' preparedness and organization allowed them to push early and effectively for their preferences

The preparedness and organization of Indigenous women's groups allowed them to push early and effectively to put their preferences on the EZLN's negotiation platform, as well as to include women in the talks.

Women participated in the first self-organization projects in Chiapas and were already well organized by 1994. Being well organized was significant: the most effective consultative forums, such as the National Indigenous Forum, were those that drew most on the capacities of civil society organizations.

The high level of organization was slightly offset by the dialogues' and consultations' use of Spanish. Indigenous women in Chiapas are less likely to attend school and less likely to be raised speaking Spanish than men.³⁸ On average, this limited the participation of non-Spanish-speaking Indigenous women in some forums.

2 | Supportive Attitude of EZLN

The EZLN, as part of its ideology of "leading by obeying" (*mandar obedeciendo*), considered itself for the most part bound by the decisions to emerge from its consultations, as well as its dialogues with its guests and advisors. The changes to the Zapatista program on gender in the early months and years of the peace negotiations can be attributed to this commitment. The overwhelming support in the EZLN's national plebiscite for women's guaranteed equal presentation in civil and political life also had an important role in shaping the EZLN's program with regard to women and gender.³⁹

In 1994, feminist observers argued that the Zapatista structure and governance was patriarchal

The organization was not, however, entirely guided by civil society, nor did all of its consultations result in concrete changes to the Zapatista program.⁴⁰ It had adopted the Revolutionary Law of Women in 1993,⁴¹ but it was not fully implemented and, after the first National Democratic Convention in 1994, feminist observers argued that the Zapatista organizational structure and form of governance was patriarchal.⁴² The EZLN took these criticisms seriously, and by the time the official negotiations with the Government began, the party was pushing for a progressive agenda on women's issues. This is illustrated by the theme Situation, Rights, and Culture of Indigenous Women featuring as part of the Indigenous Rights and Culture table, in which the EZLN noted the "triple oppression suffered as women, Indigenous, [and] poor."⁴³

3 | Elite Resistance

Many of Mexico's political elites were strongly opposed to the fundamental challenges presented by the political program of the EZLN. These included the demand for Indigenous sovereignty over the natural resources located in Indigenous land, and for Indigenous self-government and autonomy.

Some legislators argued that granting true autonomy to Indigenous communities would violate the rights of women

The elites instrumentalized the topic of women's rights to oppose reform. Some used the Zapatistas' focus on Indigenous women's rights to accuse the movement of being dominated by a group of non-Indigenous revolutionaries who had "tricked" the Indigenous population of Chiapas to follow them.⁴⁴ The Government used the same logic in their criticism that the demands for democratization in Mexico were managed from "above" or "outside," and were not developing organically from Indigenous mobilization.

Similarly, during the process of debating and amending the constitutional amendments proposed by President Fox in 2000, some legislators used gender inequality in Indigenous communities to argue that granting true autonomy to Indigenous communities would violate the rights of women; a position strongly opposed by Indigenous women present at these debates.⁴⁵ Resistance from party elites meant that the constitutional amendments were only passed after significant modifications.

III. Conclusion

The influence of women in the San Andrés negotiations was high due to early advocacy from women's groups, which was abetted by the high level of organization of these groups, as well as support from women within the negotiating delegations. Civil society actors—with women a strong influence among them—also enabled the talks to proceed by protesting for the Government to abandon its military campaign, and organizing non-violent protection for the dialogue site while peace talks were in session.

The central position of women's issues in the negotiation agenda and the overall inclusive negotiation format allowed women to contribute an important gender perspective to the Indigenous Rights and Culture Agreements.⁴⁶ The accords contain multiple references to the equal rights and status of men and women, and the requirement that the state implement welfare programs that address the needs of women and children. The rights accorded to Indigenous communities in these accords also require that they do not disadvantage women.

The progressive agenda on women's rights and Indigenous rights was substantially altered by the legislative process

This progressive agenda on women's rights, and Indigenous rights in general, was partially reflected in the constitutional amendments proposed by President Vicente Fox on 5 December 2000, but they were substantially altered by the legislative process.⁴⁷ The amendments significantly limit the provisions guaranteeing autonomy and rights to self-determination to Indigenous communities. The much-diminished

devolution of power in the constitutional reform limited the possibilities for a substantial transformation of the situation for Indigenous women.

Beyond the dialogues, the changes women achieved in the politics of the EZLN did help improve conditions for women in Zapatista-controlled areas of Chiapas, but these communities remain patriarchal, and gender equality is hampered by continued poverty.⁴⁸

One important legacy of the process, however, is that Indigenous women and women in civil society seized the opportunity provided by the San Andrés negotiations to build collaborative relationships and institutions.⁴⁹ Indigenous peoples held the first Pluralistic National Indigenous Assembly for Autonomy (ANIPA), which was still active as of 2017.⁵⁰ Other important forums include the Chiapas State Women's Convention, and the National Women's Convention. And the 1995 National Encounter of Women of the ANIPA led to the formation of the permanent National Coordinator of Indigenous Women.

References

- ¹ The Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography lists the poverty rate in Chiapas at 76 percent for 2014. The next highest in the country is Oaxaca at 67 percent. *Porcentaje de población en situación de pobreza* <http://www3.inegi.org.mx/> [accessed 23.08.2016]
- ² Christine Kovic and Christine Eber, "Introduction," in *Women of Chiapas: Making History in Times of Struggle and Hope*, eds Christine Kovic and Christine Eber (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), 1.
- ³ Mercedes Olivera, "Subordination and Rebellion: Indigenous Peasant Women in Chiapas Ten Years after the Zapatista Uprising," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 32, nos. 3–4 (2005): 165.
- ⁴ The PRI was formed in 1946, and was the successor to the National Revolutionary Party (formed in power in 1929) and the Mexican Revolution Party (1938). All parties have shared the same logo—a circle with the colours of the Mexican flag inside, below the three-letter acronym of the party.
- ⁵ The 2,500 figure is cited in Clifford Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 117; Karen Kampwirth, "Also a Women's Rebellion: the Rise of the Zapatista Army" in *Women and Guerrilla Movements: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas, Cuba* (Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 2002); Jan Rus, Shannan L. Mattiace, and Rosalva Aída Hernández Castillo, "Introduction," in *Mayan Lives, Mayan Utopias. The Indigenous Peoples of Chiapas and the Zapatista Rebellion*, eds Jan Rus, Shannan L. Mattiace, and Rosalva Aída Hernández Castillo (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 1; Stephen D. Collins, "Indigenous Rights and Internal Wars: The Chiapas Conflict at 15 Years," *The Social Science Journal* 47, no. 4 (2010), 779.
- ⁶ Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion*, 125.
- ⁷ Servicio Internacional para la Paz (SIPAZ), *Luchar Con Corazón De Mujer Situación Y Participación De Las Mujeres En Chiapas* (1995–2015), 2015, 54.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, 55.
- ⁹ Olivera, "Subordination and Rebellion", 619; SIPAZ, *Luchar Con Corazón De Mujer*, 54
- ¹⁰ The San Andrés dialogues were the inclusive component of peace negotiations between the EZLN and the Government of Mexico. The San Andrés dialogues begin with the first day of negotiations in San Andrés Sakamch'em de los Pobres and end with the EZLN's rejection of the Mexican Government's modified law to implement the San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture. Other important dates in the peace process include the Cathedral dialogues, the first negotiations between the EZLN and the Government of Mexico, from February to March 1994, and the 2001 passage of the modified constitutional amendment proposed by President Vicente Fox. This last event is taken as the end of this case study.
- ¹¹ Michael W. Foley, "Forcing the Political Agenda: The Zapatista Rebellion and the Limits of Ethnic Bargaining in Mexico," *International Negotiation* 2, no. 1 (1997): 132.
- ¹² These were: (1) Indigenous rights and culture, (2) democracy and justice, (3) wealth and development, (4) reconciliation in Chiapas, (5) the rights of women in Chiapas, and (6) the cessation of hostilities. Only tables 1 and 2 were ever discussed and an agreement was only reached for table 1.
- ¹³ The EZLN is the armed group that was responsible for the insurrection. The term Zapatista is also used to refer to members of Zapatista-affiliated communities, who are not necessarily members of the EZLN. Hence, civilian Zapatistas were included in the various modalities in the peace process alongside other members of civil society, and should be regarded as

either civil society or members of Indigenous communities (comparable to other members of Mexico's Indigenous communities who were included in the peace process).

¹⁴ Niels Barmeyer, *Developing Zapatista Autonomy: Conflict and NGO Involvement in Rebel Chiapas* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2009), 221.

¹⁵ Foley, "Forcing the Political Agenda," 134.

¹⁶ Rosalva Aída Hernández Castillo, "Between Hope and Adversity: The Struggle of Organized Women in Chiapas since the Zapatista Uprising," *Journal of Latin American Anthropology* 3, no. 1 (1997): 112.

¹⁷ See, for example, Maylei Blackwell, "The Practice of Autonomy in the Age of Neoliberalism: Strategies from Indigenous Women's Organising in Mexico," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 44, no. 4 (2012): 725–6.

¹⁸ Thania Paffenholz, "Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Beyond the Inclusion–Exclusion Dichotomy," *Negotiation Journal*, 2014: 69–91.

¹⁹ Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion*, 125.

²⁰ EZLN, "The Third Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle," news release, 1 January 1995. <http://palabra.ezln.org.mx/>

²¹ Lynn Stephen, "The Zapatista Army of National Liberation and the National Democratic Convention," *Latin American Perspectives* 22, no. 4 (1995): 96.

²² Chris Gilbreth, *Culture and the Struggle for Civil Society: Understanding the Zapatista National Liberation Army* (Simon Fraser University, 1997), 153; Maylei Blackwell, "Engendering the 'Right to Have Rights': The Indigenous Women's Movement in Mexico and the Practice of Autonomy," in *Women, Ethnicity, and Nationalisms in Latin America*, ed. Natividad Gutierrez (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), 211.

²³ Foley, "Forcing the Political Agenda," 139.

²⁴ Blackwell, "Engendering the 'Right to Have Rights'," 205.

²⁵ The *Encuentro* did lead to the formation of the National Coordinator of Indigenous Women, an important civil society forum that still exists today.

²⁶ Hilary Klein and Mariana Mora, "On the Front Lines: Women in Chiapas," *Off Our Backs* 30, no. 5 (2000).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Hilary Klein, *Compañeras: Zapatista Women's Stories* (New York: New York Seven Stories Press, 2015).

²⁹ Hilary Klein and Mariana Mora, "On the Front Lines: Women in Chiapas."

³⁰ Linda Lopez, "Advancing Human Rights Policy: Does Grassroots Mobilization and Community Dispute Resolution Matter? Insights from Chiapas, Mexico" *Review of Policy Research* 22, no. 1 (2005): 85.

³¹ Mariana Mora, "Decolonizing Politics: Zapatista Indigenous Autonomy in an Era of Neoliberal Governance and Low Intensity Warfare" PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2008, 45–46.

³² Lopez, "Advancing Human Rights Policy."

³³ Sarah Taylor, "A Better Peace? Including Women in Conflict Negotiations" PhD Diss., The New School, 2015, 26. Magdalena Gomez was a human rights activist with a civil society background, who in 1994 was serving as head of the National Indigenous Institute, a government body.

³⁴ Stephen, "The Zapatista Army of National Liberation and the National Democratic Convention," 96–97.

³⁵ The National Coordinator of Indigenous Women is a coordination network that unites Indigenous women's groups as well as women from Indigenous groups of both women and

men, including traditional groups, regional councils, and human rights and political groups. Maylei Blackwell, "(Re)Ordenando El Discurso De La Nación: Mujeres Indígenas En México," in *Mujeres Y Nacionalismos En América Latina: De La Independencia a La Nación Del Nuevo Milenio* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2004), 216–224.

³⁶ Taylor, "A Better Peace?" 251–52.

³⁷ Actions and Measures for Chiapas Joint Commitments and Proposals from the State and Federal Governments, and the EZLN, 16 February 1996.

³⁸ Karen Kampwirth, "Also a Women's Rebellion: the Rise of the Zapatista Army" in *Women and Guerrilla Movements*.

³⁹ Chris Gilbreth, *Culture and the Struggle for Civil Society: Understanding the Zapatista National Liberation Army* (Simon Fraser University, 1997), 153. Blackwell, "Engendering the 'Right to Have Rights'," 205.

⁴⁰ Neil Harvey, *The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 205.

⁴¹ The Women's Revolutionary Law, published 1 January 1994, includes such provisions as: "Women, without import to their race, creed, color or political affiliation, have the right to participate in the revolutionary struggle." "Women have the right to work and to receive a fair salary." "Women can occupy positions of leadership in the organization and have military ranks in the revolutionary armed forces."

⁴² Harvey, *The Chiapas Rebellion*, 97–98.

⁴³ Agreement Regarding the Joint Proposals between the Federal Government and the EZLN, 16 February 1996. (Agreement Regarding the Documents: "Joint Declaration that the Federal Government and the EZLN shall submit to National Debating and Decision-Making Bodies"; "Joint Proposals that the Federal Government and the EZLN agree to submit to National Debating and Decision-Making Bodies, in respect of Point 1.4 of the Rules of Procedure"; and "Commitment for Chiapas made by the State and Federal Governments and the EZLN, in respect of Point 1.3 of the Rules of Procedure").

⁴⁴ Guiomar Rovira, *Women of Maize: Indigenous Women and the Zapatista Rebellion* (Latin American Bureau, 2000), 100.

⁴⁵ Maylei Blackwell, "The Practice of Autonomy in the Age of Neoliberalism: Strategies from Indigenous Women's Organising in Mexico," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 44, no. 4 (2012): 729.

⁴⁶ Blackwell, "Engendering the 'Right to have Rights'," 204.

⁴⁷ Constitutional amendments in Mexico must pass both houses of Congress at the federal level, the chamber of deputies and the senate, and then be approved by a majority of the state legislatures.

⁴⁸ For example, the Good Government Councils established by the Zapatistas as municipal governing bodies have been criticized for a lack of women representatives. John Ross, "Celebrating the Caracoles: Step by Step, the Zapatistas Advance on the Horizon," *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* 29, no. 1 (2005): 42.

⁴⁹ Blackwell, "The Practice of Autonomy in the Age of Neoliberalism."

⁵⁰ Francisco López Bárcenas, "Los Movimientos Indígenas En México: Rostros Y Caminos," *El Cotidiano*, 2016, 66.

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Women in Peace and Transition Processes

Case studies in this series are based on findings of the “Broadening Participation in Political Negotiations and Implementation” research project (2011–2017), a multi-year comparative research project led by Dr. Thania Paffenholz at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. The Broadening Participation project examined how and under which conditions various actors participated in and influenced peace and political transition processes. The project’s dataset comprises 40 mainly qualitative case studies of negotiation and implementation processes, covering 34 countries, and ranging from 1989 to 2014. These cases are categorized according to a range of groups of included actors and a framework of seven inclusion modalities developed by Thania Paffenholz. Among the case studies under review for this project, 28 included measurable involvement of women. In this context, women were defined as relatively organized groups, including delegations of women, women’s civil society organizations, coalitions or networks, which sought inclusion in peace negotiations and the implementation of agreements. The project did not investigate the role of women as mediators. For more information, see: www.inclusivepeace.org.

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The Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative (IPTI) is dedicated to evidence-based research and its transfer to policy and practice. The objective of the initiative is to support sustainable peace by providing expertise and information on the inclusion of diverse actors in peace and transition processes. This expertise is drawn from a collection of research projects that have been conducted for nearly a decade at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva under the lead of Dr. Thania Paffenholz.

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