Report

Civil Society’s Role in Monitoring and Verifying Peace Agreements: Seven Lessons from International Experiences

January 2017

Nick Ross
This report is based on research of the “Civil Society and Peacbuilding” project (2006-2010), and the “Broadening Participation in Political Negotiations and Implementation” project (2011-ongoing), both under the lead of Dr Thania Paffenholz at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva.

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**Acronyms**

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVANCSO</td>
<td>Association for the Advance of the Social Sciences of Guatemala (Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales de Guatemala)</td>
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<td>ASIES</td>
<td>Association of Investigation and Social Studies (Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales)</td>
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<td>COHA</td>
<td>Cessation of Hostilities Agreement</td>
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<td>COPAZ</td>
<td>National Commission for the Consolidation of the Peace (Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz)</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Civil society</td>
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<td>FLACSO</td>
<td>Latina American Faculty of Social Sciences (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales)</td>
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<td>GAM</td>
<td>Free Aceh Movement (Gerakin Aceh Merdeka)</td>
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<td>HDC</td>
<td>The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue</td>
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<td>IFP</td>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party</td>
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<td>IMT</td>
<td>International Monitoring Team</td>
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<td>IPMT</td>
<td>International Peace Monitoring Team</td>
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<td>JCHA</td>
<td>Joint Committee on Humanitarian Action</td>
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<td>JCSM</td>
<td>Joint Committee on Security Modalities</td>
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<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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Executive Summary

Effective monitoring and verification increases the durability of peace agreements by addressing commitment problems inherent in peace processes. It is a feature of most ceasefire agreements and thematic peace agreements. Monitoring refers to the technical process of collecting information on the basis of which a verification judgment is to be made. Verification is the process of using monitoring information to evaluate compliance with an agreement.

The inclusion of civil society in monitoring and verification has so far been limited. With some notable exceptions, the full capacities of civil society organizations have not been embraced by policy makers or negotiation parties. However, the examples of civil society inclusion in monitoring and verification identified in this report show that civil society has much to offer, particularly in the monitoring of intra-state peace agreements. Civil society monitors may offer local knowledge, access to communities, as well as a capacity and expertise in monitoring. Civil society may also contribute to the legitimacy of monitoring and verification through a credibility stemming from their status as non-partisan or bipartisan.

Based on experiences from different peace processes, this report’s aim is threefold. First, it provides an introduction to the purpose of monitoring and verification of peace agreements. Second, it presents the different modalities of how civil society has participated in the monitoring and verification of peace agreements: (1) Official monitoring bodies required to consult with civil society; (2) Civil society organizations or groups of organizations conducting independent monitoring and verification; (3) Inclusive commissions with civil society representatives; (4) Civil society participation in international monitoring mission, drawing upon examples. Third, it analyses opportunities and challenges, and presents seven lessons for the effective contribution of Civil Society (CS) to monitoring and verification of peace agreements:

1 | CS participation in monitoring and verification is more effective when provided with political, technical and financial support
2 | Partisan political influence undermines the legitimacy of CS and increases the risks faced by CS Actors
3 | Non-specific provisions for CS inclusion in monitoring are unlikely to be implemented
4 | The inclusion of CS in monitoring and verification is most effective when it reflects the capacities and context of CS organizations
5 | Integrated monitoring is more effective than monitoring which is fragmented across many organizations
6 | CS organizations are more effective when they combine monitoring and mediation activities
7 | CS organizations engaged in monitoring and verification struggle to influence compliance without international or national support
Monitoring and Verification of Peace Agreements

The term monitoring refers to the technical process of collecting information on the basis of which a verification judgment is to be made.\(^1\) Monitoring may be conducted remotely or on the ground. The monitoring data may derive from the parties to an agreement, a specialized observer team located on the ground, reporting by citizens, as well as technological surveillance (aerial surveys or emplaced sensors). Monitoring allows all parties to evaluate the progress of agreed implementation plans and helps identify opportunities and difficulties in implementing a peace agreement. It thus creates the preconditions for finding solutions.

Verification is the process of using monitoring information to evaluate compliance of relevant parties with an agreement.\(^2\) It thus aims at the detection of violations to agreements, as well as the deterrence of potential violations, raising the expected costs of non-compliance by increasing the risk of exposure and possible sanction. Verification also provides compliant parties with the opportunity to credibly demonstrate their compliance.\(^3\)

Verification is meant to be an impartial process. However, in reality, verification judgments are made in political contexts, and with reference to the likely consequences of a decision.

In most cases, the ceasefire is an essential component of a peace agreement subject to monitoring and verification. This is partly because ceasefires lend themselves readily to monitoring.\(^4\)

Moreover, monitoring and verification duties often encompass other security-related aspects of peace agreements, including withdrawal of forces, demilitarized zones, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, cantonment, and arms embargoes.\(^5\)

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4 Incidents of armed violence are relatively straightforward to document and verify, as compared to long term commitments to achieve political reforms.
Any other aspect or provision of a peace agreement that is adequately specified in the agreement (or through subsequent negotiations) can be monitored and verified. Adequate specification of a provision requires the development of timelines and benchmarks or standards against which compliance can be evaluated. Provisions can be specified as part of the negotiation of a ceasefire or thematic agreement, or in the implementation stage. Other kinds of provisions that are commonly monitored and verified include (free and fair) elections, human rights, governance, and truth, justice and reconciliation.⁶

Studies of the implementation of peace agreements have been equivocal on the importance of monitoring and verification. In an analysis of UN peacekeeping mission composition and peace duration following civil wars in Africa, 1989–2010, Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon found that the number of unarmed observers was not significantly correlated with peace duration. In contrast, the relationship between armed peacekeepers and peace duration was both positive and statistically significant.⁷ In contrast, Page-Fortner, analysing a dataset of 48 cease-fires, argues that “the presence of monitors appears to lengthen the duration of the peace. However, the presence of armed peacekeepers does not have a statistically significant effect.”⁸ A second study of 115 cases of civil wars that began after 1944, and ended before 1997, supports this conclusion, finding that “observer missions appear to have the largest effect on the durability of peace agreements.”⁹ It is important to note that these three studies study different kinds of interventions, in different regions, and in different time periods; hence, the results are not necessarily contradictory.

Effective monitoring and verification increases the durability of peace agreements by addressing commitment problems inherent in peace processes. Peace agreements are usually made up of a series of reciprocal commitments which require one or all parties to disarm, demobilize, demine etc. in exchange for either reciprocal disarmament or political reforms. In particular, the common template in internal armed conflicts is the disarmament and demobilization of an armed group in exchange for political reforms undertaken by the Government. The problem with such an arrangement is that if one party unilaterally disarms, it places itself in a vulnerable position to attack by the other party which has not disarmed to the same degree.

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⁶ ibid.
In the case of internal armed conflicts, armed groups which disarm at the beginning of an implementation process may find they have little bargaining power if the state reneges on some or all of the commitments made in the peace agreement. This is referred to as a commitment problem.

Monitoring and verification can go some of the way to solving commitment problems by providing the parties with credible and reliable information about each other’s behavior, including the extent of disarmament and compliance with other provisions in the peace agreement. Monitoring and verification is rarely sufficient. If retaliation is the only method of sanction when one party is found to be in violation of the agreement, a cycle of reciprocal retaliation can quickly derail a peace agreement. Structures to support monitoring and verification include dispute resolution mechanisms and the provision of security guarantees by third parties.

Mechanisms for Monitoring and Verification

In order to ensure a structured process of implementing a peace agreement, the negotiating parties usually set up clear plans, timelines and mechanisms for implementation. While the parties are the ultimate guarantors of implementation, civil society (CS) and international third parties can play key roles in supporting implementation. Parties need to be mindful to establish implementation mechanisms that are manageable and effective, as a cumbersome mechanism may provide an excuse for delaying the realization of certain provisions in the agreement. While some provisions may be implemented by existing governmental entities, the parties may also establish new political and/or technical entities for tasks mandated in the agreement. At the political level, joint commissions or implementation councils – possibly with the inclusion of an impartial chairperson and other third-party or CS representatives – establish a space for parties to continue to work together and provide them with assurances that they have a say over implementation.

Implementation bodies are usually complemented by monitoring and verification mechanisms to reduce uncertainty in the implementation process. Effective monitoring helps demonstrate compliance with the agreements and thereby may build public support for the process. In the absence of effective monitoring and verification, disputes over the parties’ compliance may jeopardize implementation and ceasefires may rapidly unravel. The impartiality of the mechanism is essential, so that neither party can suspect bias in the review of performance. The work of verification mechanisms is made easier when information is more readily available, for example, when implementation bodies are mandated to report to the verification mechanisms, when the parties provide access, and when they allow monitors to work independently and impartially.
Monitoring and verification mechanisms vary in scope and in composition. The mechanisms may monitor and verify some or all aspects of the agreement’s implementation. The general trend has been toward more integrated mechanisms with a broader array of functions, including monitoring of: the cessation of hostilities, weapons stockpiles and decommissioning, prisoner releases, rights for political participation and elections, as well as providing recommendations, support and good offices. While these mechanisms may include representatives of the parties, experience has shown the usefulness of also including third-party actors – both national and international – to guarantee impartiality.

National implementation strategies frequently include special commissions charged with monitoring and verifying progress in implementation. These committees are generally bipartisan, rather than nonpartisan, including representatives of all sides in a conflict. The challenge for such institutions is often that they lack recourse to sanction or force to implement their judgments, or to encourage compliance with the agreement.

Ceasefire mechanisms, in particular, often have joint representation from the parties as well as an impartial outsider. The mechanisms require the necessary technical expertise and the capacity to deploy monitors nationwide. Unarmed monitors have proven effective when parties have reached a political settlement and are committed to its implementation. The inclusion of civil society in monitoring promotes ownership, and makes use of local knowledge and resources.

Disputes over responsibilities naturally arise during the implementation phase. The viability of a peace process depends on the ability of the parties and other stakeholders to deal with disputes that may relate to issues deliberately avoided in the peace talks, delayed implementation, disagreements over interpretation of the agreement, new issues that arise, the eruption of localized conflicts, and crises generated by rising popular expectations. A clear dispute-settlement mechanism can create a space for resolving disagreements and for reviewing and interpreting unclear aspects of the agreement. In a first instance, joint implementation bodies may address disputes and make adjustments in the implementation. If the parties are unable to solve the dispute bilaterally, they may want to make use of third-party facilitation or delegate the settlement to another entity, such as a national court, an arbitration commission or an impartial body with decision-making authorities. Such procedures should be established before the first dispute arises. Parties may also commit not to resort to the media to air concerns over implementation.

Civil Society and Peace Agreement Monitoring

More recently, peace agreements have increasingly included a role for CS in the monitoring and verification of both ceasefires and thematic agreements. CS monitors may offer local knowledge, access to communities, as well as a capacity and expertise in monitoring.\(^{11}\) CS may also contribute to monitoring and verification through a credibility stemming from their status as non-partisan or bipartisan.\(^{12}\) There is also a principled argument for the inclusion of CS representatives in monitoring and verification: the civilian population is often the most affected by armed conflict, and consequently has a strong interest in sustained peace, and a claim to be involved in ensuring sustainable peace.

The main CS actors involved in monitoring are local and national level dedicated human rights and civil rights organizations and research institutions with close connections to local communities. International non-governmental organizations may also be involved in monitoring. These organizations have generally acquired experience in collecting information on human rights violations and political developments,\(^{13}\) as well as conflict-specific and other issues, such as landmines, land access, elections, and discrimination, prior to or during the armed conflict.\(^{14}\) During the period of armed conflict, data and analysis gathered through civil society organizations is mostly used for advocacy. In a post-agreement phase, civil society’s capacity developed during the conflict can be used to contribute to effective monitoring and verification with the purpose of ensuring implementation of a peace agreement.

Modalities of Civil Society Inclusion in Peace Agreement Monitoring and Verification

CS has taken part in the monitoring and verification of peace agreements in a number of ways. A preliminary review of evidence of CS’s role in monitoring and verification of peace agreements has revealed the following formats of civil society engagement:

1. A requirement for official monitoring bodies to consult with CS;
2. Monitoring and verification conducted by individual CS organizations or groups of CS organizations;
3. The representation of CS in inclusive commissions; and
4. CS participation in international monitoring missions.

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These different formats can be combined. CS’s role in monitoring and verification can be official (provided for in the peace agreement or subsequent legislation) and unofficial. Unofficial monitoring is usually combined with advocacy, which can be non-public (communicating with the political apparatus in private) or public, through the promotion of social and political issues on the public agenda.\textsuperscript{15} The idea of verification generally implies some degree of power to determine truth or falsity; hence, unofficial monitoring is perhaps best conceived as “monitoring and advocacy”, rather than “monitoring and verification”. Unofficial monitoring and verification is not necessarily a less effective format. The following text examines each of the modalities in more detail and provides examples.

1. Official Monitoring Bodies Required to Consult with Civil Society

A commission monitoring the implementation of a peace agreement may be mandated to consult with or seek input from CS generally or from specific CS organizations. There can be formal or informal channels of consultation.


In Liberia, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2003 mandated the creation of an Independent National Commission on Human Rights. This Commission was instructed in the agreement to collaborate with Liberian human rights and CS organizations, international human rights organisations and other relevant U.N. agencies to monitor and strengthen the observance of human rights in the country (Art. XII.3). This collaboration was slow to emerge, as the Independent Commission was only established in 2010. The selection process for Commission members did not include CS consultation.\textsuperscript{16}


In South Africa, the agreement between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to end the warfare between the two organizations established a joint committee to implement the agreement and to develop practical steps to end violence. This committee was mandated to “consult with local leadership and grassroots structures.”\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{17} “African National Congress/Inkatha Freedom Party Agreement,” University of Ulster, http://www.peaceagreements.ulster.ac.uk/cgi-bin/Agreements/agree.pl?full=226%22.
Kosovo, 1999, Rambouillet Accord

The Rambouillet Interim Agreement, proposed by the international Contact Group (made up of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Russia), yet never adopted by the parties, included a provision for the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate human rights violations.\footnote{“Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (Rambouillet Accords),” (United Nations Peacemaker, 1999), 55.} The terms of the agreement provided that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), among others, could present allegations of human rights violations to the Ombudsman.\footnote{Thania Paffenholz (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010), 68-69.}

2. Civil Society Organizations or Groups of Organizations Conducting Independent Monitoring and Verification

This is by far the most common mode of CS participation in monitoring and verification. It is often unofficial, as a monitoring role for civil society is an inherent element in a democracy. These organizations or groups of organizations may perform monitoring alongside other roles and functions, or may be dedicated exclusively to monitoring. Peace agreements can also specify a monitoring role for CS organizations. This is distinct from an inclusive commission in that there are no representatives of the conflict parties or government. These arrangements are commonly CS-owned initiatives with a formal mandate by the parties to a peace agreement.

Guatemala, 1996, Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace

Guatemala’s think tanks, among them Association of Investigation and Social Studies (Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales: ASIES), the Association for the Advance of the Social Sciences of Guatemala (Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales de Guatemala: AVANCSO), and the Latina American Faculty of Social Sciences (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales: FLACSO), played an important role in the monitoring of the Guatemalan peace agreement.\footnote{Bell and O’Rourke, “The People’s Peace? Peace Agreements, Civil Society, and Participatory Democracy,” 299.} These organizations have produced rigorous studies and analyses of issues related to the implementation of the peace agreement.

The Philippines, 2001, Bantay Ceasefire

One of the most prominent examples of civil society monitoring is the Bantay Ceasefire in Mindanao, Philippines. After the Second Tripoli Agreement in 2001, a broad-based coalition of NGOs and other CS organizations created a grassroots mechanism, known as the Bantay Ceasefire, for monitoring and reporting ceasefire violations, separate from the implementation structure of the agreement. The Bantay Ceasefire’s approach has developed from ceasefire monitoring to an assessment of broader social and economic development needs, documentation of local peacekeeping efforts, and reporting and investigating alleged human rights violations. The Bantay Ceasefire has received support from all sides of the conflict to enter territory and conduct monitoring. Moreover, it has been recognized and commended for its impartiality by the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities, which includes representatives of the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Sierra Leone, 1996, Abidjan Accord

In Sierra Leone, the 1996 Abidjan Accord mandated the encouragement of a consortium of local human rights groups to assist in monitoring human rights observance (Art. 20). How exactly this consortium was meant to be encouraged remains unclear as the Abidjan Accord was never implemented and the parties soon returned to large scale armed violence.

Kenya, 2008, Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation agreements

Disputes over the results of the 2007 Kenyan general elections provoked devastating political violence which claimed more than 1000 lives and caused the displacement of tens of thousands more. When the four peace agreements were signed in spring 2008, Kofi Annan, the African Union’s mediator, invited the private Kenyan think tank “South Consulting” to provide monitoring data for assessing the status of compliance in the implementation of the agreement. South Consulting produced regular monitoring reports. In parallel, South Consulting, as well as another private research institution, Ipsos Kenya, engaged in regular public opinion polls to assess popular perceptions of the implementation of the different agenda points. The results of this monitoring were published and presented in the media.

22 Ibid.
3. Inclusive Commission with Civil Society Representatives

Inclusive commissions are specially constituted bodies mandated to assist with some part of the peace process whose representatives are not limited to members of the government and/or conflict parties. Therefore, civil society representatives can play an equal role to that of the negotiating parties. Inclusive commissions can be responsible for preparing or running a peace process. Post-agreement inclusive commissions can be charged with monitoring or implementing part or all of the agreement. The implementation of an agreement may also require the creation of inclusive permanent constitutional bodies. Such commissions can have post-agreement monitoring and verification as part of their mandate. They can exist at the national and at the local level.\footnote{Andries Odendaal, “The Political Legitimacy of National Peace Committees,” ibid. 7 (2012): 42.} In many cases, the primary role of these commissions is mediation, with monitoring featuring as a component of this role.

\textit{Aceh, 2001, Humanitarian Pause}

As part of the Humanitarian Pause in Aceh (Indonesia), the Joint Committees on Humanitarian Action (JCHA) and Security Modalities (JCSM) were commissioned to facilitate the distribution of aid and to monitor the ceasefire. The Joint Committee on Security Modalities was tasked with developing the ground rules for the ceasefire. The Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC, since renamed The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue) was designated a facilitation role. The Joint Committee on Humanitarian Action was composed of Acehnese civil society representatives nominated by the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), and was tasked with coordinating humanitarian relief and reconstruction. Monitoring structures were set up for both committees to ensure implementation, and Acehnese CS actors were invited to participate in these bodies. In fact, Acehnese NGOs played key roles in providing access for the Joint Committee on Humanitarian Action to the field, and in monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire for the Joint Committee on Security Modalities through a broad network of human rights monitoring NGOs. However, neither the GAM nor the Government of Indonesia invested much trust in the Humanitarian Pause, with the GAM using the opportunity to recruit and rearm, and the Government of Indonesia continuing its military blockade. In addition, one member of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue monitoring team was assassinated.\footnote{Konrad Huber, “The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of Ngo Mediation and Implementation,” in Policy Studies (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2004): 34.} The Humanitarian Pause broke down in April 2001, and the committees and monitoring bodies were shelved.
El Salvador, 1992, Chapultepec Accords

The National Commission for the Consolidation of the Peace (Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz: COPAZ) was a mechanism for the monitoring and verification of the implementation process of the negotiations. It was designed as a guarantee to the FMLN that the implementation of the Chapultepec Accords would receive multi-partisan support. COPAZ included two representatives from the Government and the FMLN and one representative of each of the parties or coalitions represented in the Legislative Assembly. The parties were supposed to consult with COPAZ before adopting decisions or measures relating to relevant aspects of the peace agreements. Moreover, COPAZ was given the power to consult the conflict parties at the highest level, whenever necessary.

It was intended for COPAZ to have access to inspect any activity or site connected with the implementation of the peace agreements. Moreover, COPAZ had the power to issue conclusions and recommendations relating to the implementation of the peace agreements, and make them public. It was also given the power to prepare the preliminary legislative drafts necessary for the development of the agreements both on the subject of the armed forces and on the other items on the agenda, as well as the implementation of these provisions. COPAZ was also responsible for overseeing the reparations and social security claims of former combatants. In this activity, COPAZ was authorized to address the relevant organs of the United Nations through the Secretary-General. In practice, COPAZ was riven by internal disputes, with half of the parties consistently siding with the government and half siding with the FMLN.

Solomon Islands, 2000, Townsville Peace Agreement

The Townsville Peace Agreement called for “face-to-face dialogue at community, village, family, individual and organizational levels”. To facilitate this process, the Agreement established two bodies, the Australian-backed International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT), which consisted mainly of civilians from Australia and New Zealand, and the Peace Monitoring Council, consisting of eminent representatives of various elements of CS in the Solomon Islands.

The main task of the Peace Monitoring Council was to promote compliance with the Townsville Peace Agreement, particularly with the disarmament provisions. Peace Monitoring Council members were frequently requested by conflict-affected communities to engage in mediating disputes related to the conflict. This mediation role eventually became an essential part of the PMC’s activities.


27 The PMC was eventually transformed into the National Peace Council (NPC). This reflected an awareness that the organization needed to be more independent from the government of the Solomon Islands. The NPC was externally funded to ensure greater neutrality and independence. Ibid.
4. Civil Society Participation in International Monitoring Mission

A final form of CS engagement in monitoring is participation in an international monitoring mission. This can involve local or international CS or both. While many international monitoring missions, such as those in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, have large civilian components, these are generally civilians included under the umbrella of an international organization or the government of one of the states supplying the mission.

**Aceh, 2002 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA)**

The GAM and the Government of Indonesia agreed to create a Joint Security Committee (JSC) to oversee implementation of the agreement, which would be staffed by monitors from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Free Aceh Movement and the Government of Indonesia. The international community, especially the U.S., the EU, and Norway provided significant financial support to the establishment of the mechanism. However, despite a temporary, rapid decline in violence and return to normality in most places of Aceh, the COHA quickly began to unravel. This was partly due to the same forces that left the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in charge of the Joint Security Committee: namely, Indonesia’s opposition to a role for international organizations, as well as the unwillingness of regional states to take responsibility for implementing the process.²⁸

**The Philippines, 2009, Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team (IMT)**

Based on the experience of Bantay Ceasefire (see above), the Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) bolstered their ongoing peace mechanism with a Civilian Protection Component. This peace mechanism consists of three pillars. First, there is a Joint Coordination Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities, established in 2003, where representatives of the Philippines Armed Forces and the MILF coordinate all aspects of the ceasefire. Second, an International Monitoring Team (IMT), established in 2002, provides impartial third-party monitoring with unarmed international monitors. Headed by Malaysia, the IMT includes the Civilian Protection Component, consisting of local and international civil society organizations, to prevent acts of violence and abuses of human rights directed against individuals and communities. With their knowledge of the local context and terrain, civil society monitors play an essential role in preventing occurrence and escalation of incidents.

²⁸ Huber, “The Hdc in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of Ngo Mediation and Implementation.”
By continuously monitoring the situation on the ground, the IMT can act quickly and it also has the necessary communication channels to address an incident with the parties and support a stable environment for the peace process. Third, the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group provides for informal cooperation between the armed forces and the MILF to investigate and restrain activities by criminal groups, break away units and other armed elements within or near MILF areas. This comprehensive mechanism has played a major, reinforcing role in confidence-building and preserving the ceasefire.

Conclusion: Seven Lessons for Effective Contribution of Civil Society to Monitoring and Verification

The experience of CS inclusion in monitoring and verification has so far been limited. With some notable exceptions, the full capacities of CS organizations have not been embraced by policy makers or negotiation parties. However, the limited experiences show that CS has much to offer, particularly in the monitoring of intra-state peace agreements. This brief study has suggested a number of obstacles and opportunities for effective CS monitoring and verification.

1 | CS participation in monitoring and verification is more effective when provided with the right kinds of support

Political, technical and financial support all assist CS organizations to engage in monitoring and verification, and in associated functions such as mediation, dispute resolution, and protection. CS representatives may also be vulnerable to targeting by actors hostile to the peace process.

2 | Partisan political influence undermines the legitimacy of CS and increases the risks faced by CS actors

Monitoring and verification is recognised by conflict parties as an important and consequential task. Hence, parties (or hardliners within the parties) frequently try to undermine or co-opt monitoring and verification bodies. This risk is relevant for both official and unofficial CS monitoring roles, and may even be greater for official roles. A diverse and well organized alliance of civil society can better resist political pressures. Independent funding and support by the international community can also ensure greater independence.29

3 | Non-specific provisions for CS inclusion in monitoring are unlikely to be implemented

When a role for CS in monitoring was spelled out in the peace agreement or accompanying document in vague or general language CS inclusion was either not implemented or it was implemented in an ineffective way. In contrast, where the agreement (or follow up or accompanying documents) specify in which bodies and how CS will be included in monitoring (for example, reserved seats for CS in monitoring bodies) this inclusion is more likely to occur and be effective.

4 | The inclusion of CS in monitoring and verification is most effective when it reflects the capacities and context of CS organizations

The inclusion of CS organizations in monitoring is most effective when it is commensurate with the capacities of these organizations, particularly where this has been demonstrated through prior engagement with the peace process (e.g. during the conflict or negotiation phases). Many of the most successful examples of CS monitoring and verification were cases in which the CS organizations and individuals concerned had prior experience with monitoring and verification. In contrast, inexperienced CS organizations are more vulnerable to manipulation by the conflict parties, which polarises their involvement and also exposes CS members to the risk of violence or harm. In addition, whether CS in a country is partisan, bipartisan or non-partisan can affect which form of inclusion is most appropriate. In contexts of CS polarization, for example, CS positions in a monitoring and verification body may need to be divided to reflect the diversity of civil society.

5 | Integrated monitoring is more effective than monitoring which is fragmented across many organizations

Despite the difficulties in forming CS partnerships around monitoring and verification, there is evidence that such bodies are more effective than when monitoring is fragmented across a diverse range of individual CS organizations. When there is no coordinated effort among CS organizations to monitor the implementation of the agreement, pro-status quo forces in the country can more easily divide and diminish the influence of CS organizations. A broad organizational base is key to effective monitoring and verification by civil society, as it provides for more legitimacy and capacity.

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31 Kurtenbach, “Guatemala: A Dependent and Fragmented Civil Society;” 91.
6 | Integration of monitoring and mediation mandate may be more effective

There is some evidence to suggest that a combination of monitoring, verification and mediation is an effective strategy, especially at the local level. For example, a great deal may be achieved by providing respected mediators at the community level. In contrast, monitoring mechanisms relying on advocacy or enforcement have in many cases struggled to gain the buy-in of the conflict parties.

7 | CS organizations engaged in monitoring and verification struggle to influence compliance without support

Monitoring and verification requires some mechanism to influence compliance by the parties with an agreement. Guarantees by third parties (security guarantees, sanctions, the withdrawal of aid and development assistance etc.) may be required to enforce compliance, especially on security or other sensitive issues. Civil society can influence a party’s behaviour. However, it generally has limited capacity to enforce compliance without external support.
References

